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Abstract 
When we apply safety analysis techniques on a new design, our primary objective is to 
anticipate potential scenarios of failure in the system under examination. If we assume 
that the system has a complex hierarchical structure, this task can be interpreted as one of 
identifying how failures originate at the low-levels of the design and how combinations 
or sequences of such low-level failures propagate to higher levels and give rise to system 
malfunctions. The ultimate aim is to identify weak areas of the design and stimulate 
design iterations that improve the safety of the system under examination. Unfortunately, 
the current industrial practise shows that this aim is seriously hindered by the lack of 
appropriate techniques for the analysis of complex hierarchical designs. 
Classical safety analysis techniques, such as Functional Failure Analysis, Hazard 
and Operability Studies, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis, are 
performed at different stages of the design lifecycle on the basis of models that reflect 
different levels of abstraction in the design. The selective and fragmented application of 
different methods, however, has a number of negative implications for the quality of the 
results gained from the assessment. Firstly, the results of the various safety studies are 
often inconsistent. Secondly, as hardware safety analysis and software hazard analysis 
typically form two separate parts of the assessment, the relationship between hardware 
and software failure often remains vague and unresolved. Finally there is an inherent 
difficulty in relating the results from low-level safety studies back to the high-level 
functional failure analysis. 
In the first part of this thesis we pro . pose a new method for safety analysis that 
enables integrated safety assessment of complex hierarchical designs. It helps analysts to 
identify potential functional failures at the application level and then to systematically 
determine the causes of those failures in progressively lower levels of the design 
decomposition. The result of the assessment is a collection of safety analyses that 
provides a consistent and meaningful picture of how low-failures are stopped at 
intermediate levels of the design, or propagate and give rise to hazardous malfunctions. 
In the second part of this thesis we show how features of the new method support 
also effective common cause failure analysis. That is both the qualitative identification of 
components vulnerable to common cause failures and the quantitative estimation of the 
contribution of these events to critical failures of the system. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
The success of many modern applications is highly dependent on the correct functioning 
of complex computer based systems. In some cases, failures in these systems may bring 
serious consequences in terms of loss of human life [Hecht and Hecht, 1986]. Systems in 
which failure could endanger human life are termed safety-critical. The application of 
these systems ranges from transport (aircraft, driverless and high speed trains, active 
safety in cars) through power production plant (nuclear power plants), medicine (life- 
support, patient monitoring, pacemaker) to industrial processes (chemical and petro - 
chemical industries). Significant effort is required to assess and certify these systems 
since software is extensively used. Software behaves different from hardware upon 
which safety critical systems of the past were based. Hence computer based safety 
critical systents, which are the topic of this thesis, have to be analysed with new analysis 
methods. At the moment a number of safety analysis methods (most of them extension 
of methods used for the analysis of pure hardware artefacts) are used throughout the 
lifecycle of computer based safety critical systems to ensure that they meet the necessary 
standards. 
1.1 Life-cycle 
To develop safety critical systems a number of stakeholders' requirements have to be 
considered, but safety is paramount. According to recent guidelines [SAE-ARP 4754- 
4761,1996; IEC 61508,1997] the safety analysis process should be conducted 
throughout the lifecycle of safety critical systems from the specification stage through 
implementation, integration, verification, operation, maintenance and decommissioning. 
This means also that safety engineers have to work together with system engineers to 
meet the safety requirements for the requested artefact. In this thesis we will concentrate 
on the safety analysis performed during the part of the lifecycle represented in Figure 
1-1. These are the safety analyses which support the "Decomposition and Design " and 
the "Inlegration and Verification" processes. The purpose of these analyses is to check 
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the developing system design against safety requirements, anticipate potential scenarios 
of failure and, eventually, provide feedback to system engineers on whether the system 
they are constructing will behave safely. This should avoid employing resources in 
developing systems that will not later be acceptable to regulatory authorities. 
The safety lifecycle is often represented with a" V' shape. The left branch 
represents the continuous assessment of the design as it progresses towards the 
development of more and more details (lower level components). During this process a 
number of recommendations and safety related requirements are produced. They add up 
to stakeholders safety requirements. All these constraints are to be met by the system. 
The verification of those constraints takes places in the right branch of the safety 
lifecycle, which represents the assessment of the integration process. The overall design 
of the system is accepted only if it is demonstrated that specifications, recommendations 
and safety related requirements issued during the decomposition and design stages are 
met i. e. the system is "not worse than" the one specified. The process of verification 
starts from the lowest decomposition levels (i. e. component level) and proceeds towards 
top functional levels (that is the opposite of the process that happens during the 
decomposition and design). If requirements and recommendations given for each peer 
decomposition level are not met, they can either be renegotiated with stakeholders or 
designs have to be changed, increasing the overall developing cost. 
From Concept Towards the 
Requirements Release 
Functional Level(s): 
........ ... . .......................................... .............. Hazard Identification JCI. 0 .0 0 
0 Feedback ra 0 .................. 
Architectural Level(s): 0 Verification and Consequence Analysis (P. ot worse 
........ ..... ------ -- oar ............... testing: and an Causal Analysis Predictive Causal Analysis 
Mr 
Component Level: 
Causal Analysis ..................... ........................... 
Figure 1-1: Safety life cycle 
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A safety critical system may also require a high level of reliability to be achieved. That is 
the case of systems that are requested to be fully (or partially) working to be safe, for 
example a flight control system in an aircraft or an emergency feed water system in a 
nuclear power plant. In these systems the high level of safety (as well as reliability) is 
traditionally achieved by usingfault tolerance. 
1.2 Fault tolerance 
Fault tolerance is a particular technique that allows building systems that preserve the 
delivery of their expected (or a minimum) service despite the presence of errors caused 
by faults within the system itself [Avizienis, 1985]. To achieve this behaviour they 
employ redundancy. Redundancies can be classified into four types: 1) hardware 
redundancy; 2) software redundancy; 3) time redundancy; and 4) information 
redundancy. In the case of hardware redundancy the system is provided with more 
hardware components (e. g. channels) than it would need if the hardware were perfect. 
Upon failure of a hardware component (or channel) a spare one is switched in. In the 
case of software redundancy the system may be provided wi th different versions of tasks. 
Different and independent teams of programmers write tasks so that when one fails under 
certain inputs another version can be used and there is a chance that the alternate will 
function safely. In the case of time redundancies the scheduler has some slack so that 
some tasks can be rerun and still meet deadlines. In the case of information redundancies 
data are coded in such a way that a certain number of bit errors can be detected and/or 
recovered. 
A fault tolerant system will only fail if multiple failure events happen. The smallest 
combination of failure events happening together (i. e. linked by an "AND" gate) which 
causes a system to fail is called Minimal Cut Set (MCS). A fault tolerant system usually 
has minimal cut sets that span various orders. The order of a minimal cut set is the 
number of failure events that occurring simultaneously will verify it. An order is defined 
also for a fault tolerant system. The order of a fault tolerant system is the order of the 
smallest minimal cut set that causes a critical failure. To be fault tolerant, a system 
cannot have minimal cut set of the first order. 
The introduction of redundancies makes the work of safety engineers more difficult, 
since redundancies bring with them a new class of events named cointnon cause events. 
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1.3 Common Cause Events 
Common cause events affect safety analysis so that the measurable likelihood of a 
minimal cut set is bigger than the product of the likelihood of each single event in the 
minimal cut set considered alone. Common cause events make useless increasing the 
number of redundant channels beyond a certain limit as shown in [Mauri, 1995] and 
[Cojazzi, et al, 1995]. If engineers were able to build redundant systems with 
independent redundant channels, there would not be the need of Common Cause Failure 
(CCF) analysis. In addition, engineers would be able to reach the aimed level of safety 
(and reliability) by increasing the level of redundancy. Unfortunately, it is practically 
impossible to build independent redundant channels and the contribution of common 
cause events have to be evaluated to assure that safety and reliability requirements are 
met in fault tolerant systems. 
The easiest way to consider common cause failures is to work on minimal cut sets. 
Events in a minimal cut set may represent the same failure mode in different components 
(i. e. common mode) or different failure modes. They can be generated by the same cause 
(i. e. common cause) or by different causes. However, the issue for the purpose of this 
thesis, is that, when all the events in a minimal cut set arise simultaneously by the same 
root cause, the fault tolerant system fails as if the events in the minimal cut set had arisen 
randomly. The likelihood of a minimal cut set occurring because of a common cause 
failure is usually extremely small, however, it is always greater than the likelihood of the 
minimal cut set to happen randomly. Purpose of common cause failure analysis is to 
evaluate this likelihood and to help improving the design. Without considering common 
cause events, the likelihood of critical minimal cut sets for fault tolerant systems would 
be underestimated. 
A lot of confusion exists on an unequivocal definition of common cause events 
especially between the nuclear and the aerospace industry. This thesis will be mostly 
based on the well founded definition given in [Mosleh, et al., 19881 which was based on 
the results of the benchmark exercise on common cause failure [Amendola, 1986; Poucet 
et al., 1987], organised by the European Commission. 
1.4 Motivation 
When we apply safety analysis techniques on a new design, the immediate objective is to 
anticipate potential scenarios of failure in the system under examination. If we assume 
that the system has a complex hierarchical structure, this task can be interpreted as one of 
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identifying how failures originate at the low-levels of the design and how combinations 
or sequences of such low-level failures propagate to higher levels and give rise to system 
malfunctions. The ultimate aim of this analysis is to identify weak areas of the design 
and stimulate design iterations, which eventually improve the failure detection and 
control mechanisms of the system under examination. Unfortunately, the current 
industrial practise shows that this aim is seriously hindered by the lack of appropriate 
techniques for the analysis of complex hierarchical designs. 
Classical safety analysis techniques (such as Functional Failure Analysis [SAE -ARP 
4754,1996], Hazard and Operability Studies [Kletz, 1992], Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis [Palady, 1995] and Fault Tree Analysis [Vesely, 19811) are performed at 
different stages of the design lifecycle on the basis of models that reflect different levels 
of abstraction in the design. The selective and fragmented application of different 
methods, however, has a number of negative implications for the quality of the results 
gained from the assessment. Firstly, the results of the various safety studies are often 
inconsistent. Secondly, as hardware safety analysis and software hazard analysis 
typically form two separate parts of the assessment, the relationship between hardware 
and software failures often remains vague and unresolved. Finally there is an inherent 
difficulty in relating the results from low-level safety studies back to the high-level 
functional failure analysis. Although fault trees are built precisely for this purpose, the 
traditional process of constructing these fault trees relies exclusively on expert 
knowledge, and lacks a systematic or structured algorithm which the analyst can apply on 
a system model in order to derive the tree. In the context of a complex system this 
process becomes tedious, time consuming and error prone, and the resultant fault trees 
are large but, more importantly, difficult to interpret and verify. In consequence, safety 
analyses are in practice not only voluminous but also fragmented and inconsistent. Such 
analyses are also difficult to interpret and do not always provide a useful resource in the 
design of the system. 
Common cause failure analysis has always been matter of concern for system 
developers and regulatory authorities. This is mainly due to the difficulty and the 
uncertainty of the quantification of the likelihood of common cause events. Nuclear 
industries have been pushed since the sixties to address this problem. The reason was 
that regulatory authorities (in USA and Europe) were, already at that time, asking for 
nuclear power plants where the likelihood of any critical failure was well below 10-6 per 
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year'. Aerospace and automotive industries are not yet asked for such a low frequency 
for critical failures. At the moment it seems that they are pursuing frequencies for 
critical failure of 10-9 per hour [SAE-ARP 4761,1996], which is 10 times bigger 2 than 
the minimum allowed for nuclear power plants. However the achieved failure rate for 
civil aircraft is around 10-6 critical accidents per hour 3. This higher "accepted" frequency 
for critical failures (about 104 time bigger than for nuclear) is perbap s one of the reasonS4 
for which the aircraft industry is still allowed to "escape" the quantification of the 
likelihood of common cause failure events. They perform only qualitative analysis on 
potential root causes of common cause events and their effect on the system [SAE-ARP 
4761,19961. They achieve this by conducting careful design and verifying that 
components and sub-systems are sufficiently "strong" to resist environmental hazards 
specified in a checklist (that is what they call Zonal Hazard Analysis). Then, they 
produce evidence that the system, as a whole (e. g. the aircraft), will resist particular risks 
specified on another checklist, for example the impact of a bird, fire, tyre burst (by 
performing what they call Particular Risks Analysis). Finally, they verify that events in 
minimal cut sets are sufficiently uncoupled against possible causes of common failure 
specified into another checklist, this is achieved by performing what they call Common 
Mode Analysis [SAE-ARP 4761,1996]. Checklists are provided by regulatory 
authorities, as well as being maintained by developers, and the aim of these analyses is to 
This is partly achieved since in the nuclear history of about 2* 104 civil reactor per year 
(i. e. 500 reactors running per 40 years) we have had only one critical accident: 
Chernobyl. However Russian reactors were built with a critical failure rate of 10-3 per 
year. Hence Chernobyl should not be taken into account. Three Mile Island accident is 
not to be considered a critical accident, since the container worked properly and 
avoided the spreading of long life radioactivity into the environment. 
2 The frequency of 10-6 critical reactor faihires per year is equivalent to 1.1*10"0 
reactor failures per hour (i. e. 10-6 critical reactor faill, res per year divided 8.76 *1 03 
hours per year). This is almost 10 time smaller than the failure frequency of 1* 10'9 
aimed for critical failures in civil aircrafts. 
3 The actual failure rate perceived by common people for critical failures in civil aircraft 
can be quantified as follows. If we suppose that there are 104 aircraft flying every day 
around the world, each flying 5* 103 hours per year, losing 12 aircraft every year, this 
means that the actual critical failure rate is around 4*10 -6 per hour (i. e. 104 aircraft 
around the world times 5*103 hours flown per year divided 12 aircraft lost in one 
year). http: //wwNv. ntsb. gov/Aviation/Tiblel. htm reports "0.012 critical accidents per 
105flight hours" that is not far from our estimation. [Boeing, 1996] also reports similar 
values. 
4 Another reason is the difficulty of estimating failure rates for some software 
components. 
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produce evidence that minimum requirements are met. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, regulatory authorities do not ask for any quantitative evaluation of the impact 
of couplings that cannot be removed. 
One of the reasons that the quantitative estimation of common cause failure is 
"escaped when possible", is that in the way it is performed by the nuclear industries it is 
expensive and largely based on the estimation of some parameters which may often have 
a large uncertainty. In many cases values for these parameters are given by field experts 
(expert judgement), in other cases a conservative value is taken a priori. While the first 
option can be impractical (lack of experts for specific fields) and expensive (in some 
cases there are very few experts all over the world), the second option penalises good 
systems. 
Hence, if we could mechanise the process of common cause failure analysis by 
supporting and facilitating expert judgement, we would also improve the chance of 
quantitative common cause failure analysis being more frequently used. 
1.5 Central Proposition and Objectives 
The central proposition of this thesis is the following: 
"It is possible to produce an integrated safety analysis framework 
which can be used to produce a complete and consistent safety 
analysis, inchiding treatment of common cause jaihire and which can 
be used to drive "a design -for-safety " process. " 
The main objectives of this research work are: 
a) Study the current industrial practice for safety analysis of critical computer based 
systems and for common cause failure analysis; 
b) Provide a method and a notation usable throughout the lifecycle, that supports the 
design-for-safety of computer based safety critical systems; 
c) Provide a method that supports common cause failure analysis; 
d) Give specifications for a software tool that supports the proposed method. 
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1.6 Scope of Study and Methodology 
The foundation of this thesis is the techniques widely used by the automotive, 
aeronautical and nuclear industry for the analysis of critical computer based systems. 
Some of these techniques, i. e. FHA, HAZOP, FMEA, FTA have been used for almost 30 
years. 
This thesis addresses the part of the lifecycle that goes from the decomposition and 
design to integration and verification stages. It concentrates on linking existing 
techniques and in proposing a novel method for the qualitative and quantitative 
estimation of common cause failures. Case s tudies have been done on a Fuel System and 
a Computer Assisted Braking system. 
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters: chapters one and seven providing an 
introduction and a conclusion to the thesis, respectively. The key contribution of the 
thesis is contained in chapters four and five. The literature survey and the work that 
brought to the formulation of the main method presented in the thesis are in chapters two 
and three, respectively. 
Chapter Two - Techniques for Safety Analysis 
In the second chapter we review the main safety analysis techniques used for the 
assessment of critical computer based systems by presenting principles that underlie 
individual techniques. Although those techniques are mostly used in the nuclear and 
aerospace industry, particular attention is reserved for what has been done for software in 
safety critical applications. Then we focus on techniques for the analysis of common 
cause failures. We explain the mechanisms of common cause failures and explore the 
various ways common cause failures are currently investigated. We close the chapter 
pointing out areas where further research is needed and setting out the questions that we 
aim to address in the thesis. 
Chapter Three - Preliminary Work 
The third chapter summarises the work that was done at the beginning of our research 
and that brought us (through many refinements) to the formulation of the method, known 
as Failure Logic Analysis for System Hierarchies (FLASH). It highlights the process 
underneath the development of the technique and explores some alternative approaches. 
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Chapter Four - Failure Logic Analysis for System Hierarchies 
This chapter presents the basic FLASH method, as it would be used in an idealised top 
down process. FLASH aims to support the lifecycle making possible Design-for-Safety. 
FLASH creates a framework, linking several continuous phases of the lifecycle, pointing 
out inconsistencies among designs representing different phases of the lifecycle, linking 
low level analyses to the FHA and supporting dependent failure analysis. FLASH is 
applied in two different stages of the lifecycle. In the first stage it checks the evolving 
design against higher-level safety requirements and supports the establishment of derived 
safety requirements for each sub-system. In the second stage it verifies whether the 
product as implemented and integrated meets its concept level and derived safety 
requirements. 
Chapter Five - Common Cause Failure 
This chapter extends the FLASH formalism presented in chapter four to treat common 
cause failures. We show how the hierarchy of FLASH tables can be used to identify 
those minimal cut sets that need to be analysed for common cause failures. Additionally, 
we provide a novel method for quantitative estimation of the likelihood of minimal cut 
sets with coupled events that uses some of the information collected during FLASH 
analysis. 
Chapter Six - Case Studies 
This chapter outlines the application of the proposed method on two case studies. We 
show different stages of the application of the method and highlight the most important 
features. Each case study is separately evaluated and compared with what could be 
achieved by using other analysis techniques. The pragmatics of dealing with complex 
evolving designs is presented here. 
Chapter Seven - Conclusion 
This chapter provides a surrunary of our research work, draws the conclusions of the 
thesis and highlights potential areas for further development. 
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Chapter two 
Techniques for Safety Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we review the main safety analysis techniques (as well as recently 
proposed variations of those techniques) used in the assessment of critical computer 
based systems. In the first part of the chapter we present the principles that underlie 
individual techniques and we use four criteria to compare and highlight similarities and 
differences among those techniques. In the second part of the chapter we focus on 
techniques for the analysis of common cause failures. We identify the mechanisms of 
common cause failures and explore the various ways common cause failures are 
investigated in current practice. Finally we point out areas where further research is 
needed and set out the questions that we aim to address in this thesis. 
The four criteria against which we will examine and categorise the main safety 
analysis techniques are as follows: 
1) Aim; 
2) How they explore the relationship between causes and effects; 
3) Position in the lifecycle; 
4) Presentation of results. 
The first criterion explores the primary "Ahn" of the technique under examination. As 
Table 2-1 indicates there are techniques that primarily aim to produce a qualitative 
analysis, for example by generating a list of potential failures that affect a system, and 
techniques that produce a quantitative analysis for example predicting the frequency of 
some critical accidents. Besides those two classes of techniques, there is a third class 
formed by techniques that enable both qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
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Aims Example of possible outputs 
Qualitative Analysis Generating a list of potential failures that affect a system 
Quantitative Assessment Predicting the frequency of critical events 
Both Qualitative Analysis & 
Quantitative Assessment 
A graph resembling a tree with probabilities associated 
with each leaf, branch, ramification and root 
Table 2-1: Aims of Safety Analysis Techniques 
The second criterion in our categorisation considers the way safety analysis techniques 
proceed in their investigation i. e. "how they explore the relationship between causes and 
effects". There are at least four different ways to proceed. There are deductive techniques 
that start from known effects to seek unknown causes, inductive techniques that start from 
known causes to forecast unknown effects, exploratory techniques that link unknown 
causes to unknown effects and descriptive techniques [Fenelon et al., 1994] that link 
known causes to known effects. The above categorisation scheme is illustrated in Table 
2-2. 
Effects 
Known Unknown 
Known Descriptive techniques Inductive techniques 
Unknown Deductive techniques Exploratory techniques 
Table 2-2: Four ways to investigate the causes-effects relationship 
The third criterion in our categorisation is "Position in the lifecycle". Some techniques 
are used at different stages in the development process to provide feedback to the design 
and development process. The techniques that are used at the beginning of the design 
process focus on the analysis of the abstract concept of the system. They identify 
potential failure modes to give advice for the development of the architecture of the 
system. We refer to these techniques as being used early in the life cycle. The group of 
techniques that follows, concentrates on the analysis of the architecture of the system. At 
this stage, the allocation of functions to sub-systems and components is known and the 
purpose is to identify hazards that may arise due to (abnormal) deviations of flows 
between components of the architecture. We refer to these techniques as being used in 
the intermediate phases of the lifecycle. Finally, there are techniques which are used 
after the full design process is completed. They mainly perform confirmatory analyses to 
determine whether or not the full design meets specifications and requirements. We refer 
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to these techniques as being used in later phases in the lifecycle. Beside these three 
groups of techniques, a further group is formed by techniques used across the design 
lifecycle. These techniques can usually provide continuous feedback to designers. This 
categorisation scheme is illustrated in Table 2-3. 
Position in the lifecycle Description 
Early Analysis of the abstract concept of the system 
Intermediate Analysis of the architecture of the system 
Late Assessment that the full design meets specifications and 
require ents 
Across Provide continuous feedback to designers 
Table 2-3: Position in the lifecycle 
The fourth and last criterion in our categorisation is based on the "presentation of 
results ". There are some techniques for safety analysis that provide results in a graphical 
format and others that provide them in tabular forms. A graphical format provides a 
more intuitive and perbaps easier to understand representation of the results from the 
assessment. It is also generally easier to relate the failure and recovery logic depicted in a 
graph back to the system design. However, as the graph grows, fragmentation becomes 
inevitable and the intuitive capacity is jeopardised, since the graph becomes difficult to 
read. Conversely, the tabular format can provide a quantity of detailed information which 
is easy to be read but less intuitive. There are only a few safety analysis techniques that 
provide both results in a graphical and tabular output for the same information. Those are 
among the techniques surveyed in the next section. Details of this criterion are 
surnmarised in Table 2-4. 
Presentation of results Features 
Intuitive, understandable, relate to the system 
Graphical representation of the logic or sequences of failures and 
recovery measures 
Tabular A lot of detailed information easy to be read 
Both tabular and Intuitive and easy to read 
graphical 
Table 2-4: Presentation of results 
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2.2 Safety Analysis 
Having explained the four criteria that will help us examine, relate and contrast different 
safety analysis techniques, we can now proceed to the review. The presentation of each 
technique starts with a brief historical background and proceeds with a more detailed 
description of the technique which also identifies the position of the technique in the 
above classifications. 
2.2.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) was introduced in the late sixties (1966) after the 
Department of Defense of the United States of America requested safety studies to be 
performed at all the stages of product development. They issued guidelines that were 
applied from 1969 onward [MIL-STD-882,19691 [MIL-STD-882d, 1999]. 
The Preliminary Hazard Analysis technique is used in the later stages of 
requirement analysis and in the early stages of the design process (early ill the lifecycle). 
The purpose of Preliminary Hazard Analysis is to identify safety critical areas, to provide 
an initial assessment of hazards, and to define requisite hazard controls and subsequent 
actions. The technique is not well formalised. It typically consists of brainstorming 
where the preliminary design is discussed on the basis of the experience of people 
involved in the brainstorming activity. Check lists are commonly used to help in 
identifying hazards. Results are presented in a tabular format. Table 2-5 displays a piece 
of a Preliminary Hazard Analysis table as an example. It has been made out for two of 
the hazards that may arise with a computerised braking system in a car. The first column 
of the table reports hazards that have. to be investigated, for instance the loss of the 
braking capabilities of a car and uneven braking. The second column describes the 
effects of the hazard, in our case the possible death and injury of people or directional 
instability. The third column reports the severity level for the hazard (e. g. catastrophic, 
critical, marginal or negligible). The fourth column sets out the conditions in which the 
hazard produces the most serious effects. The fifth column reports the exposure to 
danger, that is a measure of the time spent within the area of danger. The sixth and last 
column gives information about the ability of the system or the driver to avoid danger. 
Hazards listed in the first column are usually taken from a Preliminary Hazard List [MIL- 
STD-882c, 1993] that is compiled before the actual Preliminary Hazard Analysis. 
Often Preliminary Hazard Analysis tables bave a few additional columns. They are 
domain specific, defined by the company or even by the customer. In our table Effects, 
UNIVERýý71 
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Criticality, Co-effectors, Exposure to danger and Avoidance to Danger are the output of 
the analysis, while the Hazard is the input. 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis is a qualitative technique. It explores relationships 
among potential causes (i. e. the hazard) to give unknoivit effects the (accide nt) hence it is 
inductive. It is applied only during the early stages of the developing process and 
produces a tabular output. 
Hazard Effect (accident) Severity Co-effectors 
Exposure to 
dang r 
Avoidance 
ofdanger 
Death or serious High speed injury to travel and Unlikely to Loss of occupants of the Critical requirement to 
Frequent 
avoid Braking vehicle, other slow down or 
le-2 [1/hI danger 
vehicles or 
pedestrians Stop 
Directional 
instability. 
Death or serious Heavy traffic, Likely to Uneven injury to Critical Hazardous Frequent -- avoid Braking occupants of the road condition 
le-2 [1/hI danger 
vehicle, other 
vehicles or 
pedestrians 
Table 2-5: Preliminary Hazard Analysis table 
2.2.2 Functional Hazard Assessment 
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) approaches the analysis of the top-level design 
from the functional viewpoint [SAE-ARP 4754/4761,1996]. The aim of this technique is 
to identify which functions of the system contribute to hazards, and thus assigning them a 
criticality level. Functional Hazard Assessment was developed by the aerospace industry 
to bridge between hardware and software, since functions are generally identified 
without specific implementations. It requires domain specific knowledge to produce 
meaningful results from Functional Hazard Analysis. The output is a set of tables which 
give for each function, for each failure condition, and for each phase, a description of 
effects, mitigation procedures, and often the type of analysis that has to be performed to 
have the system accepted by regulatory authorities. Table 2-6 shows a standard 
Functional Hazard Assessment output table as reported by the Aerospace Recommended 
Practice [SAE-ARP 4761,1996]. The first column lists functions that have to be assessed 
(i. e. Decelerate Aircraft on the Ground). For that function, the second column lists the 
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failure conditions (i. e. Loss of Deceleration Capability, Partial Loss of Deceleration 
Capability) that may apply to each function. In our case each of the two failure 
conditions have four sub-cases (i. e. a-b-c-d). Identical failure conditions e. g. sub-cases a 
and c (or b and d) have different effects on the aircraft if they happen in different 
operational states e. g. taxying or landing of the aircraft. 
Failure Condition Effects of failure Reference to Verifica- Function (Hazard Phase Condition on Classification Supporting 
Description) Aircraft/Crew Model tion 
Decelerate 1. Loss of 
Landing 
Aircraft on Deceleration 
Mun to 
take ofJ7 
See Below 
the Ground Capability Taxi I 
La. Unannuciated Landing/ Crew is Unable to 
loss of deceleration Run to 
decelerate the aircraft, 
. Catastrophic 
Aircraft 
capability take off 
in a high speed resulting Fault Tree 
overrun 
Crew selects more suitable 
Emergency 
Lb. Annuciated airport, notifies emergency 
landing 
loss of deceleration Landing ground support, and Hazardous procedures 
in Aircraft 
capability prepares occupants for case of 
loss of Fault Tree 
landing overrun stopping capability 
Crew is unable to stop the 
l. c. Unannuciated aircraft on the taxiway or 
loss of deceleration Taxi gate resulting in low speed Major 
capability contact with terminal, 
aircraft, or vehicles 
Ld. Annunciated Crew steers the aircraft 
loss of deceleration Taxi clear 
form any obstacles No Safety 
capability and calls 
for a tug or Effects 
portable stairs 
I. e. Inadvertent 
Crew is unable to take off 
Deceleration after 
due to the application of 
the aircraft cannot Takeoff 
brakes at the same time as Catastrophic Aircraft 
be safely stopped in 
high thrust settings, FaultTree 
the ground resulting 
in a high speed 
overrun 
2. PartialLossof Landing 
Decelerating lRun to See Below 
Capability 
Crew is unable to 
2. a. Unannuciated Landing complet 
' 
ely decelerating Aircraft loss of deceleration /Run to the aircraft before the end Hazardous Fault Tree 
capability take off of the runway resulting in 
a potential overrun 
Crew selects more suitable 
2. b. Annuciated airport, notifies emergency 
loss of deceleration Landing ground support, and Major 
capability prepares occupants for 
landing overrun 
Crew may not be able to 
2. c. Unannuciated adequately stop the 
loss of deceleration Taxi aircraft before obstacle, Minor 
capability resulting in low speed 
collision. 
2 d Annunciated Crew steers the aircraft . . loss of deceleration Taxi clear 
from any obstacles No Safety 
capability 
and calls for a tug or Effects 
I portable stairs 
... .. ... 
I 
... 
Table 2-6: FHA table 
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The operational state is called Phase in our table and it is reported in the third column. 
During the landing phase the failure condition La is classified as catastrophic. In case of 
taxiing, the same failure condition is classified as major. The classification of failure 
conditions is reported in the fifth column. Mitigation measures that can be taken to limit 
effects are reported in the sixth column. Analyses that have to be undertaken to verify 
that the system meets safety requirements go into the seventh and last column. 
Several other techniques have been proposed to achieve a Functional Hazard 
Analysis. One of these, the Functional Failure Analysis (FFA), is recommended in 
[Papadopoulos and McDermid, 1999a]. This technique considers three misbehaviours 
for each function. They are 1) fiinction not provided when requested; 2) filliction 
provided when tiot required; and 3) inalfitlictimi. The Functional Failure Analysis table 
differs slightly from the table described above, but it pursues the same objective. 
The aim of the Functional Hazard Analysis is to perform a qualitalive analysis in the 
early stages of the design process to identify which functions of the system contribute to 
hazards, thus it is an deductive technique. The output is tabitlar. 
2.2.3 HAZOP and HAZOP based techniques 
HAZard and OPerability study (HAZOP) [CISHEC, 1977] [Kletz, 1992] [Adelard, 1994] 
was developed by Imperial Chemical Industries in the early 1970's [Lawley, 1974] 
[Lawley, 1976] and extended to software in the early 1990's [McDermid et al., 1995]. 
HAZOP is performed after an outline equipment design is proposed showing the main 
design components and the flows between them. The results of the HAZOP may be 
either to accept the proposed architecture, subject to some safety-related derived 
requirements, or to ask for the design to be modified. 
HAZOP is a team process, aimed at achieving an "imaginative anticipation of 
hazards". At a mechanistic level it consists of completing a table according to some 
"guide words" (e. g. None, More of, Less of, Part of, More thall, Other). A guideword 
describes a hypothetical deviation from the normally expected attributes of a flow. 
Driven by these guidewords, failure causes and their effects are listed. The acceptability 
of the effects of the deviations is considered and measures proposed to decrease the 
likelihood of the failure cause, or to mitigate the effects. Table 2-7 shows an example of 
a HAZOP table for a hydrocarbon flow feeding a chemical reactor. The first column 
reports two of the guidewords that drive the analysis, i. e. none and more. The team starts 
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from these guidewords to identify deviations to the expected behaviour of the flow that 
are placed in the second column (i. e. No Flow, More Flow, More Pressure, More 
Temperature, etc. ). In the third column the team records potential causes of deviation in 
the flow (in our case the flow feeding the chemical reactor). For instance, there may be 
no hydrocarbon available in the storage tank or a failure of the pump feeding the reactor. 
Consequences of each deviation are recorded into the fourth column. In our case this 
give rise to the formation of polymers in the heat exchanger. The last column reports 
actions that the team recommends for reducing the hazard. 
The aim of the HAZOP is to perform a qualitative analysis in the intermediate 
stages of the design process to anticipated hazards, thus it is an exploratory technique. 
The output is tabular. 
Guide 
Word Deiiation Possible Causes Consequences Action Required 
Loss of feed to reactor 
1) Ensure good communication 
NONE No flow No hydrocarbon available from . Polymer formed in with storage area 
storage heatexchanger 2) Install low level alarm on 
settling tank 
Transfer pump fails (motor 
fault, loss of power, impeller As above Covered by 2) 
corroded etc. ) 
3) Install high level alarm 
Level control valve fails to 4) Check size of overflow 
MORE More flow open, or Level Control Valve Settling tank overfills 5) Establish locking-off 
bypassed in error proceduf e for Level Control 
Valve bypass when not in use 
More Isolation valve or Level Control line subjected to full 
Pressure Valve closed when pump pump pressure 
6) Install kickback on pumps 
running 
More High intermediate storage 
Higher pressure in 7) Install warning of high 
Temperature temperature transfer 
line and temperature at intermediate 
I settling tank I storage 
Table 2-7: HAZOP table 
HAZOP has been traditionally used for hazard identification at plant level. More recently 
though we have seen categorisations of abstract failure classes for Software components 
[Ezhilchelvan and Shrivastava, 1986], [Bondavalli and Simoncini, 19901, and a number 
of HAZOP-inspired techniques for hazard analysis of software architectures [Burns and 
Pitblado, 1993]. The early extension of HAZOP to computers was called CHAZOP, for 
Computer HAZOP. However CHAZOP was really an extended checklist, and did not 
really build on ideas of flows and guidewords. Work in York produced the Software 
Hazard Analysis and Resolution in Design (SHARD) [McDermid and Purnfrey, 19941 
which is much more HAZOP-like, but applied new guidewords i. e. Early, Late, 
Omission, Commission, and Value, rather then the classical guidewords. Like HAZOP, 
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SHARD is used to analyse an outline design and can produce derived safety 
requirements. 
The aim of SHARD is to perform a qualitative analysis in the intermediate stages of 
the design process to anticipate hazards, thus it is an exploratory technique. When 
hazards are known, SHARD may also be used in a deductive mode (i. e. for the analysis 
of embedded systems). The output of SHARD is tabitlar. 
Another technique that originated from HAZOP is the Failure Propagation and 
Transformation Notation (FPTN) [Fenelon & McDern-dd, 1993] [Fenelon et al., 1994]. 
This is a hierarchical graphical notation that represents system failure behaviour. It is 
linked to a design notation and, like HAZOP and SHARD, is both an inductive and 
deductive analysis. FPTN makes consistency checks and is designed to be used at all 
stages of the life cycle. FPTN represents a system as a set of interconnected modules; 
these might represent anything from a complete system to a few lines of program code. 
The connections between these modules are failure modes, which propagate between 
them. Figure 2-1 displays a FPTN module. Each module has a set of input failures, to 
which it is susceptible (i. e. A: t, B: t, C: Vu, X: Vd at the left side of the module), and a set 
of output failures, which it propagates (i. e. D: o, E: c, F: o at the right side of the module). 
A module can also generate new failures (e. g. F: o) and handle existing ones (e. g. X: Vd). 
Equations inside the module show how the input and the internally generated failure 
modes contribute to the output failure modes (i. e. D: o = A: t & B: t; and E: c = B: t I C: v). 
Figure 2-1 displays also that an FPTN module may record the criticality of the module 
(in the right top corner), and whether the module is further decomposed into the other 
more simple modules (the shadow). 
FPTN is a qualitative technique that can be performed at any stages of the design 
process, thus across the lifecycle. Its role is to summarise analyses, thus it is a 
descriptive technique. The output is graphical. 
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Criticality 
MODULE NAME 
- At D: o = A: t & B: t D: o 
E: c = B: t I C: v BA E: c Output 
Input failures 
C-. Vu HANDLED F: o failures 
X: Vd by [mechanism] 
X: Vd 
INTERNAL 
GENERATED by processor failure Po 
Shadow indicates decomposabilityýý 
Figure 2-1: FPTN module 
2.2.4 FMEA 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been developed since the sixties 
[Recht, 1966] for studying aircraft safety, then it was used for space applications 
[Bussolini, 1971], for chemical plants [King and Rudd, 1971] [Lees, 1980] and car 
manufacturing [Yamada, 1977]. FMEA was recommended for Nuclear installations after 
the accident at the Three Mile Island power station [NUREG 2300,1983]. Many 
standards deal with FMEA. Guides were published by the US Department of the Navy 
[MIL-STD-1629a, 1980] and the Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers [IEEE, 
1975]. 
FMEA is an inductive analysis technique used to study the effects of component 
failure modes on a system. FMEA starts from knowledge of component failure modes 
and considers the effects of each failure on subsystems and the system. It involves the 
study of all the components in a system and is often applied also to higher level 
assemblies and systems. It checks whether proposed components, with their known 
failure modes, fulfil system-level safety requirements. The result of the FMEA may be 
to accept the proposed components or, perhaps, to issue recommendations for 
maintenance checks, or to ask for components to be substituted. In light of the FMEA, 
analysts are able to ensure that all the conceivable failure modes and their effects on the 
system operability are taken into account, although this is clearly a very costly process 
and, for a complex system might not be practical. It is also common to use FMEA to 
determine whether or not a design meets the general requirement that "no single point of 
failure" shall give rise to a hazard. 
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A classical FMEA output is shown in Table 2-8. The first column lists basic 
components of the system, the second column lists failure modes that apply to each 
component. The third and fourth columns respectively list effects on the subsystem and 
system. The fifth column classifies effects according to their severity, the sixth column 
gives the failure rate associated with the failure mode, and the last column is left for 
comments. Thus Table 2-8 tells us that the speed sensor (first column) in a car may fail 
in various modes, one of these is delivering No Signal (second column). This failure 
produces effects at subsystem level (third column). The subsystem believes that the 
vehicle is not moving. The system is indirectly affected by this failure since the speed 
indicator shows a null speed, the mileometer is not incremented and the electronic 
gearbox selects a wrong gear (fourth column). Obviously the hazard severity for the first 
and second failure modes is less severe than the third one which may cause loss of lives 
and the vehicle. 
FMEA is a qualitative and quantitative technique that proceeds from known causes 
to unknoiwt effect thus it is inductive. FMEA needs the knowledge of the full system 
design so it is performed later in the lifecycle. The output is tabular. 
Component Failure subsystem Vehicle Effects Haz 
Failure 
rate Comments Mode Effects [11h] 
1. No speed indication Min Effect 3) 
2. Milcometer not Min requires 
incremented simultaneous 
Vehicle Vehicle speed 3. Electronic gearbox Maj failure of 
Speed No signal will always 
be control may select too 513-5 engine load 
Sensor calculated as low gear, possibly calculation 
zero resulting in wheel lockup and 
or transmission damage mechanical 
interlocks on 
aearbox 
Calculated 4. Indicated speed greater Min 
vehicle speed than actual Effect 6) is 
will be too 5. Milcometer over-reads Min hard to detect 
Vehicle Noisy high. If edges 6. Electronic gearbox Min via engine 
Speed (too Many arrive at control may select too 3E-5 load 
Sensor edges) higher rate high gear, possible calculation, 
than specified, resulting in stall unless noise is 
they will be extreme 
lost 
Calculated 7. Specd indicated lower Min 
Vehicle 
Speed Intermit- vehicle speed than actual 412-5 See above 
Sensor tent will be too 
S. Milcometer under-reads Min 
low i 9. As 3) 1 Maj I I 
Table 2-8: Failure Mode and Effect Analysis table 
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A natural extension of FMEA is Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA). It was introduced almost immediately after FMEA. It is based on FMEA but 
in addition to this, it performs a criticality analysis verifying that failure modes with 
severe effects have sufficiently low occurrence probability. An FMECA table has at 
least two more columns that record the probability-severity5 pair for each failure mode. 
If the likelihood is high or the consequences severe, the more critical is the failure mode 
and the need to take corrective measures. 
2.2.5 Fault tree and Event tree analyses 
Fault Tree 
Fault Tree Analysis has developed since the early sixties (1961) when Bell Laboratories 
introduced this concept as a method to assess the safety of the launch control system of 
the Minuteman missile [Henley and Kumamoto, 1981]. A few years later fault tree 
analysis was adopted and improved by engineers working for Boeing [Haasl, 1965] 
[Fussell, 19731. But it was not until the eighties that the fault tree construction process 
was formalised under pressure from the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and a handbook was written [Vesely, 19811. Since then various procedures and tools to 
support fault tree analysis have been proposed in [Taylor, 1982] [Poucet et al., 1993 b]. 
In 1995 there were more than a hundred different tools [Sardella, 1995]. However, only 
recently has fault tree analysis extended to software [Leveson, 1983 and 1991]. 
The aim of fault tree analysis is to determine the possible combinations of causes 
that may give rise to some undesired events called top events. A fault tree consists of 
several levels of event connected in such a way that each event, at a given level, is a 
consequence of events at the level just below, through various logical operators (gates). 
Events may be equipment failures, human errors, software errors, etc. that are likely to 
cause an undesired outcome. Figure 2-2 represents a simple fault tree. The Top Event D 
occurs when both the basic event A and the intermediate E get rise. However E occurs 
only when any of the basic events B or C get rise. 
5 If we know the mission time for the system considered in Table 2-8, then we can 
calculate the likelihood of each component failure mode. Hence we can say that Table 
2-8 contains sufficient information to be used also for an FMECA. 
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Top Event 
D 
Basic Event Intermediate 
ve AE nt 
Basic Event Basic Event 
BIIC 
Figure 2-2: Fault Tree 
In a fault tree, basic events must be independent of one another. Fault tree analysis is 
extensively used, as its simple graphical style is readily applied and well understood by 
practising engineers. In the many years since its introduction, the fault tree technique has 
gone through many extensions. One of these is the addition of new gates to represent the 
dynamic behaviour in advanced fault tolerant digital -systems. This extension also made 
fault trees fully compatible with Markov chains (explained later in this chapter). The 
fault tree handbook reports five gates AND, OR, XOR (exclusive OR), Priority-AND and 
INHIBIT [Vesely, 1981]. These gates capture the effects of failures that depend only 
upon the combination of causal events, but not those that depend on the sequence in 
which the events occur. There are three. sequences of events for which dedicated gates 
were introduced [Dugan et al., 1993]. Figure 2-3 displays these three new gates. The 
F, unctional dependency gate (a) represents the functional dependency of the events 
below the gate from the trigger event depicted on the left side of the gate. When the 
trigger event happens all the functionally dependent events (below the gate) will happen. 
The occurrence of any of the functional dependent events has no effect on the trigger 
event. The Cold spare gate (b) models components that are not powered up until they are 
needed for backup purpose. When the primary event arises (event 1 in Figure 2-3b), then 
a cold spare is powered up and operates until it fails (event 2 in Figure 2-3b) causing 
another cold spare to be powered up. The gate is "true" when all the basic events have 
arisen, and hence all the spare components used up. The basic hypothesis behind this 
gate is that spare components are as good as neiv until they are powered up for the first 
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time. The Sequence enforcing gate (c) represents events happening in a particular order. 
This gate fires "true" if and only if all the events listed below the gate happen from left 
to right. For any other sequence of events the gate does not fire. 
Non-dependent Output Gate-Output Gate Output 
ttt 
FDEP CSP SEQ 
Trigger event 
2n Primary active unitt 
AL 
I 
1 st alternate unit 
2nt alternate unit 
------ - --------- 
nth alternate unit 
a) Functional dependency gate. b) Cold spare gate. c) Sequence enforcing gate. 
Figure 2-3: Dynamic fault tree gates 
Like FMEA and FMEA derived techniques, fault tree analysis can provide quantitative 
output, for any state of the system. In fact any fault tree can be reduced to sequences of 
events connected by only "AND", "OR" gates and negation "NOT" [Contini, 1999b], 
and eventually be fully represented by a list of minimal cut sets that are the n-dnimum 
combination of events which, when they happen simultaneously, can cause the top event. 
The probability of the top event is then estimated by adding up the probability of all the 
minimal cut sets of the tree. It is not intended in this section to detail how the 
quantitative evaluation of fault trees proceeds. For that we refer to the fault tree 
handbook [Vesely, 1981]. 
Although fault tree analysis is extremely powerful in supporting both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis, the fault trees technique is very much dependent on the analyst: 
different teams draw different fault trees for the same system [Amendola, 1986]. To 
avoid this dependence, several tools which draw fault trees automatically, from Plant and 
Instrument (P&I) diagrams, have been developed e. g. in [Carpignano & Poucet, 1994]. 
At present, the weak points of those tools concern mainly the large size of generated fault 
tree diagrams when they are compared with hand-produced fault trees [Sardella, 1995]. 
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The fault tree technique aims both at a qualitative analysis and a quantitative 
assessment. However the quantitative assessment is not always possible. It needs 
knowledge of probabilities associated with basic events (leaf events). In the case of 
software fault trees it is not possible to associate probabilities with some failure modes, 
hence fault tree analysis is used only qualitatively. 
In addition, fault tree analysis proceeds from known effects to unknown causes thus 
it is a deductive technique. 
The fault tree technique can be used at any stage of the design and development 
process. Fault tree leaf events may represent functional failures, system failure modes or 
component failure modes. Thus fault tree analysis can be used at any stage of the design 
process i. e. functional, architectural and component level, that is across the lifecycle. 
Finally, the output of the fault tree is a graph (resembling a tree) and, when it is 
possible, it also provides the likelihood of the top event. However, since a fault tree can 
be represented by the list of its minimal cut sets, this list can also represent the ou tput of 
the fault tree analysis, hence we can say that fault trees also have a textua16 output. 
Event Tree 
The event tree technique is an inductive method that develops the possible consequences 
of a generic initiating event, e. g. a failure. The consequences of such an event can be 
mitigated, or made worse, by systems dealing with it immediately afterwards. Figure 2-4 
shows the event tree that may originate from the initiating event High Pressure in the 
vessel of a chemical reactor. Emergency systems are designed to deal with this event, 
however they may fail in various ways and, in some circumstances, the vessel may 
explode with severe consequence. The event tree in the figure shows that when the 
safety sensor detects high pressure in the vessel, emergency systems are triggered. If the 
system called into action works, the upper path of each branch (i. e. Y= Yes) is true, 
otherwise the lower path (N = No) is taken. In this example, following always the upper 
branch, we can see that the initiating event is completely handled and safety is 
maintained (although the plant is now unavailable). Following this path we see that the 
input flow is cut off (to avoid any further increase of reagent in the reactor), the output 
flow is increased to maximum (to facilitate the depressurisation) and the warning lamp lit 
(to communicate the abnormal state to the operator). If a system does not work we follow 
They can be represented also in a tabular form. 
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the lower path. The worst outcome happens when neither the input flow is cut off nor 
the output flow is increased to maximum and the safety valve does not open (there are 
two paths like this that are highlighted in the picture). Between these two extremes there 
is a "grey area" that represents the cases in which some of the safety systems work and 
some others fail. Remaining paths represent these outcomes. 
Front Line Responses 
Sensor 
detects the III 
Initiatin 
I 
pressure- 
'Input flow in I Output flow ig 
Event 
9: 
emergency 
", ýe 
vessel is 
ý increased to I Safety valvd Warning I 
I opens I lamp on I system is I cut Off I ma)dmum II 
I activated I 
I------T------T---------- -- r- -- -1, 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y1Y 
IN Failure in the II control loop --- ý; - i1.. Y 
pressurein 
the vessel 
Figure 2-4: Event tree 
Possible 
outcomes 
The system 
handles fault. 
Warning given. 
No accident risk 
The system does 
not handle the 
high pressure in 
the vessel. It may 
explode. Risk of 
accident 
When probabilities of mitigating events are known, it is possible to calculate the 
likelihood of each path. It is not intended in this review to detail the quantitative 
evaluation of event tree paths. For that we refer to the [NUREG 2300,1983]. Further, 
event tree mitigating events may represent functional failures, system failure modes or 
component failure modes. Thus event tree analysis can be used at any stage of the design 
process i. e. functional, architectural and component level, that is across the lifecycle. 
The event tree is a graph and, when it is possible, also the likelihood of each path can be 
given. An event tree can be represented by the list of its paths, hence we can say that it 
has also a te-wital (or tabular) output. 
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Drawing some conclusions, the aim of event tree technique is to provide both a 
qualitative analysis and a quantitative assessment. Event trees proceed from known 
causes to investigate unknown effects hence they are inductive. They can be used at any 
stage of the design development i. e. across the lifecycle. The output is both graphical and 
textual, although use of the graphical is more common. 
Large Fault Tree, Small Fault Tree 
Two different approaches can be used for a Probabilistic Safety Assessment of complex 
systems, i. e. Nuclear Power Plants, airliners, etc. First, the Large Event Tree - Small 
Fault Tree (LET/SFT) approach called also event tree with boundary conditions or, event 
tree linking or small fault tree. Second, the Small Event Tree - Large Fault Tree 
(SET/LF-F) approach called also fault tree linking or large fault tree. Both approaches use 
Event trees and Fault Trees to perform the Probabilistic Risk Analysis. The difference 
between those approaches lies in the fact that in the LET/SFT support systems (e. g. 
power supplies, water supplies etc. ), are modelled in event trees, whereas in SET/LFT 
support systems are modelled in fault trees. Although LET and SET analysis conducted 
with the same level of detail give the same numerical result [Rasmussen, 1992], so far, 
the SET approach has always been preferred to the LET. This is because fault tree 
construction and analysis (being a deductive process) can be extensively automated while 
event tree construction and analysis (being an inductive process) cannot be automated 
except by using techniques like Monte Carlo simulation. Hence it is preferable to deal 
with big fault trees rather than with big event trees. Software that deals with large fault 
trees can be found in [Carpignano & Poucet, 1994; Sar. della, 19951. 
2.2.6 Markov chains 
Markov methods are useful for evaluating components with multiple states i. e. several 
good, degraded, and critical states [Norris, 1998]. Let us consider the system in Figure 
2-5 with three possible states 0,1, and 2. In the Markovian model, each transition is 
characterised by a transition rate (i. e. failure rate = A2-1, A, -. O, repair rate = jil-2,110-1). 
If 
we define 
Pr, (t) = probability that the system is in state i at time t. 
pij (t) = the transition rate (either A or It) from state i to state 
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And if weassurne that Pri(t)is differentiable it can be shown that: 
d Pri (t) 
dt =-(ý Pii 
(t Prj(t)+ pji (t) 0 Pri (t 
If a differential equation is written for each state and the resulting set of differential 
equation is solved we obtain the time dependent probability of the system being in each 
state [Modarres, 1993]. Markov chains are mainly a quantitative technique though the 
state and transition diagram also gives qualitative information about the behaviour of the 
system. 
k2-1 
1%1-0 
State State State 
0 20 
ýU-2 
Figure 2-5: Markovian model for a system with three states 
2.2.7 Master Plant Logic Diagram 
The Master Plant Logic Diagram (MPLD) method was proposed in [Modarres, 1987] as 
an outgrowth of the Master Logic Diagram [NUREG 2300,1983] to represent all the 
physical interrelationships among various plant systems and subsystems in a simple logic 
diagram. It is used for probabilistic safety assessment to model and integrate the 
relationship between all plant functions and equipment, therefore it is suitable for several 
safety applications [Modarres, 1992] such as: 
11 Understanding and propagating effects of equipment failures; 
0 Generating and quantifying accident sequences; 
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" Determining important elements of plant safety and ranking of major contributors to 
unsafe situations; 
" Helping designers and analysts in the identification of risk-significant configurations; 
" Evaluating safety implications of an actual event occurrence. 
The aim of the MPLD method is to make the construction of a system safety model easy, 
and to make such a model easy to update. Although fault trees and event trees are well- 
established methods, as a matter of fact, they become inscrutable and resource -intensive 
when they extend to multiple pages. Their limitations are especially severe when they 
are updated following changes that have been made to the system i. e. operation, 
procedures, hardware, software, etc. Finally, fault trees and event trees are not easily 
traceable and their independent review and quality control is very time consuming. On 
the contrary, MPLD is a more intuitive representation of the system and it can be kept up 
to date more easily when there are changes in design or configuration of a plant. It can 
also be used to update risk estimates. 
In success space, MPLD shows the manner in which various functions, sub- 
functions, and hardware components interact to achieve the overall system task. 
Conversely, a MPLD in failure space displays events, i. e. functional failures and relevant 
hardware failures causing system failures, therefore MPLI)s can easily map the 
propagation of plant hardware failures to the system level [Modarres, 1992]. 
The hierarchy of an MPLD is shown by a dependency matrix (see Figure 2-6) in 
which the dependency is established and shown explicitly by a "o". The same picture 
shows that the failure of each of the functions F, and F2 causes the system failure. Each 
of those functions is supported by two sub-functions, each of which is enough to provide 
F, and F2. 
The MPLD shows a clear Single Point of Failure (SPF) of the support system S3 that 
directly causes the failure of sub-function F2-1 and indirectly (causing the failure of 
support system S2) causes the failure of sub-function F2-2- Moreover, the MPLD shows 
that support system S, is provided by two functions (SI., and SI-2) that must fail 
Simultaneously to cause S, to fail. Finally, the MPLD shows that the failure of the 
support System S2 is not critical because that failure can cause neither F, nor F2 to fail- 
Fault trees would not have allowed the same failure mechanisms to be shown in such an 
intuitive and compact way. 
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Like the fault tree and event tree techniques MPLD supports both qualitative 
analysis and quantitative assessment [Modarres, 1992]. It can be performed at any stage 
of the design process, thus across the lifecycle. The output is both graphical and textual 
or tabular. Table 2-9 summarises the graph in Figure 2-6. The likelihood of end state can 
be quantified. 
Figure 2-6: An example of MPLD in Failure space 
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Combinati- 
on number 
Failed 
support 
function (or 
equipment) 
Support Function (or 
Equip. ) Failed Because 
of dependencies 
Likelihood End State 
I SI-I 171.1, F2.1 
2 SI-2 FI-2, F2-2 
3 S2 F1.1, F2-2 
4 S3 S2 171-1, F2 
5 SI-1, SI-2 171, F2 
6 SI-1, S2 171.1, F2 
7 SI-1, S3 S2 171-1, F2 
8 SI-2, S2 171, F2-2 
9 SI-2ý S3 S2 F1, F2 
10 S2, S3 171.1, F2 
11 SI-1, SI-2. S2 Fl, F2 
12 S 1-1, S 1-2, S3 S2 F1, F2 
13 S 1-1, S 1-2, S3 171-1, F2 
14 SI-1, SI-2, S3 F1, F2 
15 SI-1, SI-2, S2, S3 171, F2 
16 No failure No failure 
Table 2-9: Combination of support function failure and end states 
2.2.8 Taxonomy of Techniques for safety analysis 
Techniques for safety analysis discussed so far provide feedback to the design process so 
that their output is used either to let the design proceed without modification or to 
recommend improvements. However, it is evident that the presented techniques for safety 
analysis achieve the feedback to the design in various ways, which the four criteria 
presented in the introduction of this chapter highlight to some extent. Table 2-10 
summarises the discussion that has been undertaken so far by ranking the presented 
techniques against the four criteria. 
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Classes Techniques 
Qualitative analysis 
Preliminary hazard analysis, Functional Hazard 
Analysis, Functional failure analysis, HAZOP 
Quantitative assessment Markov chains 
Both qualitative analysis 
& quantitative Fault tree, event trees and FMEA 
assessment 
Relationship among Descriptive technLques 
ý 
known causes and FPTN, Master Plant Logic Diagram 
; Z known effects 
From known effect to Inductive techniques 
unknown causes 
- 
Event tree 
Relationship among Exploratoa techniques 
unknown causes to FPTN, Preliminary Hazard Analysis, HAZOP, 
unknown effects SHARD 
Relationship among Deductive technL ues C4 known causes to known q SHARD, HAZOP, Fault tree 
effects 
Early Preliminary hazard analysis, Functional hazard 
analysis, Functional failure analysis 
Intermediate HAZOP, SHARD, FPTN 
Late FMEA 
Across Fault tree, Event tree, Master plant logic diagram, 
Preliminary hazard analysis, Functional hazard 
Tabular analysis, Functional failure analysis, HAZOP, 
FMEA 
Graphical FPTN 
Both tabular and Event tree, Fault tree, Master Plant Logic 
graphical Diagram 
Ta ble 2-10: Technioues for saf etv analvsis listed against thp fonr critprin 
2.3 Common Cause Failure Analysis 
Common cause failure analysis has its own section in this review since it considers 
failure events that cannot be dealt with (explicitly) by techniques presented in the 
previous section. These failure events are not usually considered as independent events 
occurring within a system, but as influences on the system from some source that are 
common to redundant components, resulting in some abnormal output states. 
The first problem in dealing with common cause failures is the definition of an 
unambiguous terminology. This was perceived in the many meetings that we were 
involved in during our research. Hence, we begin this section by presenting results of 
research into the terminology describing common cause failures by detailing the terms 
that we will be using in the development of the thesis. 
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The terminology on common cause failure has changed over the years. In the beginning 
only common mode faihires were considered [Edwards and Watson, 1979]. Later, the 
definition of common causefaihire was introduced referring to a slightly wider group of 
failures [Bourne et. al., 19811 superseding common mode failures. However, at that time 
the idea that common cause failure was sYnonymous with common mode failure was 
widespread. The issue regarding the difference between common cause and mode was 
clarified in 1985, when the term dependent faihires was introduced to supersede and 
encompass common cause, common mode failures and "cascade failures". Table 2-11 
gives the definitions of dependent, common cause, common mode and cascade failures 
as given by the safety and reliability directorate of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority in an official document [Humphreyes and Johnston, 1987]. Cascade includes 
all dependent failures that are not common cause failures [EPRI, 1985; Johnston and 
Crackett, 1985]. Figure 2-7 summarises what we have said so far. Common mode 
failures are a subset of common cause failures, whilst dependent failures encompass both 
common cause and cascade failures. We agree with these definitions and we use them in 
the rest of the thesis. 
The likelihood of a set of events, the 
Dependent failure (DF) probability of which cannot 
be expressed as 
simple product of the unconditional failure 
probabilities of the individual events. 
This is a specific type of dependent failure 
Common cause failure 
that arises in redundant components where 
(CCF) simultaneous (or near simultaneous) multiple failures result in different channels from a 
single shared cause. 
ommon mode failure 
This term is reserved for common-cause 
(CIVIF) failures in which multiple 
items fail in the 
same mode. 
These are all those dependent failures that 
Cascade failure (CF) are not Common Cause, i. e. they do not 
affect redundant components. 
Further: 
The term "Dependent failure" as defined above is designed to cover all definitions of 
failures that are not independent. From this definition of dependent failure it is clear 
that an independent failure is one where the failure of a set of events is expressible as 
simple product of individual event unconditional failure probabilities. 
Table 2-11: Derinitions 
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Dependent 
imon Mode 
-ailures 
Figure 2-7: Dependent failures 
2.3.1 Dependent failure events 
The theoretical definition of dependent events can be found in statistics and probability 
books. In [McCord and Moroney, 1964; Peyton and Peebles, 1987] we can find that 
given two dependent events A and B, the probability that both events A and B happen, is 
not equal to the product of the two unconditional probabilities: 
P(AandB)=P(A)-P(BIA)=P(B)-P(AIB); eP(A)-P(B) (2-1) 
More specifically, in this thesis, we are concerned with the situation in which the 
likelihood of two (or more) events is greater than the product of the likelihood of each 
single event: 
P(A and B) > P(A) - P(B) 
2.3.2 Common cause failure events 
The reference document for studying common cause failures is NUREG 4780 [Mosl eh et 
al., 1993]. The author says that to understand the mechanisms leading to dependent 
events, and to model them, it is necessary to answer questions like: 
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Cascade 
failure 
" Why do components fail or why are they unavailable? 
" What is it that can lead to multiple failures? 
" Is there anything at a particular facility that could prevent such multiple failures 
occurring? 
The root cause, the coupling factor and the existence or lack of engineered or 
operational defences against unanticipated equipment failures are the answers to such 
questions. The root cause explains the mechanism underlying the transition from 
available to failed or functionally unavailable. For example, if two components are 
located in the same room and they are susceptible to high humidity, a common cause 
failure could occur as a result of an event outside the room but causing high humidity in 
the room. In this case high humidity is the root cause of failure for the two components. 
Given the existence of the root cause, the coupling factor explains why a particular 
cause affects several components. It creates linking conditions to cause multiple 
components to fail in a correlated fashion. For example, location in the same room is a 
coupling factor for those components susceptible to high humidity. Figure 2-8 shows the 
mechanism of failure of multiple components, that is whenever there is a coupling factor 
(e. g. same location) and a trigger event (e. g. failure of an air conditioning system) occurs, 
the root cause (e. g. high humidity) acts causing multiple components to fail. 
Component 
a 
Component 
b Root Coupling 
Cause Factor 
.................... 
Component 
n 
Figure 2-8: The root cause through the coupling factor affects several components 
46 
Engineered defences means all those mechanisms that could be adopted to prevent root 
causes and couplings from occurring. It is possible to act in two different ways: 
preventing root causes and/or reducing coupling factors. 
In the first case the susceptibility of components to particular root causes (e. g. 
humidity) has to be reduced. In the second case we need to increase diversity. This is 
possible with techniques of design control and quality control that help in segregating 
equipment and in ensuring high quality construction. 
2.3.3 Common mode failure events 
Systems using redundancies, and fault tolerant systems in general, are able to continue 
operating despite the failure of a limited number of their hardware or software 
components. This is so when the failures are of individual components independently, 
but these systems are vulnerable to common mode failures. These failures may sometime 
endanger safety critical systems, hence they are of interest for safety analysts. It is 
generally recognised that there are four different types of common mode failures 
[Edwards and Watson, 1979; Humphreyes and Johnston, 1987]: 
1) The coincidence of failures of two or more identical components in separate 
channels of a redundant system, due to a common cause (the failures will 
probably bave common failure mode also). 
2) The coincidence of failures of two or more different components in separate 
channels of a redundant system due to a common cause (the failures will probably 
have common failure mode also). 
3) The failures of one or more components which result in the coincidence of 
failures of one or more other components not necessarily of the same type, as the 
consequence of some single initial cause (the primary and secondary failures 
might also be coincident, and any coincidental failures mýight have different 
failure modes but all will be in the same category). 
N. B. In any of the above cases, the failure can occur at the same instant or at 
different times, but at some time the failed states will be coincident. 
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4) The failure of some single component or service which is common to all channels 
in an otherwise redundant system (e. g. common maintenance, test). This only 
includes component services which are an integral part of the system and on 
which system operation is dependent. 
On the basis of these types of failure, Edwards and Watson gave their definition of 
common mode failure: 
"A common-mode failure (CMF) is the result of an event(s) which 
because of dependencies, causes a coincidence of failure states of 
components in Avo or more separate channels of a redundancy system, 
leading to the deflized system failing to perform its intendedfiinction ". 
Causes of common mode failures 
Causes of common mode failures can be depicted as in Figure 2-9 [Edwards and Watson, 
19791. To study common mode failure the boundary of the system has to be explicitly 
defined, i. e. what is included and excluded in the system. Hence what is included in the 
system has to be dealt with by safety analysis techniques presented in the previous 
section and what is excluded by the boundary of the system is the domain of common- 
mode failure analysis. 
Common 
Influences 
(Failure cause) 
Redundant Abnormal 
Input P. system P. Output 
(Failed) (Failure mode) 
Figure 2-9: Causes of common-mode failure 
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The picture indicates the causes of common mode failure as Common Influences (i. e. 
Root Causes + Couplings). In a fault tolerant system they may occur either in the period 
prior to operation or during its operating life. In the first case the influences take place in 
activities such as specification, design, manufacture, installation and commissioning, in 
the second case they happen in maintenance or operation. These include deficiencies of 
the system that are due to common influences that happen in the period prior to operation 
and become apparent while the system is running. For example, the system might not be 
able to perform completely its task or in particular circumstances; or it may be vulnerable 
to common influences during operation due to inadequate design, quality control or 
commissioning. 
However, to define which causes of failure are common influences we have to start 
defining what is a system and what is its boundary. Edwards and Watson say that a 
system is an "interconnection of components that conibine to forin a specified fittictional 
relatioyzslzipbetiveeiiitipiitsatidoittpitts". Hence, we can understand that everything that 
is not needed by the system to provide the input-output relationship when it is 
functioning normally, is not part of the system and therefore it is a possible cause of 
common influences. These influences can be a failure cause like fire, explosion, missile 
impact, contamination interference etc. Remote sources that can have a significant 
common influence on the system are also the weather, earthquakes, floods etc. 
Difficulties arise when there is the direct involvement of humans in the system as 
for operation, maintenance and test. If the human influence is required for the system to 
fulfil the functional relationship between input and output then the human influence has 
to be considered inside the boundary otherwise it has to be considered as a common 
influence. Thus, test and maintenance are to be considered as conunon influences, while 
operation may or may not according to the system or the application. If operator action 
is required for the system to perform its functionality then the operator action has to be 
considered part of the system. For instance, in a manually controlled system like an 
aircraft, pilots are an essential part of the functionality of the system since they control 
the aircraft from the information presented to them. If pilots were only interacting now 
and then with the control system of the aircraft like making initial or occasional 
adjustments and then the aircraft was completely operated by the auto -pilot then pilots 
would not be part of the system. Actually pilots contribute to most of the aircraft 
accidents especially with regard to navigation, therefore they have to be considered part 
of the system. While in automatic protective systems like in nuclear reactors the operator 
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is only responsible for certain adjustment and supervision. Hence operators have to be 
considered as common influence and possible cause of common -mode failure. 
We said already that common cause failures supersede common mode failures. That 
is because common cause failures cause all the events in a minimal cut set to occur at the 
same time 7. Whilst common mode failures are a specific type of common cause failure 
in which events in the minimal cut set are failure modes of the same type. 
2.3.4 Defending against Root Cause 
Defending against root causes seems to be quite straightforward, but it is not always 
possible to do, and sometimes is not economically viable. There are two main steps to 
provide defences against root causes: 
The identification of all possible root causes; 
The definition of affordable improvements for reaching the required system 
robustness. 
Whereas the second point is purely a technological and economic matter, the first is quite 
a difficult issue, as the identification of all the possible root causes (that must be outside 
system boundaries to be considered by common cause failure analysis) may require 
expert judgement, and so depend on the expertise of the analyst. 
A number of different schemes for classifying root causes of dependent events have 
been proposed both in the Nuclear and Aerospace domain. They have been developed to 
help analysts in identifying root causes. Each classification scheme is expected to be, 
ideally, exhaustive and its categories to be mutually exclusive. 
2.3.5 Defending against couplings 
Defending against couplings is subtler than identifying root causes. It implies the 
assessment of a number of types of couplings deriving not only from the positioning of 
each item inside the system, but also from the item design and construction phases. 
Therefore all the development and maintenance life cycle of the components must be 
analysed. Looking at different types of couplings, the nuclear sector has defined three 
main categories of dependencies: functional, physical and human [NUREG 2815,1985]. 
Or in a short time interval. 
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They use the term fivictional dependencies when an item depends on shared 
functions that can be achieved either by shared hard)vare, or on a process coupling. In 
the first case, multiple devices depend on the same equipment (e. g. a support system); in 
the second one, the function of one device depends on the function of another device 
(e. g. temporal dependence). They use the term physical dependencies when two or more 
devices are coupled through the same environment, so that an event affecting the 
environment affects also all the components inside that particular area 8. They use the 
term hunian-interaction dependencies to address all those couplings caused by human 
actions. They analyse both the cognitive behaviour (e. g. failure of diagnosis) and the 
procedural behaviour (e. g. multiple maintenance errors). 
A checklist helping in the identification of couplings is reported in the NUREG 
5801 [Mosleh et al., 19931. According to this publication the analyst should focus 
mainly on the identification of those components of the system which share one or more 
of the followings: 
Same design 
Same hardware 
Same function 
Same installation, maintenance, or operation procedures staff 
Same system/component interface 
Same location 
Same environment 
Therefore it could be useful to develop checklists of key attributes such as design, 
location, operation etc., where the analyst can find most or all of the possible couplings. 
An example of such a checklist that help s in the identification of redundant components 
in a system and in the identification of the most commonly observed couplings for a 
Motor Operated Valve9 is reported in Table 2-12. 
8 With the word area we do not mean just the same zone (e. g. a room), but also multiple 
volumes linked by a common ventilation duct or inside the same electromagnetic field 
are considered as a single area. 
9A checklist to address software components, that we have developed during this work, 
is reported in Table: 5.1. 
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* Component size 
Component Type - Material 
- Special features 
- System isolation 
Component Use - Flow modulation 
- Parameter sensing 
- Motive force 
Component Manufacturer - Brand 
- Absolute or differential pressure range 
Component internal oTemperature range 
conditions - 
Normal flow rate 
- Chemistry parameter range 
* Power requirements 
Component boundaries and - Common discharge header 
system interfaces - Interlocks 
Component location name - Room 
and code - Area 
, -Temperature range 
Component external - 
Humidity range 
environment conditions - 
Barometric pressure range 
- Atmospheric particulate content and 
concentration 
Component initial conditions - 
Normally closed, open 
and characteristics - 
Energised 
Normally running, standby 
Component testing 
Test intervals 
procedure and characteristics 
Test configuration 
Effect of maintenance on system operation 
Component maintenance 
Planned 
procedures and 
Preventive maintenance frequency 
characteristics 
Maintenance configuration 
Effect of maintenance on system operation 
Table 2-12: Checklist for a Motor Operated Valve 
2.3.6 The aerospace industry 
Aerospace industries approach dependency analysis in a slightly different way. They do 
not talk explicitly about root causes and couplings, and they use the term common cause 
analysis to address what the nuclear industries call dependent failure analysis. In 
common cause analysis they identify three different issues which they address with zonal 
safety analysis, particular risks analysis and common mode analysis [SAE-ARP 4754 
and SAE-ARP 4761,1996]. 
Zonal Safety Analysis addresses all those concerns regarding equipment 
installations, interference between systems, the robustness of the system against possible 
maintenance errors and the claimed independence of events in a fault tree. They look for 
all the installation aspects of each system and the mutual influence between systems 
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installed in close proximity on the aircraft. The whole aircraft is divided into several 
zones and for each of these zones a zonal safety analysis is performed. The objective of 
the zonal safety analysis is to ensure that the system design meets the safety objective 
with respect to: 
" Basic installation; 
" Effect of failures on aircraft; 
" Implication of maintenance errors; 
" Verification that the design meets the FFA independence claims. 
Particular Risk Analysis addresses specific events listed by airworthiness regulations 
that potentially may cause a failure inside the system itself. For each risk the possible 
consequences for the whole aircraft should be evaluated; if one of the risks may affect 
safety, proper measures should be taken. Table 2-13 lists particular risks set out in 
[SAE-ARP 4761,1996]. 
Fire 
High energy devices (non-containment): 
- Engine 
- Auxiliary Power Unit 
- Fans 
High pressure bottles 
High pressure Air Duct Rupture 
High temperature Air Duct Leakage 
Leaking fluids: 
Fuel 
Hydraulic 
Battery acid 
Water 
Hail, Ice, Snow 
Birds strike 
Tyre burst, flailing tread 
Wheel rim release 
Lighting strike 
High Intensity Radiation Fields 
Flailing Shafts 
Bulkhead rupture 
Table 2-13: Subjects of Particular Risks Analysis 
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Common Mode Analysis addresses redundancies. According to ARP 4761, common 
mode analysis should be performed in the lifecycle after Functional Hazard Analysis and 
Preliminary System Safety Analysis. Its aim is to verify that all the inputs to all AND 
gates (both explicit and implicit) in the failure logic analysis (Fault Tree Analysis, 
Dependence Diagram, Markov Analysis etc. ) are independent. Basically, components 
with the same hardware and software could be susceptible to common mode failures due 
to couplings arising from particular risks, or other causes. Therefore the principal task of 
the analysis is to look for couplings and to evaluate to what extent 'root causes' could 
affect coupled components. Identifying coupling is the major task and is very much 
dependent on the expertise of the analyst; several check lists have been tailored to help in 
discovering couplings. Table 2-14 reports different common mode categories and Table 
2-15 reports a checklist useful for the qualitative assessment (so far no quantitative 
assessment of common mode failure has been done). Both tables are taken from [SAE- 
ARP 4761,1996]. 
Software design errors 
Hardware design errors 
Hardware failures 
Production repair/flaw 
Stress related events 
Installation errors 
Requirements errors 
Environmental factors 
Cascading faults 
Common external source faults 
Table 2-14: Common Mode Fault categories to be analysed 
It is important to point out that whereas common cause failure analysis in the nuclear 
industry is both a qualitative and quantitative procedures, common cause failure analysis 
in the aerospace industry is purely a qualitative analysis. 
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COMMON 
MODE TYPE 
COMMON MODE 
SUB-TYPE 
EXAMPLES OF COMMON 
MODE SOURCES 
EXAMPLES OF COMMON 
MODE FAJLURES/ERRORS 
Concept and 
Design 
DESIGN 
ARCHITECTURE Common discharge Header 
Common discharge failure 
Common external sources 
(ventilation, electrical, power... 
Failure of common sources 
Equipment Protections Designer failure to predict an 
event, 
Operating characteristics 
(normally running, standby... 
Others General design error, 
TECHNOLOGICAL New/Sensible technology Hardware error, 
MATERIALS Component type (size, material,.. ) 
EoUIPMENTTYPE Common Software Software error... 
Component Use ... 
Internal Conditions (Temperature, 
ranges,.. ) 
usage out of operating ranges (T, 
P) 
Initial conditions 
Others 
SPECIFICATIONS Specification Origin 
Origin error (human), lack of 
specific protection in equipment 
design, ... 
Same Specification Defective specification, 
Others ... 
Manufacturing MANUFACTURER Common Manufacturer 
Common error due to 
manufacturer, error due to 
inadequately trained personnel, 
Others ... 
PROCEDURES Same procedure Incorrectness procedure, 
Others 
PROCESS Same process 
Incorrect process, Inadequate 
manufacturing control, inadequate 
inspection, inadequate testing, 
Others ... 
Installation/ FITTER Common fitter Installation or error due to fitter, 
Integration Others 
and Test PROCEDURES Installation phase Common error due to phase, 
Others 
LOCATION Same zone Local failure or event, 
Others 
ROU'TING Same routing Local event, 
Others 
Operation STAFF Common Staff 
Error due to inadequately trained 
personnel, overstressed or 
disabled operator, 
Others 
PROCEDURES 
- 
Same procedure 
Faulty operation procedures, 
misdiagnosis (following wrong 
procedure), Omission of action, 
incorrect or inadequate 
commission of action, 
Others ... 
Maintenance STAFF Common Staff 
Error due to inadequately trained 
personnel, Incorrect action, 
Others ... 
PROCEDURES Same procedure 
Failure to follow repair procedures 
defective repair procedure. lack of 
repair procedure, 
Others ... 
Test STAFF Common Staff 
Error due to inadequately trained 
personnel, Incorrect human 
action, 
Others ... 
PROCEDURES Same procedure Faulty test p ocedure, 
Others 
The table continues on the next page. 
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COMMON COMMON MODE EXAMPLES OF COMMON EXAMPLES OF COMMON 
MODE TYPE SUB-TYPE MODE SOURCES MODE FAJLURES/ERRORS 
Calibration STAFF Common Staff Error due to inadequately traineT 
personnel, 
Calibration Tools 
Others ... PROCEDURES Same procedure Inadequate tools adjustment, 
Others 
... 
MECHANICALAND Fire, lightning, welding etc., Environmental THERMAL Temperature cooling system faults, electrical 
short circuits, ... Airborne dust, metal fragments 
Grit generated by moving parts with 
inade uate t lerances, ... 
Impact Pipe whip, water hammer, 
missiles, structural failure, 
Vibration Machinery in motion, 
earthquake, 
Explosion, out of tolerance 
Pressure system changes (pump 
oversoeed. flow, blockage), 
Humidity Steam pipe breaks, ... 
Moisture Compensation, pipe rupture, 
rainwater, ... Thermal stress at welds of 
Stress dissimilar metals, thermal 
stresses, 
Others 
... 
ELECTRICALAND Welding equipment, rotating 
CORROSION Electromagnetic electrical machinery, lightning, 
interfaces power supplies, 
Radiation Gamma radiation, charged 
ion, 
Conducting Medium Moisture, conductive gases, 
Out-of-tolerance Power surge voltage, short 
circuit, ower surge, current, 
Others 
CHEMICALAND Leak of acid used in 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Corrosion (acid) maintenance for removing rust 
and cleaning, 
Failure leading to a water 
Corrosion (oxidation) medium or around high 
temperature metals (ex 
filaments), ... Galvanic corrosion, complex 
Other chemical reactions interactions of fuel cladding, 
water, oxide fuel, ... Poisonous gases, animate 
Biological causes (mussels in heat 
exchanger), 
Others ... 
Table 2-15: Checklist with Common Mode Types, Sources, and Failures/Errors 
2.3.7 Software domain 
So far we have surveyed common cause failure analysis in the nuclear and aerospace 
fields. Now we move to consider common cause failures in computer based systems. To 
our knowledge, no formalised methods exist to study dependencies amongst software 
components, even if there are efforts to build software "common mode failure free". The 
Airbus company built the first passenger aircraft with a computer-based flying control 
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system (A320) using several precautions to avoid any kind of coupling [Dorsett & 
Mellor, 1993]. They used: 
" Computer systems developed by separate companies using 80186 & M68000 
processors; 
" Separate teams (only the requirements specifications were available for 
communication); 
" For each computer: the control channel was written in Pascal, and the monitor in 
C; or the control channel in assembler and the monitor in Pascal; 
" Particular care has been taken to ensure independence in cormnand and monitoring 
development teams; 
" Each team used different compilers; 
" The voting logic was different in each computer. 
Even if this is indeed a starting point, we cannot say to what extent such efforts are 
appropriate for the task they are asked to deal with, whether designers have been "more" 
or "less" effective than might reasonably be expected in avoiding couplings. 
Additionally, this comment does not reflect on the A320 per se, it simply indicates a lack 
of understanding of root causes and couplings affecting software. 
2.3.8 Defences against common cause failures 
The policy to prevent common cause failures starts early in the lifecycle. It involves 
engineers being aware of sources of common cause failures and possible defences 
against them. It is by eliminating sources of common cause failures from early in the 
design phase that saves expensive remedies later. However when it is not feasible to 
reduce causes of common cause failures, ad hoc defences against them based on specific 
features of each plant can usually be set up. Defences against common cause failures are 
careful project administration, planning, functional diversity, equipment diversity, 
protection and segregation of equipment, barriers, equipment derating and simplicity, 
quality control, preventive maintenance, monitoring etc. To check whether plant 
defences have been considered for each potential cause of common cause failure, some 
techniques have been conceived. The development of one such technique that lists plant 
defences against potential causes of common cause failures has been sponsored by the 
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and presented under the name of "Cause Defense 
Matr&" in [Paula and Parry, 1990; Mosleh et al., 19931. 
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Table 2-16 displays an example of a cause defence matrix focused on environmental 
factors. A cause-defence matrix is a formal way to make sure that in a plant some 
defences have been considered for each potential cause of common cause failure. The 
first column from the left of the table lists causes of common cause failures, i. e. groups 
of failure causes. The remaining columns list the measures that are taken in the plant 
against each failure cause mechanism, that is the root cause (i. e. trigger event + 
conditioning event) and the coupling factor. 
Failure Cause Defence Against 
Grou Root Cause Coupling p 
Conditioning Event Trigger Event Factor 
Internal Surveillance Functional diversity 
environmental effect 
Ensure internal 
" " testing/condition 
Equipment diversity 
(corrosion, environment is pure monitoring (slowly 
Barrier between inputs 
blofouling, etc. ) 
Preventative maintenance developing only) to redundant trains Staqqered maintenance 
External 
environmental 
Barriers at the component 
Barrier between source 
of shock and component 
External barriers 
effects Shock (fast 
(equipment hardening) Inspection of potential 
between redundant 
acting) 
Equipment qualification sources of shocks trains 
Slow acting 
Barriers at the component Barrier between source Functional diversity 
(equipment hardening) of shock and component Equipment diversity 
Surveillance testing/ External barriers 
Equipment qualification condition monitoring 
for 
cumulative effects of 
between redundant 
I environments 
trains 
II 
Table 2-16: Cause-Defence matrix for environmental -related causes 
2.3.9 Common cause failures quantitative assessment 
The contribution of common cause failures to the likelihood of critical events is 
estimated by using parametric models. These models were introduced in the late 1960's 
[Marshall, 1967] when the need to evaluate common cause failures arose. The most 
widely used parametric models are named from the parameters they use. The Beta factor 
model [Marshall and Olkin, 1967; Fleming, 1975] names the parameter it uses with the 
second letter of the Greek alphabet. While the Multiple Greek Letter model [Fleming and 
Kalinowski, 1983] uses many parameters (the order of redundancy minus one) called 
P, y, 8, etc. In the case of two redundant components the multiple Greek letter model 
reduces to the Beta Factor model. Parameters can be thought of as representing the 
strength of the coupling among redundant components, but also as conditional 
probabilities as will be shown later. They range between 0 and 1. The lower bound 
represents complete lack of coupling whereas the upper bound represents complete 
coupling. In many cases it is difficult to estimate common cause failure parameters due 
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to lack of statistical data, therefore analysts use conservative values. Experience has 
shown that a conservative value for beta is 0.1'0 [Mosleh, et al., 1988]. Additionally, if 
some care is taken to ward off common cause failure, the beta for a redundant system can 
easily be reduced by one or two orders. 
Parametric models take into account the contribution of common cause failures by 
modifying the value for the likelihood of events. They split this up into two or more 
contributions of which one is the likelihood of the independent occurrence of the event, 
the other(s) are probabilities of the common cause failures. Hence if we wish to 
represent common cause failures in a fault tree we have to add some events. To see how 
a fault tree is modified to consider common cause failures we produced a simple example 
based on a system the function of which is to arise oil from one tank to another. The 
system architecture consists of three redundant pumps. However only two of them are 
required to run at any one time to assure the system functionality. Figure 2-10 displays 
the architecture of the system. The system fails when any two pumps fail. The fault tree 
for the system is in Figure 2-11. If failures of the three pumps were completely 
independent, the fault tree would consist of only one level that is represented by the 
darker part. Since failures of pumps are not considered independent, the failure 
probability of each pump is divided into four contributions representing the random 
occurrence (i. e. & 131 and CI), the occurrence because of a shared cause with one other 
pump only (i. e. CAB, CAc and CBc) or because of a shared cause with both other pumps 
(CABC)- Parametric models assign probabilities to all the contributors to the pump failure 
probability both independent events (i. e. & 131, CI) and dependent events (i. e. CAB, CAC) 
CRCi CABC)- 
10 Up to 0.18 for diesel generator sets. 
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.................... ............ 
Sump 
Figure 2-10: Triple redundant system raising oil from the sump to the tank 
All the existing parametric models are based on the Symmetry Hypothesis [Mosleh, et al., 
1988]. This hypothesis relies on the common practice in safety and reli ability analysis to 
assume that the probabilities of similar events involving similar types of components are 
the same. Hence if there are three events, i. e. A, B, and C, the symmetry hypothesis 
assumes that the probability of any one of them occurring independently is the same and 
is equal to a value called "Qj ". Further it assumes that the probability of any two events 
occurring simultaneously is identical and equal to T2". Additionally it assumes that the 
probability that all the three events occurring simultaneously is equal to "Q3". This is 
represented by the following equation 2-2. 
P(Al) = P(BI) = P(CI) = Q, 
P(CAB)=P(CAC)=P(CBC)=02 (2-2) 
, 
P(CABC)=Q3 
The symmetry hypothesis certainly holds in the many cases in which identical 
components are used in redundancies, but that cannot be taken for granted when fault 
tolerance is achieved by any mixture of software, hardware, or information and timing 
redundancy, e. g. for computer based fault tolerant systems. However before discussing 
this issue, we continue presenting the different features of the Beta factor and the 
Multiple Greek letter parametric models. 
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The Beta-factor model is the simplest of the parametric models. It considers the 
independent likelihood of each event in the MCS and the likelihood of all the events 
happening simultaneously because of a common cause failure. This is achieved by 
assuming the likelihood of common cause failures not affecting all the components to be 
zero, see equation 2-3 and 2-4. 
P(Cab) -": P(Caj -: P(Cbc) ": Q2 ": 
0 (2-3) 
P(Cabc) "" P* P(Al) -" 03 
(2-4) 
The Beta factor model is normally used with low orders of redundancy (maximum three 
channels) since it becomes conservative as the order of the redundancy increases. In 
these situations the Multiple Greek Letter method comes into place. 
(S) system 
Faawe 
Basic Event Basic Event Basic Event Basic Event 
CAC 
II 
Cac 
II 
CAB 
II 
CABC 
SVshm A S"mm c 
Independerg lM=e, 
Oent 
kovefl&rd 
FaW" AII Fahre SII Faboe C 
Figure 2-11: Tree for the system in Figure 2-10 
The Multiple Greek Letter model [Fleming and Kalinowski, 1983] is an outgrowth of the 
Beta factor model that can consider systems with any degree of redundancy. Values for 
probabilities are assigned according to equations in 2-5. It is out of the scope of this 
thesis to explain how that equation is obtained, the explanation can be found in [Mosleh, 
et al., 1988]. We only say that in represents the number of redundant components in the 
system, k represents the order of the generic subset of components that can be created 
inside the common mode failure component group. It ranges between 1 and nz. Qk 
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represents the failure probability of a generic subset of events of the minimal cut set. 
Finally, A represents these generic parameters (i. e. pl=, 8; p2=y; p3=6; P4=0; etc. ). 
Qk ý ?Z11 
(U 
Pi) (1 - Pk+I)Qt (2-5) (k 
- 1) 
If we consider the system in Figure 2-10, i ranges between 1 and 3. Thus: 
tit 3 
P, 
P2= 
P3=Y 
P4= 6 
Where: 
Conditional probability that the cause of a component failure will be shared by one 
or more additional components, given that a specific component has failed. 
y= Conditional probability that the cause of a component failure that is shared by one or 
more components will be shared by two or more additional components, given that 
two specific components have failed. 
8= Conditional probability that the cause of a component failure that is shared by two or 
more components will be shared by three or more additional components, given that 
three specific components have failed. 
For the system in Figure 2-10, equations (2-5) becomes: 
Q3 2 Pl(1-P2)Qtý 
(1-ß)QI 
Q3 2ý PIP2(1-P3)Qtý -ß('-Y)Qý 22 (1) 
3=1 PIP2P3(1-P4)QI ý ßY 91 Qj' (2 
2 2) 
(2-6) 
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After a Boolean simplification of the tree in Figure 2-11, MCS are obtained, and the 
system failure probability Q, is evaluated by using equation 2-7. 
33 
Qs =Qi +2Q23+Qi (2-7) 
Giving values to parameters 
Methods have been developed to estimate values for parameters used by parametric 
models. These methods are partly based on statistics on common cause failure events 
recorded in databases, and partly on empirical considerations [Mosleh, et al., 1988]. 
Most of the time they estimate boundaries, i. e. max. and min. for each parameter. For 
instance, if a set of parameters for a plant is known, and a similar plant is reckoned more 
robust to common cause failures (but for which no statistics are available as it is a new 
plant), it will be assigned a set of parameters of slightly smaller values. An example of 
such an empirical method is given in [Humphreys, 1987]. This method is very field 
specific and concerns programmable electronic systems. It basically allows the 
estimation of the parameter P used in the Beta factor model by giving a weight to eight 
sub-factors as Table 2-17 shows. 
FACTOR SUB-FACTOR WEIGHT 
DESIGN Separation 8 
Similarity 6 
Complexity 6 
Analysis 6 
OPERATION Procedures 10 
Training 5 
ENVIRONMENT Controls 6 
Tests 4 
Table 2-17: Factor, sub-factor and sub-factor weight 
Different sets of these sub-factor weights can also be assigned to account for different 
degrees of couplings in different plants. In Table 2-18, column 'a' and 'e' represent 
respectively the highest and the lowest possible sub-factor weight, thus the highest and 
the lowest possible coupling. One column need not be a multiple of another since the 
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sub-factor might not grow linearly with the strength of the coupling. Since the beta is a 
probability and it ranges between 0 and 1 it is obtained by a proper normalisation. 
SUB-FACTOR a b C d e 
Separation 2400 580 140 35 8 
Similarity 1750 425 100 25 6 
Complexity 1750 425 100 25 6 
Analysis 1750 425 100 25 6 
Procedures 3000 720 175 40 10 
Training 1500 360 90 20 5 
Controls 1750 425 100 25 6 
Tests 1200 290 70 15 4 
Table 2-18: Possible sub-factor weights 
2.4 Discussion 
In this chapter we saw that a number of different techniques are used for safety analysis 
as the design evolves in the course of the lifecycle. Furthermore we saw that those 
techniques are not formally linked to each other and as a consequence the consistency of 
the analysis cannot be assured throughout the design development process. In a complex 
design it is, therefore, often difficult to trace (using the results of the safety assessment) 
the causes of critical malfunctions of the system in the hierarchy of subsystems and 
components that compose the design. We have also noted the trade-off between 
techniques providing a graphical and tabular representation of results. 
The second part of the chapter focused on common cause failures. We discussed the 
mechanisms leading to common cause failures, and based on this discussion we showed 
that there are two possible ways to avoid common cause failures, either by eliminating 
root causes or removing coupling factors. We saw that there are methods that help to 
consider defences for each potential cause of common cause failure in a plant. However 
there are no methods that measure (or at least map) couplings among redundant 
components in a system. We also noticed problems related to the estimation of 
parameters for the quantitative evaluation of common cause failures. To address the 
limitations and shortcomings of classical techniques that we have highlighted here, this 
thesis will attempt to answer the following questions: 
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a) Is it possible to develop a technique that encompasses the diffeTent safety analyses 
typically performed across the lifecycle? 
b) Can the application of this technique result in a meaningful and easy way to perform 
a collection of safety analyses which can assist the design of the system? 
C) Can we ensure the consistency of the results within the assessment? 
d) Can those results be represented both graphically and in tables, so that we can 
combine the benefits of both representations? 
e) Finally, is it possible to use this technique to systernatise the identification of 
common cause failures? 
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Chapter three 
Preliminary work 
In Chapter 2 we surveyed techniques for safety analysis. We saw that there are many 
techniques for tackling specific needs, however little has been done to integrate those 
techniques that are typically used in cascade across the lifecycle. That causes several 
problems that were highlighted. In addition, we found a lack of formalised methods to 
consider common cause failures in computer based safety critical systems. Causes of 
common failures have to be sought across the lifecycle so if a method has to be built to 
relate techniques typically used across the lifecycle the issue of common cause failures 
must be considered. 
In this chapter we present the work that was doneat the beginning of our research 
and that brought about (through many refinements) the formulation of the technique, 
known as Failure Logic Analysis for System Hierarchies (FLASH), that is presented in 
chapters 4 and 5. We think this preliminary work is important because it explores some 
original approaches and shows the reasons for developing FLASH. 
3.1 Template based approach 
The research started looking for a notation capable of showing how hardware and 
software elements are dependent and support each other in safety critical computer 
based systems. It was thought that this notation was needed to support top -down study of 
a system: the functional level first, then the architectural level and finally the component 
level. Therefore the functional representation of the system was addressed first. 
Functional failures were studied independently from the implementation of the function 
(i. e. hardware, software components or both). Malfunctions were represented as top 
events in fault trees whose basic events were either software or hardware failures. We 
perceived the importance of having formalised trees so we tried to systernatise their 
construction by proposing inini-trees to represent failures of sub-systems and sub- 
functions. Figure 3-1 displays an example of a fault tree built using mini-trees for the 
system in Figure 3-2. These, which are very similar to the ones in [Leveson, 1983], 
represent the most common causes of failure. Additionally, they have undeveloped 
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events for considering faulty inputs and failures from other functions, sub-systems or 
components. The idea was that, once fault trees were built for system malfunctions, they 
could be assessed for repeated branches, which clearly are sources of dependent failures. 
These repeated branches were shared by both software and hardware components, hence 
they were identifying software-hardware dependencies. 
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Figure 3-1: Fault tree built using mini-trees 
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Figure 3-2: Fragment of a functional block diagram of a Computer Braking System 
However, this notation was only deductive and it was not suitable for representing 
recovery actions taking place in fault tolerant systems. So it was thought desirable to 
represent recovery by using some of the gates used in cause consequence analysis. An 
example of such a representation is shown in Figure 3-3. In this notation a function, a 
component or a task (e. g. the sub-function OUT in the graph) is represented as a box with 
inputs, entering from the bottom, and outputs departing from the top. The ones leaving 
from the top left corner of the box are intended outcomes, whilst outputs leaving from the 
top right half are fault outcontes. Whilst a component can have only one correct 
functional model', it can have many failure modes. Hence, it was thought useful to 
represent failure modes by using an event tree style graph placed near the top right 
11 It is recognised that, in principle, there can be many functional modes. However, for 
safety analysis, we can group them together. 
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corner of the gate and connected to its failure outcome. Then, each path through the 
"event tree" would represent a failure outcome of the function/component/task in the 
box. However, this notation posed additional problems: for instance it was not clear 
where to put the many fault trees representing failure modes of the component 
represented by the box. We decided to put them underneath the event tree so we ended 
up with the Event Tree Output notation that is presented next. 
7 
1 IN 
Figure 3-3: Cause and consequence analysis style notation 
3.2 Event Tree Output Notation 
Fault trees representing causes of system malfunctions were gathered below a sort of 
event tree providing a different path for each failure mode or combination of failures. 
Figure 3-4 shows an example of such a representation. The upper part of the graph 
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shows the outputs provided by the box, either good (i. e. YES) or faulty (i. e. NO). 
However, whilst at any time there can be only one good output (i. e. path on the top of the 
event tree), there can be many non-straight paths representing the presence of faults (i. e. 
when mitigation or recovery took place) or failures (i. e. where mitigation or recovery 
failed). Out of these outputs, some may comproniise the safety of the system, hence be 
critical, whereas others may produce less serious consequences. Fault trees showing 
causes of each functional failure are represented below the event tree. Repeated 
branches in fault-trees identified couplings among functions. 
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Figure 3-4: Fault trees are shown below an event tree 
This notation provides a graphical representation of dependencies between software and 
hardware components, however it has some limitations. First of all it provides a huge 
number of outputs for each component. Hence a sort of filtering mechanism on the 
output to avoid propagating non-critical outputs should have been developed, but that 
would have complicated further the method. Additionally shared fault tree branches and 
shared components are represented in different places in fault trees and, in some cases, it 
is not easy to identify repeated branches. At this point it was thought practical to try to 
improve the representation by exploiting a variant of another notation: the Master Plant 
Logic Diagram. 
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3.3 Master Plant Logic Diagram approach 
The next attempt to provide a notation able to merge the analysis of software and 
hardware components, considering common cause failures in complex computer based 
safety critical systems, was an extension of the Master Plant Logic Diagram notation in 
[Modarres, 1992]. As we said in the second chapter, the MPLD notation effectively 
represents the interrelationships amongst various components, and can model 
relationships between functions and systems, so it already has some of the characteristics 
that we were aiming for in our method. But MPLD as it is defined in [Modarres, 19921 
does not allow the mapping of couplings which originate common cause failures. 
Consequently we extended this notation to include this additional category of couplings. 
The extended notation was called MPLD*. 
MPLD* is a logic diagram that shows how functional, equipment and component 
failures combine to cause a system malfunction. An MPLD* diagram is constructed for 
each failure mode of the system that is represented as top event in the MPLD* graph. 
Combinations of function, sub-system and component failures, which cause the top 
event, are represented in a fault-tree-like structure. However, an MPLD* graph differs 
from a fault tree since basic events are not represented as leaf events in the tree, but they 
are listed in the lower left part of the graph and connected to gates through a sort of 
matrix. Lines that originate at basic events and those that end at each gate make this 
matrix. Small blobs mark active intersections of those lines. Therefore AND or OR 
gates can be connected to a number of primary events through a vertical line that 
intersects horizontal lines originating from events. Figure 3-5 shows the MPLD* for a 
functional failure (i. e. complete lack of braking) in the computerised braking system 
described in 6.2 and represented in Figures 6-9 and 6-10. It is possible to see that this 
failure (top event in the MPLD*) is caused by failures of both actuators (i. e. output 
modules 1 and 2). The failure of any of these components can be caused either by an 
internal failure (hardware failure) that is represented in the list at the bottom left, or by 
failures in both the redundant busses i. e. Bus 1 and Bus 2 (see the AND gate on the left 
immediately below the OR gate). Similarly, the failure of anyone of the busses is caused 
either by internal failures (i. e. hardware wear out or software implementation) or by the 
simultaneous failure of all of the three output tasks (i. e. output 1, output 2 and output 3). 
Failure of these tasks can be caused by other functional or hardware failures (e. g. 
Modifier addition, Bus Watcher, Modifier Selection, Basic, In, etc. ) and ultimately, by 
wrong inputs from sensors (i. e. fault data from sensors) or supports (e. g. processors). 
71 
Critical Failure Modes A: Complete lack of brakina 
'I I Bus 2 ýý 
lll*t", H ModlVe 
ý! 
l 
1 11- 
AMi m 
! 
Add, bm2 AMA- 3 
atche, 
I lwatche 
W 
Bus II 
atcher 3 
Bus 
zz 
klodfiK 
SelecL 2 
mod5" 
Sdect 3 
Supports A Irputs (SAJ 
Amtysks Am 
Data frorn Swsors 
Modfier Addibm Code - 
OutCod, s-SW 
SEE 
lasic Ude- S& 
Modfier Selecbon Code - 
In ýS 
_T=essor I& retated 
Processor 2ý elatO 
Pm. sso, 3& etaled 
Ekzsýý 
Bus I vAre - HJW 
Output moWe I HJW 
04ut module 2HIW 
C-ý Cww 
E-ItArwlys, SAM3 
Figure 3-5: MPLD* for complete lack of braking in a braking system 
Cmplete 
laCk Cl 
b, akmg 
cop-t I! Ortpt 
Module II Module 2 
72 
However, what we have described so far is, actually, nothing other then the failure logic 
underneath a functional failure in a different format than a fault tree or an MPLD. We 
now show how, additionally, the MPLD* notation represents couplings among different 
sub-functions sub-systems and components that may give rise to common cause failures. 
For this purpose the MPLD* notation reserves the coninion cause events area 
immediately below the input and support area. This area lists common cause events 
affecting two or more sub-functions, sub-systems, tasks or components. As for basic 
events, common cause events are graphical linked to intermediate events that are arisen 
by them and represented into the upper part of the graph. The dependency matrix at the 
right side of the list of common cause events identifies couplings. 
It has to be noticed that in the MPLD* graph there is not a clear distinction between 
the functional, architectural, and component level, and there are sub-function failures as 
well as subsystem and component failures. This is because the analysis is not 
hierarchically represented, but flat. It is performed deductively moving backward from 
unwanted effects to causes. In addition, the MPLD* has two other limitations. It does 
not clearly represent the mapping of software to hardware (or vice versa) and does not 
allow recording of detailed information for basic components, for example component 
failure rates, mean time to failure, mission time, etc. Hence we had to define two other 
notations to apply at higher and lower levels of detail. 
At the higher level of detail, we proposed a sort of block diagram notation 
displaying the mapping of functions to hardware and software components. An example 
is in Figure 3-6a that shows a cascade of two functions (i. e. boxes A and B) that are 
mapped onto three processors (i. e. boxes P1, P2 and P3). Figure 3-7a displays the 
breakdown of function A and its redundant architecture. Function A is actually achieved 
by three sub-functions (Al, A2 and A3) each mapped to a different processor. A 
breakdown of sub-function Al is displayed in Figure 3-8a. It shows that this sub-function 
is achieved by three tasks called A1.1, A1.2 and A1.3 all running on processor PI. 
Master plant logic diagrams associated with these architectures are represented in Figure 
3-6b, Figure 3-7b and Figure 3-8b. 
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Figure 3-6: High functional level 
Figure 3-6b shows how functions A and B are supported by processors P1, P2 and P3 and 
that function B has one only input that is from function A. At this representation level 
nothing is shown about their failure modes. Figure 3-7b shows the relationship among 
the three tasks, Al, A2 and A3 constituting function A and similarly for function B. The 
two functions are apparently independent, since they run on different processors and 
have different failure modes (i. e. A1. x, A2. x and A3. x) but they all share the same 
software. The coupling matrix shows that the three tasks are not coupled except for the 
software that is common to all of them. 
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Figure 3-7: Medium functional level 
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Figure 3-8: Detailed functional level 
At lower levels of detail we defined a table-based notation placed along side the 
graphical ones. The tables record the information needed for a probabilistic analysis. 
This notation requires association of a table with each component in the design, contour 
information describing internal and external failures influencing the component's output, 
whether correct or faulty. In these tables there are various areas describing, for example, 
locally generated failure modes and couplings, externally generated failure modes and 
couplings, and the mechanism underneath the transformation and propagation of failures. 
Figure 3-9 shows the table that is associated with component Al represented in Figure 
3-7. The table is divided into five areas (i. e. Laws, Handled Couplings, Internal 
Couplings, Locally Generated Failure Modes and External Couplings); the Laws area is 
further divided into sub-areas. Failures that arise inside the component may appear either 
in the internal coupling or in the locally geizeratedfaihire mode area. That depends on 
whether they are shared by one or more elements at the component level architecture. In 
a similar way, failures that happen outside the component boundary may appear either in 
the extenzal coupling area or in the input area. This depends on whether they come from 
support systems shared by one or more other components or they are actually the input of 
the component i. e. data (or analog variables) that have to be processed by the function. 
The Laivs area shows the failure logic describing how failure modes and couplings, 
listed in the previously mentioned areas, combine to provide either faulty or good 
outputs. This area is further divided into three headings that are Faihlre Conditions 
describing faulty outputs; Normal Output describing the (results of the) process that 
recovers recoverable failures and the ConservativelDefaidt outputs describing when the 
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system handles failures and goes into a safe state. These are the cases in which full 
recovery is not possible, but the system can still deliver a safe output. A similar table can 
be written for the MPLD* in Figure 3-8b. It can be seen that the laws area in a table 
contains the information needed to draw part of the MPLD* diagram for the system. 
The information in the laivs area of the table is also the causes-effect relationships 
explaining the deviation of output flows (propagated by the component) from their 
expected values. This information is also the same that is needed to conduct a fault tree 
analysis. Hence, it can be used to draw the upper part of the MPLD* that is actually 
nothing else than a fault tree, as we have already said. Further, the information about 
couplings and support systems in the table is used to visually connect intermediate events 
representing component failures in MPLD* graph. Hence it can be used to draw the 
lower part of the MPLD*. Joining together the information in tables for all the 
component of the system it is possible to construct MPLD*s for each system failure 
modes. Ultimately, block diagrams mapping the software upon the hardware can be 
drawn with the information about software -hardware dependencies that can also be 
stored in the tables. 
Drawing some conclusions, the MPLD* notation with the associated tables and 
Block Diagram notations are intended to fill the gap existing in the analysis of safety 
critical computer based system to account for the interactions of software and hardware 
components. They can be used in place of fault tree analysis but they do not substitute 
for Preliminary Hazard Analysis, HAZOP and FMEA. Table 3-1 compares the analysis 
of a safety critical computer based system from three different viewpoints: the hardware, 
the software and the integrated sofAvare-hardivare viewpoints. The table shows that the 
MPLD* notation can be used at functional as well as at architectural and component 
level during the decomposition and design of safety critical computer based systems. 
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LAWS (TO THE OUTPUT POOL) 
FAILURE CONDITION (END EFFECTS) 
Value (2/3 Channels) A1.1 M AND A2.1 M OR A1.1 M AND AM M OR A2.1 M AND A3. i M 
ORO input OR V Input 
OmIsilon (2/3 CCannels) A1.2 (Late) AND A2.2 (Late) OR A1.2 (Late) AND A3.2 (Late) OR A2.2 (Late) 
AND A3.2 (Late) 
NORMAL OUTPUT (GOOD INPUT To NEXT DOWNSTREAM COMPONENT(S) 
Al & A2 AND INPUT OR Al & A3 AND INPUT OR A2 & A3 AND INPUT 
CONSERVATIVE DEFAULT OUTPUT (NExT HIGHER LEVEL EFFECT) 
(Not in this example) 
INPUTS 
Input Description 
O-Input: == Input (Pool) gives Omission failure then At & A2 & A3 read the previous value 
V-Input: == Input (Pool) gives Value failure then Al & A2 & A3 read a wrong value 
INTERNAL COUPUNGS 
Internal SjW A is shared by Al & A2 & A3 => Need Expert Justification 
Note: Expert may say that in this circumstances SjW does not constitute a coupling to be further analysed 
LOCALLY GENERATED FAILURE MODES 
A1.1 =Value; 
AI. 2 = Late (Scheduler failure in Al) 
A2.1 = Value; 
A2.2 = Late (Scheduler failure in A2) 
AM =Value; 
A3.2 = Late (Scheduler failure in A3) 
EXTERNAL COUPUNGS 
Processor PI support Al 
Processor P2 support A2 
Processor P3 support A3 
Note: Although Al, A2, A3 are not coupled by the same hardware, they might share the same life cycle (i. e. 
same type, same manufacturer, etc. ) => Need further analysis 
Figure 3-9: Table associated with component Al represented in Figure 3-7 
Viewpoint 
Hardware Software Hardware-Softivare 
PHA or FFA + PHA or FFA + 
Functional PHA or FFA + MPLD* 
FFA FTA 
-In SHARD + 4rchifectural HAZOP + FFA SHARD + MPLD* 
software FTA 
FMEA + 
Component FMEA + FFA FMEA + MPLD* 
software FFA 
Table 3-1: Overview of the Safety analysis used to assess critical systems 
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3.4 Discussion 
Our aim was to address some shortcomings and limitations of classical safety analysis 
I techniques for the study of complex computer based safety critical systems. After 
endeavouring to use some existing template based notations and what we called "Event 
tree output notation" we came out proposing a variant of another technique, the Master 
Plant Logic Diagram. This notation was able to solve some inefficiencies of the classical 
techniques like the visual representation of dependencies between hardware and 
software, but it also left us with some unresolved problems. For instance, it was not 
possible to represent clearly the mapping of software to hardware and it was not feasible 
to store in an MPLD* graph all the information that is needed to calculate the likelihood 
of its top event. Hence we proposed a graphical notation to represent the mapping of 
software to hardware and a table based notation to store the detailed information that 
could not be stored into an MPLD*. Further the table notation was enriched to contain 
information to encompass both MPLD* and the representation of the mapping of 
hardware upon software (i. e. the table and block diagram notations). 
However these techniques alone were not enough to achieve the targets we were 
aiming for in the thesis. In fact, though they were applicable at any stage of the 
development phase, they were not integrated with other analyses (i. e. FHA, HAZOP and 
FMEA) that are performed in parallel. Additionally, they did not solve the problem of 
ensuring the consistency of results of analyses performed during the lifecycle by 
common safety analysis techniques, hence we decided to take a new approach in the rest 
of our research. 
Out of these techniques, the table -based notation was the one that solved most of the 
problems we wanted to address. Such an approach allows information to be stored in a 
format which is easy to access. Hence we tried to extend further this notation to 
encompass other classical safety analysis techniques such as HAZOP, Functional Hazard 
Analysis and FMEA. We found that that was feasible. The starting point was the fact 
that flows and flow deviations propagated by a component to another contain 
information about the hypothetical deviations of flows from their expected value that are 
used to drive HAZOP. Hence we thought about a possible way to modify the table used 
to record specific information in the MPLD* notation to encompass also HAZOP 
analysis. This was the starting point that brought us additional further enhancements and 
finally to formalise the Failure Logic Analysis for System Hierarchies that is presented in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter four 
Failure Logic Analysis for System 
Hierarchies 
This chapter presents the FLASH method, which enables the integrated assessment of 
complex hierarchical designs by helping analysts to identify potential functional failures 
of the system at the application level and then to systematically determine the causes of 
those failures in progressively lower levels of the design. The result of the assessment is 
a consistent collection of safety analyses which provides a meaningful picture of how 
low-level failures are stopped at intermediate levels of the design, or propagate and give 
rise to hazardous malfunctions. 
FLASH is applied at two different stages of the lifecycle: a) system decomposition 
& design and b) integration & verification. In the first stage it checks the evolving 
design against higher-level safety requirements and supports the establishment of derived 
safety requirements for each sub-system and component. In the second stage it verifies 
whether the product as implemented and integrated meets its concept level and derived 
safety requirements. 
The chapter begins giving a broad overview of the FLASH method, continues 
describing details of FLASH tables that are the core of the method, the process of 
conducting a FLASH analysis by compiling FLASH tables, presents the software tool 
that was developed to aid the analysis and finishes discussing some limitations. 
4.1 FLASH Overview 
FLASH enables the assessment of a hierarchically described system from the functional 
level down to the low levels of its hardware and software implementation. To ensure 
consistency of results, in FLASH, all safety analysis are performed on the same 
consistent hierarchical model of the system. The method places constraints on the 
notations used, and introduces some additional notation for describing levels of design. 
The notation allows complex systems to be modelled as system hierarchies (see Figure 
4-1, left side). At each level of the hierarchy, flow diagrams are used to describe the 
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architecture of subsystems or components. At plant level these flow diagrams can be, for 
example, piping and instrumentation diagrams. At lower levels they can be derived from 
any form of structured design notation used for the architectural design of software or 
hardware components, for example Data-flow diagrams [Yourdon and Constantine, 
1985] or MASCOT diagrams [Budgen, 1985]. 
Design Hierarchy 
----------- v 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Figure 4-1: The design hierarchy and the hierarchy of safety analyses 
The system hierarchy is created during the decomposition and design phase. The process 
involves the decomposition of the system into modules, and then further decomposition 
of each module into several more basic modules. 
In the course of safety analysis, each module of the architecture (i. e. sub-system or 
basic component) is systematically examined for potential failure modes. One of the 
aims, here, is to identify the failure modes that the module propagates to other modules 
and the causes of those failures in lower levels of the design. The specific failure modes 
of each module are identified as the outputs of the module (functions, material flows, 
energy flows, data) are systematically examined for potential deviations from the 
expected normal behaviour. At the highest level of the design, failure modes represent 
functional failures. At lower levels they represent failures of subsystems as these can be 
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Hierarchy of Safety 
Analyses (FLASH tables) 
observed at the outputs of those subsystems. Finally at the lowest level, they represent 
root failures of the basic components of the architecture. 
The results from the analysis of each module are recorded in a separate table, and 
the analysis is completed when we have created a table for each module in the design 
hierarchy. At the end of the assessment process, the results from the analysis of the 
system and its constituent parts form a hierarchy of FLASH tables (see Figure 4-1, right 
side). Table 4-1 illustrates a fragment from an example FLASH table for sub -system S1 
in the architectural decomposition depicted in Figure 4-1. The table records the analysis 
for one of the output failure modes of sub-system S1 (Output Deviation f 1). It can __q LS 
be seen that the analysis of a module is presented in six columns. 
Sub-system S1 
Failure 
Description Causes Contribut- Criticality, Handling Summary of 
events ing factors 
_ 
Recommendations FIVIEA Results 
Criticality: Critical - The failure 
Handlinjj: The failure is detection 
handled. The system detects mechanism is 
the failure event and reliable (pointer to 
replaces the malfunctioning the relevant 
The output of SI with S2 analysis) 
sub-system SI Failure 
- 
Mo Excessively Recommendations: output 
7 
deviates from de 
- 
of C1 high a) 
Ensure that the failure The failure rate for 
Deviation the design AND detection mechanism is this effect was 
-of 
SI intention. Failure-Mo temperature (T>max) reliable calculated to be No effect on de_of_C2 b) The acceptable failure X=le-5 (i. e. within 
the system S rate for this effect should be the acceptable limit) 
k<le-4 (Uh) 
Action required: Thus, the 
Analyse the error detection architecture of 
mechanism for potential sub-system S1 is 
failure modes accepted 
Table 4-1: A fragment of an example FLASH table for sub-sYstem S1 
The first column (Failitre events) lists the failure events generated by the module and 
propagated to other modules of the architecture. For each such outputfailure event, the 
second column (Description) provides in natural language a description of the event and 
its effect on the system. The third column (Causes) records a logical combination of 
lower level jaihire events that occur in the subordinate level of the architectural 
decomposition and cause the output faihire event under examination. Table 4-1, for 
example, shows that the event Output Deviation_pf. ýl can be caused by a simultaneous 
failure of components C1 and C2. 
The next column (Contributing factors) contains a set of qualifying conditions that 
are necessary for the given output jaihire event to occur. Such conditions typically 
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represent adverse environmental conditions (temperature > inax, for example) or 
particular states that the system is in. The fifth column (Criticality-Handling- 
Recommendations) contains qualitative results from the analysis of the given event. 
Those results include the criticality of the event, information on whether it is handled or 
not, and requirements for ensuring that the event occurs with an acceptable frequency as 
well as that the system responds well to the occurrence of the event. During the 
development of the design this information can be used for a preliminary assessment of 
the architecture against qualitative safety requirements. Once the decomposition process 
has reached the lower possible level and we know the precise implementation of the 
system, we can use the reliability data contained in the FMEAs of basic (non- 
decomposed) components to calculate the frequency of each output faffilre event in the 
hierarchy. This information is recorded in the Stuninary FMEA results column and can be 
used to take a final decision on the suitability of the proposed architecture for the system 
or its constituent parts. 
It is beyond the scope of this introduction to explain the precise role of the FLASH 
table in the development lifecycle. Here, we will just focus on the two most significant 
columns of the table, that listing the outputfailure events propagated by the module and 
that listing the causes of those failure events. Our aim is to illustrate how it is possible to 
achieve consistent linking of safety analyses within the framework of the proposed 
method. Figure 4-2 illustrates fragments of the analyses for our hypothetical system S at 
three successive levels of its architectural decomposition. It can be noticed that the 
causes considered at a certain level of the analysis become the failure events considered 
in subsequent levels. We can notice, for instance, that the output deviation of sub -system 
_f _ýI) appears 
as a cause of a functional failure at the highest S1 (Output Deviation o 
level of the analysis. At the same time, this event also appears in the intermediate level 
of the analysis where it becomes the failure event under investigation. That consistent 
linking between the causes and effects of failure which occurs in the vertical axis of the 
hierarchy is a significant property of the proposed method. This property allows: 
a) The implementation of automated checks that can verify the consistency of the 
analyses; 
b)The implementation of hyperlinks between tables which would allow navigation 
from functional failure modes down to basic events; 
c) The mechanical construction of fault trees from FLASH tables. 
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Design Hierarchy 
1 
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Failure modes Ca es 
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Figure 4-2: Relationship between design hierarchy and hierarchy of HASH tables 
Figure 4-3 illustrates the fault tree that can be constructed for the high level fillictional 
faihire of S from the information contained in the FLASH tables of Figure 4-2. It is 
apparent that this fault tree can be mechanically generated by simply traversing the 
FLASH tables and by progressively substituting the causes of failure at one level of the 
design with the corresponding failure modes at lower levels. To enable the automatic 
construction of fault trees in the framework of FLASH, we currently extend an existing 
algorithm for the mechanical synthesis of fault trees [Papadopoulos and McDermid, 
1999b] which already operates on structural models of the system and tabular 
representations of failure behaviour. This algorithm is at the moment implemented in an 
experimental tool that supports hierarchical modelling of systems and the synthesis of 
fault trees for those systems. Figure 4-4 provides a distant view of an example fault tree 
that has been mechanically synthesised using this tool. 
Functional 
failure-of-§ 
rAND 
Output_ Output_ 
Deviation-of-Sl Deviation 
- of - 
S2 
rA-NDý 0 
7 
Failure Mode Failure Mode 
of ci of C2 
- tf 
§" Figure 4-3: The top-level fault tree for the event "Functionaljailurý q 
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Hierarchy of Safety 
Analyses (FLASH tables) 
Figure 4-4: An example of a mechanically generated fault tree 
It is important to point out that the synthesis algorithm would not be able to generate 
such fault trees if there are any inconsistencies among the safety analyses. In that case, 
the algorithm would simply point out the inconsistencies. The resultant fault trees, 
therefore, effectively link in a consistent manner the results from the various analyses to 
each other and back to the high level FLASH table for the overall system, and hence 
guarantee the consistency of results. At the end of the assessment process, those results 
(FLASH tables and synthesised fault trees) form an integrated collection of safety 
analyses which provides a consistent and meaningful representation of anticipated 
scenarios of the propagation or mitigation of failure in the system. 
4.2 FLASH method: tables 
FLASH analysis follows the decomposition and design of the system and produces a 
hierarchy of tables alongside the hierarchy of modules (see Figure 4-5). These tables 
contain the assessments of peer modules (i. e. functions, systems or components) in the 
system hierarchy. Whilst modules propagate flows, tables propagate events which may 
represent different entities according to whether the module bears the analysis of a 
function, a system or a component. Before we reach the lowest level of decomposition, 
events are failures as they appear at the output of the module propagating them, that is 
floiv deviations on outgoingflows. At the lowest level of decomposition they represent 
internal nialfitnctions of basic components in the design. 
The table for a function focuses on fitnctional failure modes (i. e. loss of function, 
provision of function when not required, incorrect operation), associates with them a 
criticality level, lists their causes and where risk reduction is required. On the basis of 
the risk reduction needed, recommendations and derived safety requirements for the 
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architecture that achieves the function are given. Figure 4-6 a) sununarises fields in a 
FLASH table used to assess a function. 
The table for a system focuses on system faihire modes. For each failure mode that 
can potentially be propagated by the system, it identifies causes and where risk reduction 
is required. On the basis of this risk reduction, derived safety requirements for each 
component are recorded. Figure 4-6 b) summarises fields in a FLASH table used to 
assess a system. 
The table for a component focuses on componentfailure modes propagated to other 
components or systems. Causes are identified and for those that are failure modes of that 
component, reliability data (i. e. failure rates, repair rates, failure probability on demand 
etc. ) and information about the lifecycle to be used for common cause failures analysis 
are recorded. For the causes that are external events, i. e. input or primary events, the 
module originating them is identified in the last part of the name of the failure mode 
itself, the tag. Figure 4-6 c) summarises fields in a FLASH table used to assess a 
component. 
hierarchy of tables 
---------- 
Figure 4-5: Hierarchy 12 of modules and tables 
12 This is a very generic decomposition. We do not mean this decomposition to 
accommodate any sort of systems 
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hierarchy of modules 
A single generic table template is proposed for these three analyses. The information 
recorded inside the table identifies whether it refers to a function, a system or a 
component. 
Fields used for the analysis of a function 
1) Effects (i. e. Functional failure modes) 
Inputs and Functional 1 
2) Causes 
f ilu rL 
)-dda V 
on, , S) 
Seco Failure Modes P' ýýj n 3) Criticality (functional failu s 
4) Description 
5) Justification, design recommendation and 
a) derived safety requirements 
6) FIVIEA results 
Fields used for the analysis of a system 
Inputs and System 1) Effects (i. e. Failure modes propagated) 
I-- 'y' 
Secondary-event Ss' ailure Modes P' Sysem or 2) Causes 
Component failur 3) Description 
4) Justification, design recommendation and 
b) derived safety requirements 
5) FMEA results 
Fields used for the analysis of a 
component 
Inputs and Component 
1) Effects (i. e. Failure modes propagated) 
Second Failure Modes 2) 
Causes 
(System or 00. 
Component failures 3) Description 
I 
4) Justification, design recommendation and 
derived safety requirements 
C) 5) Component's failure modes & reliability 
data (given by the manufacturer) 
Figure 4-6: Fields in a FLASH table for a function, a system and a component 
4.2.1 Events 
The term event is used to designate a generic failure mode (or a success mode) that is 
propagated by a module (i. e. function, system or component) to another and any of its 
causes, either internal or external. Events are unique entities inside a FLASH analysis, 
consequently two failure modes of the same type propagated by two identical modules 
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are actually two different events. Events may represent malfunctions, module failure 
modes, the intended flow delivered by the module, its deviations from the correct value 
or tell whether data are delivered on time (i. e. early or late), not delivered at all or 
delivered when they were not supposed to be delivered. Events are used to link tables 
across the hierarchy. At the functional level events propagated by a table are fillictional 
faihire modes. At the architectural level events propagated by a table are system failitre 
modes. At the component level events propagated by a table are component faihire 
modes. Events have their own syntax illustrated in Figure 4-7. 
Event syntax 
Events are identified by two pieces of information: an entity and a tag. The syntax is: 
<Event>: = < Entity>. <Tag> 
The tag identifies the module propagating the event (e. g. the name of the component or 
an acronym). The entity characterises the event. The entity may assume various 
meanings. In the FHA, it represents functional failure modes: 
Entityx= <Functional failure Mode> (e. g.: OMISSION OF FUNCTION X) 
In HAZOP, an entity consists of two pieces of information: a flow and a deviation that 
can be associated with that flow. 
<Entityx= <Deviation>xF1ow> (e. g.: LESS. OUTPUT PRESSURE) 
In FMEA, an entity represents a component failure mode. 
<Entityx= <Component failure mode> (e. g.: SENSOR SHORT TO GROUND) 
FigUre 4-7: Syntax for events 
Whether events represent functional, system, component failure modes or the intended 
value at the right time, they can be ranked using the taxonomy in Figure 4-8. Events are 
classified into three classes: events that are propagated by modules i. e. Outgoing Events 
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and are also called Effects; the ones that enter the component, i. e. Inconting Events; and 
the ones that are generated inside a module, i. e. Generated Events. 
Outgoing events can be propagated either towards modules at the same hierarchical 
level, (i. e. to the sanze leveo or to modules at a higber bierarchical level, (i. e. enclosing 
leveo. 
Incoming events can either be input or secondary events. Input events are 
differentiated from secondary events since they represent deviations of the variables (e. g. 
flows, data etc. ) that are processed by the module which the table refers to (i. e. the 
module was designed to process those variables). Secondary events represent deviations 
of flows supporting the function the module has to achieve. They provide what the 
module needs to carry out its task, e. g. power supply. Both input and secondary events 
may come from tables of the same hierarchical level, i. e. from same level13, or from 
tables belonging to the higher hierarchical level, i. e. enclosing level. 
2n 
0 
Effects f 
to the same level 
to the enclosing level 
from the same level 
from the enclosing level 
from the same level 
from the enclosing level 
basic 
further developed 
Input 
Events E 
0 0 C: 
II Second 
75 
CD 
Primary 
Figure 4-8: Taxonomy of events 
13 We found that the distinction between Input (and Secondary) events from the same 
level and from the enclosing level helps when parsing tables for the construction of 
fault trees. The algorithm may either follow, at first, links that come from the same 
level and then from the enclosing (or the other way round). 
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Events generated inside a module boundary are called Primary events. When the module 
represent a basic component (i. e. not further decomposed) they are called Basic events. 
For a basic event it is generally possible to give reliability data. When the module 
represents a system that is further decomposed into sub-modules or components they arc 
called Prinzary eventfitrther developed. Causes of primary events further developed are 
investigated by analysing enclosed modules. Figure 4-9 summarises how effects, 
primary, secondary and input events relate each other. They refer to the highlighted 
module. 
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Figure 4-9: Incoming, Outgoing and Generated 
4.2.2 Areas inside a table 
FLASH tables are divided into three main areas that are used: to analy se outgoing events, 
to list incoming events and generated events (see Figure 4-10). The Outgoing event area 
is for the analysis of events propagated towards modules of the same or the enclosing 
level. The Incoming event area lists input and secondary events. The Generated event 
area lists primary events and records information about basic events. 
Table header 
Outgoing event area 
Incoming event area 
Generated event area 
Figure 4-10: Main areas of a FLASH table 
4.2.3 Outgoing event area: Effects 
When referring to a module, events leaving the boundary are called Effects. A module 
transfornis primary, secondary and input events into other events that are propagated. 
This may happen, for instance, when a timing error enters from an input and a value error 
is delivered by the output, or when a value error enters a module, but it is detected by a 
voting logic mechanism that allows the module to deliver a "good" event. The relation 
that models the transformation of events inside a module is written into the Causes 
Cohnnn of the FLASH table and (if it is made by only AND and OR gates) obeys the 
syntax in Figure 4-11. In the case additional gates are required to model the 
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transformation (e. g. XOR, N out of M or dynamic fault tree gates), more composition 
ritles have to be added to the ones listed here. When an event leaves a module, it inherits 
the tag that identifies the father. The tag can be either the full name of the module or an 
acronym. 
<expression> <term> I <composition> 
<composition> <conjunction> I <disjunction> 
<conjunction> <term> "AND" <expression> 
<disjunction> <term> "OR" <expression> 
<term> <event> I "("<expression>")" 
<event> see Figure 4-7 
Figure 4-11: Syntax of the Causes column of a FLASH table 
For the construction of the hierarchy of tables, we found it useful to divide effects into 
two tables. Effects that are propagated directly towards the boundary of the enclosing 
module (i. e. to the higher hierarchical level) that are analysed in the table in which the 
first column is Event to a higher level; and effects that are propagated towards other 
enclosed modules, which appear in the table in which the first column is Event to the 
same level. Both these tables have six columns (see Table 4-2). 
From left to right, the Effects cohinin lists events propagated that have to be 
analysed. The Causes column records the logical combination of events (i. e. incoming 
and generated events) which cause the Effect. The Description column gives details of 
consequences of the event propagated. The Criticality column contains the criticality of 
the Effects, however it is used only at the functional level. The 5 1h column 
(Justifications, recommendations, derived safety requirements ... etc) contains the result 
of the safety assessment of the proposed model of the module (i. e. against safety 
requirements). If the design satisfies such constraints, then the system decomposition 
proceeds, i. e. each sub-module is further decomposed. If the design is not satisfactory, a 
decision is taken on whether to modify the model of this module or the model of the 
enclosing module. In addition the table contains recommendations and derived safety 
requirements to develop enclosed modules. The FMEA results column is used in the 
integration and verification phase, that is when the decomposition process has reached 
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the lower possible level and rates becomes available for most of the basic events. At this 
stage, fault trees can be constructed for events propagated by parsing causes columns in 
FLASH tables. Summarised results from the probabilistic calculations of these fault trees 
are recorded in the FMEA results colunin. This information is then used to take a final 
decision on the suitability of the proposed model for the module. 
5 th column Verifica- Effects Criti- Justification, tion Events to the same Causes Description 
cality 
Recommendations (FMEA level Derived Safety 
results) uirements 
Event 
-1 
ANWOR Description Analysis of the Event - 
10 
Evenf 2 
of the 
Event 
- 
10 and likelihood, 
Event 10 
AND/dR Event-5 
Event 10 and 
derived safety as calculated 
AND (Event 6 OR - requirements for from 
Event 7) JAND/OR its the modules comp. 's data 
... I 
consequences causine this event sheets 
Event 1 AND/OR 
Event-3 AND Analysis of the Event 20 (Event 6 OR 
- 
Description Event 20 and likelihood Event 7 OR 
- 
ofthe derived safety 
, 
as calculated Event 20 1 1) AND Eveni Event 20 and - requirements for from (Event 6 OR its 
the modules comp. 's data Event 7AND consequences causing this event sheets Event 11) fANDIOR 
5 fn column 
Effects Justification, Verifica- 
Events to the Causes Description 
Criti- Design tion 
enclosing level 
cality Recommendations (FMEA 
Derived Safety results) 
e uIrements 
Event 2 AND/OR Analysis of the Event 30 Event74 OR 
- 
Description 
Event 30 and likelihood, 6 OR Eveni of the _ derived safety as calculated Event-30 Event 7 AND/OR Event-30 and requirements for from Event-1 1 AND/OR its 
the modules comp. 's data Event_14 (AND/OR 
I 
consequences causing this event sheets 
Event 6 AND/OR 
Event_7 AND/OR Description 
Analysis of the Event-40 
(Event 6 OR 
ofthe 
Event 
- 
40 and likelihood, 
Event 40 
Event 7AND Event 40 and 
derived safety as calculated 
Event 11) AND/OR - requirements for from 
12AND/OR Event 
its 
the modules comp. 's data 
_ Event_1 5 JANDIOR consequences causing this event sheets 
Table 4-2: Effects to the same and enclosing level 
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Table for groups of events 
Sometimes the expression in the Causes column of a FLASH table is quite complicated. 
To simplify it we found it useful to take out of that column those groups of events that 
repeat in different rows (or that may have particular meanings). See, for example, groups 
of events that are highlighted in bold italic characters in Table 4-2: they can be taken out. 
The group of events "Event-6 OR Event-7 appears in rows for events: Event - 
10, 
Event-20 and Event-30. In similar cases to make the table more neat and tidy, we 
suggest the substitution of repeated groups of events with one single event in this case it 
is called GOE_1. This new event and its causes are described into another table that is 
called Group of events table. Table 4-3 is an example, it has an identical structure to the 
effects table. A similar thing is done for the other group of events in Table 4-2 i. e. 
'Event-6 OR Event-7 AND Event-11 ", which is called GOE - 
2. After substituting 
groups of events that we have identified, Table 4-2 appears as in Table 4-4. 
Sth column, 
Critica Justification, Design Group of events Causes Description lity Recommendations, FMEA Derived Safety 
Requirements 
Analysis of the 
Event 6 OR Description of the GOE -1 and 
derived 
GOE-1 Event -7 GOE_I and its safety requirements 
consequences for the modules 
causing this event 
Analysis of the 
Event 
-6 
OR Description of the GOE -2 and 
derived 
GOE_2 Event-7AND GOE_2 and its safety requirements 
Event-I 1 consequences for the modules 
causing this event 
Table 4-3: Groups of events written for Table 4-2 
4.2.4 Incoming event area: Input and Secondary events 
Input and Secondary events are the only events that enter the module boundary. Each of 
them represents a flow with one of its deviations. Input events are differentiated from 
secondary events. Whilst Input events are processed by the module, Secondary events 
provide the module with what it needs to process input events. For example, take an 
Electronic Controller that receives signals from sensors, sends signals to actuators and 
needs a power supply to operate. Signals coming from sensors with any of the deviations 
that applies to them (i. e. omission, commission, early late, etc. ) represent Input Events, 
93 
whilst the power supply with deviations from its expected value is a secondary event. 
Input and Secondary events are listed into two tables differentiating whether they come 
from modules on the same or the enclosing level. 
5"' column, Verifica- 
Criti- Justification, Design tion Effects Causes Description 
cality 
Recommendations, 
(FMEA Derived Safety 
results) Requirements 
Event 10 
Event I AND/OR Description Analysis of the likelihood, 
Event-2 of the Event-10 and derived as Event-10 AND/OR Event 5 AND Event-10 and safety requirements calculated 
- GOE 1) fAND/OR ... I 
its for the modules from 
_ consequences causing this event comp. 's 
data sheets 
Event 20 
Event 1 AND/OR Description Analysis of the likelihood, 
- Event 3 AND (GOE 1 ofthe Event - 
20 and derived as 
Event 20 _ - OR Event 11) AND Event-20 and safety requirements calculated 
GOE 2 fANDIOR ... I 
its for the modules from 
_ consequences causing this event comp. 's 
data sheet i 
5 th column, 
Criti- Justification, Design Effects Causes Description 
cality 
Recommendations, FMEA 
Derived Safety 
Requirements 
Event 30 
Event 
-2 
AND/OR Description Analysis of the likelihood, 
Event-4 AND/OR of the Event 30 and derived as 
Event-30 G0E_1 AND/OR Event-30 and - safety requirements calculated 
Event-1 I AND/OR its for the modules from 
Event-1 4 fAN D/OR ... consequences causing this event comp. 's 
data sheets 
Event 40 
Event-6 AND/OR Description Analysis of the likelihood, 
Event 7 AND/OR ofthe Event 40 and derived as 
Event-40 GOE_2 AND/OR Event-40 and safety requirements calculated 
Event-12 AND/OR its for the modules from 
Event-15fAND/OR ... I consequences causing this event comp. 's 
data s 
Table 4-4: Effects written using Groups of Event, defined in Table 4-3 
4.2.5 Generated Events area: Primary events 
Events generated inside the module boundary are called Prinzary events. There are two 
types of primary events: Basic events which are not developed any further, and Pritnary 
eventsfurther developed which are propagated by enclosed modules. When the module 
is a basic component, it is often possible to provide failure rates for its basic events. 
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When the module is further decomposed into other modules, its failure modes are the 
results of failures in its enclosed sub-modules or components, hence the analysis has to 
go further, investigating lower levels. 
Basic Events 
Basic events are component failure modes for which causes are not investigated any 
further. Often it is possible to collect reliability data for these events from the 
manufacturer of the component, but in some other cases (e. g. some software) it is not 
possible. The table for basic events is divided into two sub -areas. The upper part is used 
to collect Reliability data, the lower part to collect Lifecycle information, see Table 4-5. 
Reliability data (i. e. failure and repair rates, mean time to failure, failure probability on 
demand etc. ) are calculated from manufacturer's data sheets and adapted to the 
environment where the component operates (i. e. temperature, vibrations, magnetic fields, 
humidity etc. ). Lifecycle information is additional data regarding the component 
generating the event. It records information about the whole life of the component, going 
from the design, through the production, installation, testing, maintenance, and the 
environment where the component operates. It is collected from various sources 
including manufacturer, designers, experienced people working in maintenance and 
testing of similar installations and weighted using a multiple criteria decision analysis 
methods such as that in [Prasad, 19981. Lifecycle information is actually a list of defects 
or errors that may occur during the component lifecycle that are likely to cause the 
component to fail in one of its failure modes. Defects can occur in the manufacturing 
process, in the materials employed or in the assembly line; errors can be in 
specifications, architecture, design, choice of materials, installation, test, operation, 
maintenance, etc. The list of defects and errors is supposed to be exhaustive 14 , span the 
whole lifecycle and divide it into mutually independent categories called Lifecycle 
Categories. Lists in Table 2-12, Table 4-5 (taken from [SAE-ARP 4754,1996]) and 
Table 5-1 obey such constraints. Lifecycle information is used to identify couplings 
among events and to estimate common cause failure probabilitieS15. For each ith 
Category of the lifecycle two data are given: the Percentage %j and the Coupling Code. 
The Percentage "%j" represents the contribution of the ith lifecycle Category to the 
likelihood of the basic event X. For example, take a generic component, manufacturer's 
14 In practice it can never be exhaustive, but it should be as extensive as practical. 
'5 The issue of Common Cause Failure analysis is dealt in details in Chapter 5. 
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data show that the likelihood of one of its failure mode to be due to errors during 
maintenance is low e. g. below 1 %. They justify this by saying that there is a very simple 
procedure that operators rarely get wrong. However the environment where the 
maintenance take place is quite harsh, according to experienced people working in 
maintenance of similar equipment and they say that this increases the likelihood of errors 
if compared with normal situations. Similar considerations are made for all other 
lifecycle categories. The safety analyst after hearing all the different viewpoints 
associates numbers to each of the lifecycle categories. Obviously the sum of all the 
Percentage "%i" has to be 100. It is not our intention to explain any formal method to 
arrive to those numbers, we just say that there are methods for the evaluation and 
consideration of the expert judgement that can be employed for this task [Prasad, 1998]. 
The Coupling Code specifies the actual source of the coupling. For example, take a 
group of valves of the same type. Several lifecycle categories may be responsible for 
failure modes in these valves, maintenance procedures is one of these. If it is known 
(i. e. from specifications) that the same maintenance procedure is used for the 
maintenance of all these valves, then failure modes of these valves will have the same 
coupling code for the Lifecycle Category "Maintenance Procedures". That coupling code 
is the identifier of that specific maintenance procedure. 
Chapter 5 explains in details how FLASH uses coupling codes and lifecycle 
categories for common cause failure analysis. 
Primary events further developed 
Printary events fitrther developed are generated by components or sub-modules of the 
module under examination, i. e. this module is decomposed into more units which 
generate these events. Reliability data for these events become available only when the 
system hierarchy has been decomposed into sufficient detail that there are sufficient data 
to build and evaluate fault trees with these events at the top. 
4.2.6 Table template 
In the FLASH method the same table template is used for the analysis of any module at 
any level in the system hierarchy. The template we propose for such analysis is 
presented in Table 4-6. The header identifies the module's instance, type, periodicity (in 
case it represents a real time software function), and the acronym that is used to identify 
the module in the hierarchy (i. e. tag). Areas for Outgoing events, Incoming events and 
Primary events follow below the header. However not all the fields of the table are 
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always used. The criticality column, in the outgoing event area, is considered only when 
the module represents a high level function, and incoming and generated events areas 
may not be used for some components. 
Having said that, we add that the layout of a FLASH table is not strict, it can be 
modified to suit needs that may arise in the analysis of some systems. For instance, an 
additional column in the area for outgoing events may be necessary when causes of an 
event, which is propagated by the module, are function of a state (or mode) of the 
system. The additional column will made it possible to distinguish among different 
failure mechanisms that propagate the same failure mode but in different states of the 
system. If we do not have an additional column, which identifies the state in which the 
failure mechanism applies, the state has to be considered somewhere else, for instance in 
the causes column e. g. by using conditional or dynamic gates, however complicating the 
expressions. 
Failure Rate X[1/h] 
Repair Rate g[l/hl 
Mean Time to Failure MTTF [h) 
Failure Probability on demand cc - Mission time for the system [h] 
Design Architecture 
Concept and 
Design 
Technological 
Materials Equipment 
Type 
Specifications 
Manufacturer 
Manufacturing Procedures 
Process 
Installation/ Fitter 
Integration Procedures 
And Test Location 
C" 
IV Routing 
cc L) Operation Staff 
2 Procedures . Maintenance Staff 
Procedures 
Test Staff 
Procedures 
Calibration Staff 
Procedures 
Mechanical and 
Thermal 
Environmental Electrical and 
Corrosion 
Chemical and 
miscellaneous 
Table 4-5: Basic Events in a FLASH table 
coupl. % 
Code 
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4.2.7 Programmable electronic modules 
TABLE HEADER 
Instance = <Name> Component Type= <Name> I Periodicity = <Periodicity> Tag= <N me> 
OUTGOING EVENTS 
EFFECTS 
Same level Causes Description Criticality 
r Column 
Justification, Design 
Recommendations, Derived 
Safety Requirements 
Verification 
(FMEAresuits) 
NA I <Event> NA I <excression> NA I <description> 
- 
NA I <descriptlon> NA I <descriotion> 
f <Event>) f <expression>j j<descripflon>j (<descdpbon>) (<descdption>) 
Enclosing Level Causes Consequences 
I 
Criticality I 
r Column 
Justification, Design 
Recommendations, Derived 
Safety Requirements 
Verification 
(FMEAresults) 
NA I <Event> 
1 
NA I <expression> NA I <description> I I NA I <description> NA I <description> 
f<Event>) [ <expression>) (<description>) I j<description>1 j<descripfion>) 
; ROUPS ofEvents _ 
Group of Events Causes Consequences Criticality 
511, Column 
Justification, Design 
Recommendations, Derived 
Safety Requirements 
Verification 
(FMEA results) 
NA I <Event> NA I <expression NA I <descrioton> NA I <description> NA I <description> 
(<Event>) j <expression>) 
_L<d 
ess 
___ 
J<des ripton>) 
INCOMING EVENTS 
INPUTS 
Same level Enclosing level 
NA I <Event> 
(< Event>) 
NA I <Event> 
< Event>) 
SECONDARYEVENTS 
From the Enclosing Level From Modules of the same level 
NA I <Event> 
< Event>) 
NA I <Event> 
(< Event>) 
GENERATED EVENTS 
PRIMARYEVENTS 
Primary Events Further developed 
NA I <Event> 
<Event>) 
Basic Events 
Reliability data <Event> <Event> <Event> <Event>) 
Failure Rate X[1/hj 
Repair Rate pfl/hl 
Mean Time to Failure MTTF 
[h) 
Mission time [h] 
I-Ifecycle 
Category 
Coupl. 
Code 
% Coupl. 
Code 
% Coupl. 
Code 
%% Coupl. 
_Code 
% 
Design Architecture ... ... 
Concept and Design Technological Materials 
EquipmentType ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Specifications ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Manufacturer ... ... ... ... 
Manufacturing Procedures ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Process 
Fitter 
Installation/ Integration Procedures ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
And Test Location 
Routing ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Operation Staff ... ... I ... ... I ... ... ... ... 
Procedures 
Maintenance Staff ... ... 
Procedures ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Test Staff ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Procedures ... ... 
Calibration Staff ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Procedures ... ... 
Mechanical and Thermal 
Environmental ectl Ele rical and Corrosion 
m misc 
Cc hemical and 
iscellaneous ... ... .. 
Table 4-6: Template for a FLASH table of a generic module 
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Programmable electronic modules are those modules that contain software. They may 
represent control units (made up of processors, memories, input and output circuits), 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), smart sensors and smart actuators. In addition 
to hardware failures, these modules can suffer from software failures. Software failures 
are caused either by failure of the hardware upon which the software runs (e. g. memory 
and processor errors) or by flaws in software. The problem with the analysis of 
programmable electronic modules is due to the complexity of the hardware and the 
difficulty of mapping the software onto the hardware. The mapping depends on many 
factors, amongst these the compiler used to create the binary executable file and the 
chipset on which the binary file runs. In some cases the software dynamically allocates 
processes and variables to various hardware resources e. g. often variables are 
dynamically allocated in memories. Hence, a detailed mapping of the software onto 
hardware can be very complex. 
The study of a system with both software and hardware components is usually 
performed considering all interdependencies. The analysis of programmable electronic 
modules in the FLASH method has a similar approach. A system is hierarchically 
decomposed regardless of the fact that functions are achieved by software, hardware, or 
by a n-tix of both of them. The decomposition proceeds until failure events propagated by 
a component are modelled as a combination of hardware and software basic events. 
Figure 4-12 shows the model of a programmable electronic module of such a kind. It 
encloses several sub-modules: input, output, processor, and the software. Input includes 
primary events that describe the failure and success of input circuits and registers. 
Output includes primary events that describe the failure and success of output circuits 
and registers. Processor contains primary events that describe the failure and success of 
processors and memories. Sofnvare contains primary events that account for 
requirements, specifications and implementation flaws of the executable file. Arrows 
that connect input, output and processor to the software module in Figure 4-12, represent 
success and failure events that can be transformed inside the programmable electronic 
module by the software. For example, the failure of one out of n redundant processors 
can be recovered by suitable software voting logic. Arrows that connect the software 
module to the output module represent success and failure events that can be transformed 
inside the output module by a suitable hardware. For instance the output module may 
have implemented hardware voting logic able to recover from some software failures. 
Arrows that connect input, output, software and processor straight to effects, represent 
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success and failure events that cannot be transformed any further inside the 
programmable logic module, e. g. undetectable software flaws, some requirements and 
specification errors, or register failures in the output module. They result in the 
propagation of failure events. All the events and combination of events that cause the 
same effect are linked by "OR" gates in the cause column of the relevant FLASH table. 
A full understanding of the system and how it works is necessary to build the model of 
the module and the corresponding FLASH table. 
Undetectable and 
Unrecoverable events 
Detectable or I Software 
Recoverable (Requirements, 
events ........ Specifications 
and Software) 
Input .. I 
events Input 
1. - .. .... ------- 
t 
. 
output 
module 't 
- 
- 
Effects 
(input 
Circuits and 
11 11 (Output 
Circuits and 
A L L 
Aw 
register, listers) L 
A 
Processor 
(Processors and 
I 
----- 
Memories) 
--------- --- 
Secondary events 
(Power Supply) 
Figure 4-12: Propagation of events in a programmable electronic component 
4.3 FLASH method: process 
The previous section explained the statics of the FLASH method, that is the system 
hierarchy, the hierarchy of the safety analysis, and the FLASH table with all its entries. 
This section explains the dynaniics of the FLASH method, that is the process of 
conducting a FLASH analysis by completing FLASH tables. First of all we explain how 
FLASH supports and drives the development of the system design. Then, we consider 
the ways in which FLASH supports the integration of different analysis and makes 
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possible overall system verification. A simple case study is used to show the process in 
practice. 
4.3.1 Decomposition and Design 
The FLASH process in the decomposition and design stage of the lifecycle is split into 
two phases, the first comes before the design of the internal model of the module takes 
place, the second comes after the design stage. During the first phase (see Figure 4-13), 
the analyst identifies events that are propagated by the module and consequences of such 
events on the whole system and environment. This information is stored in the Effects 
and the Description columns of the FLASH table. This preliminary part of the process 
makes safety analysts to focus on the severity of events propagated so that they can issue 
safety-related recommendations to designers for the development of the internal 
architecture of the model. These recommendations are written into the upper part of the 
5 th column. Once designers have produced the design of the module, safety analysts 
assess it by checking whether it meets the recommendations they gave before. For such 
analysis they consider hypothetical failure modes that may be propagated by components 
and sub-modules and write the mechanism underneath the propagation of failures in the 
causes column, in terms of generated, inputs, primary events and logical operators. The 
equation in the causes column is similar to the ones in FPTN [Fenelon et al., 1994], but 
in addition to the FPTN notation, in FLASH, the equation is later analysed and results 
recorded into the 5 th column. Such analysis may bring safety analysts to accept the 
design proposal or to refuse it, giving some justifications. To help analysts in their 
decision making, the 5 th column has been divided into sub headings: Detection, 
Recovery, Maximum accepted likelihood for critical events in the causes column, and 
Recommendations. Basically, the 5 th column reports information on whether it is 
possible to detect or recover from the event propagated, the maximum accepted 
likelihood for critical events in the causes column and recommendations, either for 
choosing suitable components to place inside the module or for developing sub -modules. 
Table 4-7 shows how the 5 th column is partitioned. 
One of the concerns witb FLASH is about the amount of information stored in the 
5 th column. Such information could be spread on multiple columns simply by changing 
the layout of the table. However, we prefer to keep this arrangement since during the 
integration and verification stage it is easier to compare recommendations and derived 
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safety requirements with what is actually achieved in the real system and recorded into 
the FMEA results column that is the 61h column. 
Events propagatFd 
(Effects) and description PI 
j 
Before the 
it columns are wntter design of 
the internal 
model of the 
Recommendations for the module model of the module 
are written in the Vh 
column of the FLASH table 
The model for the module is 
I 
proposed 
I 
Incoming and Generated 
Events for the module 
are written 
The Causes column of 
the FLASH table for the 
module is written 
After the 
design of 
the internal 
model 
of the 
module 
completed 
(i. e. Justification, 
Reccomandation, 
Dedved safety 
Figure 4-13: Process of creating a FLASH table 
Eff ects ... 
5'h Column (Justifications, Recommendations, 
derived safety requirements, ) 
Verification 
(FMEA 
results) 
Before design 
Recommendations 
Effect max accepted likelihood 
After design 
Event Detection 
propagated 
Recovery 
Recommendation 
Max accepted likelihood for critical causes. 
Table 4-7: The 5 th column is divided into many areas 
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The causes column 
The expression modelling the transformation of events that goes into the Causes column 
of a FLASH table is constructed from the knowledge of the internal design of the 
module, of flows exchanged among its components and sub-modules, and their failure 
modes. Two approaches exist to write that equation. In the first approach, the fault tree 
for each effect is first constructed, then reduced to a logical expression, and finally this 
expression is written in the Causes column. The knowledge of the layout of the module, 
its components and sub-modules is used to draw the fault tree as suggested in [Vesely, 
1981]. This approach is suitable for any modules of the system hierarchy. In the second 
approach, the correlation among causes and effects is written without the previous 
construction of the fault tree. This requires more effort from analysts since they have to 
make the effort to do all the steps for the construction of the fault tree before writing the 
actual expression. However this second approach can be much faster for experienced 
analysts than the first, and we recommend it for simple modules. These two approaches 
are shown for the system in Figure 4-14, which is made by four components and a 
control unit. These four components are divided into two groups. Components Al and 
131 make Line 1, components A2 and B2 make Line 2. Only one line is needed for the 
system to work. The task of the system is to regulate a flow going from left to right. 
In the first approach the tree with the effect NoYloiv. Modide as top event is defined 
first, see Figure 4-15. Then it is reduced to a logical expression made up of events, 
logical operators (e. g. "AND", "OR") and parentheses, finally it is written into the 
Causes column like in Table 4-8 and Table 4-9. 
In the second approach, causes of the critical effect "NoYlomModule" are written 
as combinations of four incoming events (i. e. NoYloiv. Tank, C-. Stop__ýSig11aLStOP' 
0-. Start-SignaL Start, No. Poiver. Busbar) and two Groups of Events (GOE) 
(NoYloiv Lhze_1. GOE and No. Floiv Line_2. GOE) see Table 4-8. Incoming events 
describe the lack of incoming flow from the tank i. e. No. Floiv. Tank, the omission or 
commission of start and stop signals i. e. 0-. Start-SigliaLStart, C-. Stqp-. Sig11aL Stop and 
the lack of power from the bus bar i. e. No. Poiver. Busbar. Groups of events describe the 
failure of line one (i. e. valves Al and 131) and line two (i. e. valves A2 and 132). Table 
4-9 shows that Causes of No. Floiv Line_LGOE are component 131 generated events i. e. 
No. Flow. Bl, or input events from the controller i. e. No. Signal-BI. Ctr. Similarly, 
component Al may fail because of its generated events i. e. No. FloivAl or because of the 
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lack of the signal from the controller i. e. No. Signal Al. Ctr. In conclusion causes of 
NoYlow Line_LGOE can be written as: 
(No. Floiv. Bl OR No. Signal-BI. Ctr) OR (No. FloivAl OR No. Signal Al. Ctr) 
With similar reasoning it is possible to write causes for the second group of event, 
No. Flow Line-2. GOE: 
(No. Flow. B2 ORNo. Signal-M. Ctr) OR (No. FloivA2 ORNo. Signal A2. Ctr) 
These expressions are then written into the Causes column of the Group of Events table, 
see Table 4-9. 
Redundancy of information 
The hierarchy of FLASH tables may contain redundant information. For instance, 
incoming events for a module may appear both as causes in the table of that module and 
as causes in the table for the enclosing module. Once the hierarchy of tables is parsed for 
the fault tree construction these events are likely to originate two identical branches in 
the same fault tree. However, this is not a problem since cut set analysis will eliminate 
the duplication, additionally the algorithm for fault tree construction can be made 
sophisticated enough to draw fault trees avoiding repeating branches. 
Module Line I 
I 
NO. Flo. -Al 
! 
NO. Flý, Bl Noflý-Une_I. GOE 
Al 01 BI I. 
No. Flow. Tank 
Line 2 
A2 it 1--. B2 
T--- .2K Jý 
O. Start signal. -L, 
C. Stop 11 Cwtrol 
_, 
Signal. Stop, 
w 
No. Power. BusBar 
No. Flo, v_ý. _ZGOE 
Figure 4-14: Model of fault tolerant flow controller 
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OU TGOING EVENTS 
Effects Sth Column: Justification, Design Verific Events to Causes Description Critica- Recommendations, Derived Safety a-tion 
the same lity Requirements (FMEA level 
Before design 
No flow of Recommendations 
fuel from The failure of the module cannot be 
the flow handled. A fault tolerant architecture 
controller is needed to prevent that single 
to the failures in any of the valves cause a 
engine. system failure 
The engine The module has to be built with 
cannot redundant components. 
start. No 
No. Flow. Ta electric Effect max accepted likelihood 
nk power is 10 -4 on demand OR provided 
0. Start S After design ignaLStart It can be It will 
OR caused by Detection be C Stop Si an A flow sensor after and external the used 
No Flow M gnaLStop omission of module 
during 
. 
odule 
OR the start Cat. the 
NoYower. signal, a verifica 
Busbar commissio Recovery Possible for failure of one line -tion OR n of the stage 
NoYlow Li stop signal, 
ne l. G(5E lack of fuel 
Recommendation 
AITD from the 'ne second flow line has to be 
No. Flow Li tank or uncoupled with the first. 
ne 2. GdE because CCF analysis is required. 
there is no 
flow in the Max accepted likelihood for 
two critical events in the Causes 
possible Column. 
paths that A (No. Flow. Tank) < 
10-7 h" 
can be P(No. SignaLSensor) < 10-5 
activated demand 
bythe P(Q-. Starl-SignaLSIart) < 10'5 
Controller demand 
P(Cý_. Stop_. ýignaLStarl) < 10-5 
demand 
A (No. Poiver. Busbar) < 10-7 h-1 
Table 4-8: Causes of the critical effects No. FlowModule 
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Group of Critica- 
51h Column: Justification, Design Verifica 
events 
Causes Description l it Recommendations, Derived Safety -tion y Requirements 
Before design 
Recommendations 
The failure can be handled. The system 
detects the failure event and replaces 11nel 
with Line 2 
Ensure that the failure detection mechanism is 
reliable 
Effect max accepted likelihood 
The acceptable failure rate for this effect 
(No. flow. B1 should be %, Clo-3 (1/b) 
OR Une 1 is out It will be 
No. Signal B1 of work but 'ý 
go flow mai After 
design used 
No. Flow Line Ctr) ' OR through line 2. N/A 
Detection 
A flow sensor after and external the module 
during 
the 
LGOE7 (No. flow. Al Action is verifica- OR 
needed to Recovery 
tion 
No. Signal A1 
operate line 2 line 2 is activated upon failure of line 1 stage Ctr) 
Recommendation 
The second flow line has to be uncoupled with 
the first. 
CCF analysis is required. 
Max accepted likelihood for critical events 
in the Causes column. 
P(No. SignaLAI. Ctr) < 10-5 on demand 
P(N, o. SignaLB1. Ctr) < 10-5 on demand 
P(No. flow-4 1) < 10-5 on demand 
P(No. flqiv. Bl) c 10-5 on demand 
Before design 
The failure cannot be handled. Unel has 
already failed. Failure of line 2 causes the top 
event 
Recommendations 
Ensure that the failure detection mechanism is 
reliable 
Effect max accepted likelihood 
(No. t1o w. B2 
Une 2 is out 5* 10-5 on demand 
OR of work. It will be 
No. Signal B2 Since line 2 is 
operated After 
design used 
No. Flow Line 
_ 
'Ctr) OR upon failure of N/A 
Detection 
Not possible 
during 
the 
2. GOLý (No. flow. A2 line 1, which verifica- 
OR is already lost then the Recovery 
tion 
No. Signal A2 , 
whole system Not possible 
stage 
Ctr) is lost. 
Recominendation 
Minimise couplings with line 1, perform a 
common cause failure analysis 
Max accepted likelihood for critical events 
in the Causes column. 
P(No. SignaLA2.0r) < 10-5 on demand 
P(No. SignaLB2.0r) < 10-5 on demand 
P(No. floivA2) e 10-5 on demand 
P(No. flomB2) < 10-5 on demand 
. Table 4-9: Group of Events for table in Table 4-8 
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No. Flow. module 
-------------------- ------------------------------------ 
----------- ------------ 
Start ignal. 
-S Start 
-------------- 
- 
------ 
Cý_. Stop Signal 
------------------------ ------------------------ 
stý No. Flow. Tank p 
----------- - ----------- ----------------------- 
---------- t 
---------- 1. 
NoTlow 
Unel. GCTE 
I ý, No. f7low. Al ýI NO. Row 
No. Signal-AI. Ctr II No. Signal-Bl. Ctr 
------------------------- 
No. Power. Busbar 
No Flow from Une 
----------------------- 
: 
----------- 
I and 2 
: 
------------ ----------- 
J- 
---------- 
No. Flow 
Une_2. Gl5E 
Figure 4-15: Tree for the event NoYlowModule for the module in Figure 4-14 
Analysis of basic components 
Basic components are modules that are not further decomposed in the system hierarchy. 
They may represent hardware equipment, software functions or tasks. Causes of their 
failure modes can only be incoming events or basic events. The writing of relationships 
in the Causes column of FLASH tables for basic components proceeds in a similar way 
as for other modules. Figure 4-16 shows the failure model propagating the event 
NoYloiv. Al (i. e. out of component Al) for the system in Figure 4-14. The corresponding 
FLASH table is Table 4-10. Causes of NoYloiv. Al can be two primary events (i. e. Fail 
to Open, Phigged) and two incoming events (i. e. No. Signal Al. cir and NoYloiv. Tank). 
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The tree built for the top event NoYloiv. Al is in Figure 4-17. Given the simplicity of the 
failure model the tree comprises only one OR gate. As already said, the tree and the table 
are equivalent and the construction of the tree is not necessary for the construction of the 
table. Figure 4-18 shows the full model for component B1, which actually is a different 
instance of component Al. It has two incoming flows (i. e. FloivAl and Signal B1. Ctr) 
and one outgoing flow (i. e. Poiv. Bl). The outgoing event area in Table 4-11 considers 
all the events that can potentially be propagated by the module and their relations with 
Incoming and Generated events. Reliability data for generated events (taken from 
[OREDA, 1984]) are recorded into the Basic Events area. GOE are not used for the 
analysis of this component since relations between effects and causes do not need to be 
further simplified. 
Al 
No. Flow. Tank 
Fal lo open Plugged ---] 
No. Flow. Al 
L Fag to close - 7-d 
No. Signal-Al. Ctr 
Figure 4-16: Failure model for component "Al"16 
16 For the completeness of the drawing all basic events of the component A are shown. 
However Fail to Close, Significant Internal Leakage and Partially PhIgged are not 
causes of the effect NoYloivAl, they contribute to other effects propagated by the 
module that are not analysed here. 
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OUTGOI NG EVENTS 
Effects 
Events to C D i ti 
Critica- 51h Column: Justification, Design d ti D i dS f t 
Verification 
FMEA 
the same auses escr p on lity 
Recommen a ons, er ve a e y ( 
level Requirements results) 
Before design 
Recormnendations 
The output of The failure have to be handled by 
component detecting the failure event and activating 
Al deviates Line 2 
from the Effect max accepted likelihood 
design 10-4 on demand 
intention. After design 
NoYloiv. Ta Ilere are no Detection 
nk effects on the A flow sensor after and external the 
OR system if the module It will be No. Signal 
- 
failure is Recovery used during No. AI. Ctr detected and N/A Possible switching to line 2 the FlowAl OR recovered Recommendation verification Fail to The Iine2 has to be uncoupled with the stage OpenAl Line I is out line 1 
OR of work, but Ensure that the failure detection 
PluggedAl flow can go mechanism is reliable 
through line Analyse the error detection mechanism 
2. for potential failure modes 
Max accepted likelihood for critical 
Action is events in the Causes column. 
needed to Failure rate for Fail to OpenAl should 
open line2 be < 10-3 h-1 
Failure rate for PluggedAl should be 
< 10-3 h-1 
Table 4-10: FILASH table for the model in Figure 4-16 
----------- ------------- ----------- 
No. Signal AI. Ctr No. FLo" 
------------- ------------ ----------- 
---------- -------- 
Figure 4-17: This tree for the effect NoYlowAl in Figure 4-11 
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Flow. Al 
Fail to open 
Fall to close 
Signal-Bl. Ctr 
Plugged 
Significant internal 
leackage 
Figure 4-18: Model for Component B1 
Bi 
Flow. Bl 
Analysis of sub-modules 
The analysis of sub-modules proceeds in a similar way as the analysis of modules. Here 
we will see the analysis of the programmable electronic module Control in Figure 4-14. 
This sub-module has both software and hardware components. Events propagated can be 
caused either by incoming events, generated events that are further developed into lower 
level modules (i. e. Input, Output, Hardware and Software modules) and combinations of 
those. In fact this module has fault tolerant capabilities, hence the ability to recover 
from some single hardware or software failures. However, the recovery action may fail, 
either because of random failures or couplings, and cause failure events still to be 
propagated. The simultaneous occurrence of failure events with the redundant failure of 
the recovery action is represented by AND gates in the Causes column of the FLASH 
table. Figure 4-20 and Table 4-12 report the tree and the table for the effect 
No. Signal B1.0r that is propagated by the Controller in Figure 4-19, the failure of any 
recovery function is represented by AND gates. 
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OUTGOING EVENTS 
Effects Effects & P Column: Justification, Design Verification 
Events to the same Causes Consequences Criticality Recommendations, Derived Safety (FMEA 
level description Requirements results) 
Before design 
Recommendations 
The failure have to be handled by detecting 
The output ofcomponcnt the 
failure event and activating Line 2 
BI deviates from the Effect max accepted likelihood 
Xo. FlowAl expected behaviour. 104 on dc=nd 
OR There are no effects on the Afterdesign 
No. Szg,, iaLBI. Czr system 
ifthe failure is Detection It will be used 
XO. FloW. BI OR detected and recovered NIA A flow sensor after and external the module, during the 
FailtoOpen. B] Recovery verification 
OR Line I is out of work, but Possible switching to line 2 stage 
Plugged. Bl flow can go through line 2. Recommendation 
Line2 has to be uncoupled with line 1, CCF Action is needed to open analysis is needed, Iinc2 Max accepted likelihood for critical 
events in the Causes column. 
X (Failto Op, &Bl)< 10' h" 
X (Plu zze'LBI) < 104 h-1 
Brfore design 
Recommendations 
Ibc failure cannot be handled since Al has 
The output of component already failed 
BI deviates from the Effect max accepted likelihood 
Afore. Flo. -41 design intention. 104 on demand 
AND 'There are no effects on the After design 
(Cý_. SigwLBI. Czr system if the failure is Detection It will be used 
Afore. FlowBI OR detected and recovered N/A A flow sensor afler BI during the Fail to CloseBI Recovery verification 
OR Too much flow is delivered Not possible stage Significant Internal by the BI. At has already Recommendation 
Leakage. BI) failed. Valve At has to be uncoupled with Valve 
III, CCF analysis is needed. 
system is lost Max accepted likelihood for critical 
events in the Causes column. 
X (Significant InzernalifeakageXI)l< IOh-' 
X(Fail to CloseBI) 
Before design 
Recommendations 
The output of component 
'The failure have to he handled by detecting 
BI deviates from the the failure event, closing line I and activating 
design intention, Line 2 
There arc no effects on the Effect Max accepted likelihood 
system if the failure is 104 on demand 
LessFlowAl dctwed and recovered After design It will be used 
LessFloiv. Bl OR NIA Detection during the 
Partially PluggedBI Less flow than required is A flow sensor after and external valve 131 verification delivered by the Recovery stage 
component Line 2 is likely Possible switching to line 2 
to compensate. Recommendation 
Linc2 has to be uncoupled with the line 1, Action is needed to CCF analysis is needed. 
operate Iinc2 Max accepted likelihood for critical 
events In the Causes column. 
I X (Parfiallv PlueZedlll) < 104 It' 
Normal. FlowAl It will be used 
Korina). Flow. Bl AND Line I is working line NIA Reliability must be > 0.999998 
during the 
NornialSignaLBI. Cir verification 
stage 
Before design 
Recommendations 
The system has fault tolerant capabilities, 
henec it is 11-cly it is working though some 
bilures has occurred 
Effect max accepted likelihood 
A recovery action took 
place in the controller. 
X (Partially_Plugged. BI) < 10 h-' 
Nornial. FlowAl After design It will be used 
Tagged. F1o. BI AND The module is still NIA Detection 
during the 
Tagged. SignaLBI. Ctr u orking, hoý ever the Already detected verification 
system ý ill be lost for any Recovery stage 
additional failure Already done 
Recommendation 
Correct the problem as soon as possible and 
not later than two hours after detection. 
Max accepted likelihood for critical 
events In the Causes column. 
NIA 
Basic Events 
Reliability data Fail to Open. BI Plugged. Bl Significant Internal Fail to Close BI 
Pattiagy 
Leakage. Bl . Plugged. B1 
Failure Rate Xfl/h) ieý5 le-5 le-6 le-5 1 e-5 
Repair Rate t. [1 fnj . 25 . 25 
---72-5 
. 25 
Mean Time to Failure MTTF [h) 
Mission time (of the system) [h) 8740 8740 8740 8740 8740 
Table 4-11: FLASH table for BI 
ill 
Input failures 
Controller Software failures 
recoverable Software module Software Module Failure -recoverable 
by the 
by Software Output module 
(Requirements. 
Specifications 
and Software) 
No. Signal. Sensor 
Input 
ý7w 
output No. Signal-Bl. Ctr 
41D I 
module . 
IF 
Hardwa,. Failure . failur 
(input recov ý, atile (output 
Circuits d by So Uare Circuits and 
registers) 
ýJIFI 
registers) 
"Z-1 
Processor module 
Output failures (Processors and 
recoverable Memories) Hardware Mýdule Failure 
by Software 
Input Mo4le Failure 
r -- ----------- Hardawe failures 
No. Power. BusBar recoverable by the 
Output module 
Figure 4-19: Controller with included modules 
Ha, &- faMxe Pardware faý 
,d Ape P&S, -.. B. ss. V. Lse- NaP t4a. vwue]. Pý ýery kmt 
faiý faff 
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......... 
p_, kse 
The Wwwo Ws M 0"%. A w. 
Ygm faae ard UWA Waa and 
h. d... lk,. h. -.. ble by 
ta, ý. f.. b- t. ý. 
operates gý 
faý I. fa I 
J1. 
, S_ propa; Xesm 
; 
1'1ý1 
r, 
1911W 
Figure 4-20: Tree for the event No. Signal-Bl. Ctr for the Controller in Figure 4-19 
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OUTGOIN G EVENTS 
Event to the searne Causes Description Criticality , juibli"ti" , Design Recii-dittitiret. Derived Safety 5' C = Verification level (Effects) Rq u Ix (FMEA results) 
E, f- dsit. 
Recennnrcrd. tiiin 
LValueOutpulOR 
ý 
11. failmecannet hatulled. 11bastobe, "-Iyunlikely 
No. Pgnaf. Sensor Effect ... accepted likelihood 
OR O. Value. output OR 10'.. demand 
No Power Ousbar Aft- d, * l g OR No. Valua Input OR Some f2u l t toknnm has been achin ed, however wine single failures of No. Value Output 
OR O. Value. 1hput OR Line 1 is out of 
the Output tied Input module cannot be recovered. 
LValue. Input OF? work. but flow 
Det etion 
S0ftw HardwareL JeJYure ard can go through . _ _ hurict failure. GOE arejeCý fine 2 
Recovery It will be used 
No. SigriaLBI. Ctr _ OR . WA Not possible during the 
Software lalFure and Hardw, The control Recomunendatiou verification stage 
are rec ýimct t7kre-GOE should activate Sofmare most be developed to comply wilb safety integrity level few 
04' -- fine2 Alai accepted tiWithood for critical events In the Can column. 
Input faifureý an(t Software A (L Value. Ouipul) IOh-' 
_ _ - re4j huru: t failure. GOE OR JL(No. SqrkV. Sensoj ý IO'h` 
. input fai&q and sonware 
- 
)L(O. Value-Outpul) < Wit` 
recý Iunct 61re-ZiOE OR A(No. Power. Bus bar) < 104h' 
. HaTdwar; Failure and Outp A (No. Value. Inpuli e le b-, 
LtrecLJ1u7xt tailt. Fe. G511 A (No. Value. Input) e lob" 
A(No. Value. Oufpu0 < IO'h' 
I I A (1-Value. /hput) e 10'h' 
Group of events Causes Description Criticality 
5- Columat Justification. Design Recommendations, Derived Safety Verification 
Recluirements (FMEA restults) 
B, fore d, ýig. 
R-maim. d. timis 
The failete "mot be handled. It has to be extoemly =likely 
Effect max ampted likelihood 
P f l bl f l t S ft 
19'.. demand 
Hardware failimq_an 
rocessor ai ure recovera e 
by software 
AND 
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Basic Events 
Processor Output fails to Input 
Softare fails to 
failure Software tails to Software failure rncovera failure mcovera 
Reliability data recoverable reCONier a recoverable by recoverable recovera- recoverable 
by the recoverable the output hardware failure and ble by 
hardware latiture 
software 
hardware failur 
vropagates, no signal software and propagates no signal 
Failure Rate Xilb] 1OEw5 1OEm5 iOEm5 
Rate i, 11 I R IL 
Mean Tiý FailumMTTF(hi 
Mission firne [h) 14. 8740 
Table 4-12: Piece of the FLASH table for the effect No. Signal BI. Ctr 
4.3.2 Integration and Verification 
The aim of the FLASH analysis in the integration and verification phase is to confirm 
that the system with its real components meets requirements, specifications and 
recormnendations produced during the decomposition and design. This verification 
cannot be done earlier, since the detailed information about components is not available 
until the end of the design process, which is when basic components are chosen. After 
this stage, we have the most detailed knowledge about the system and all the information 
we need to assess how good the system will be with real components. During the 
verification process, each component, sub-module and module in the hierarchy is 
individually verified to confirm that they meet requirements, specifications and 
recommendations. The process starts from basic components and proceeds towards 
higher levels of integration finishing at the top level. All the tables are considered and 
the likelihood of propagated events is evaluated by using fault tree analysis. 
Probabilities of these events (which are top events in fault trees) are recorded in the 
"FMEA results" column. Additionally, in this column evidence is given to show that the 
requirements and constraints defined during the decomposition and design are met. If 
some of the recommendations are not met they are reviewed or the system design 
enhanced. In the latter case, the architecture of the module that does not meet 
recommendations is modified. In some instances it may be sufficient to replace only one 
component, in others, a whole module may have to be re-engineered. Following those 
modifications, FLASH analysis has to be re-run for all new components and all the ones 
interfacing with them. Figure 4-21 shows the entire process of verification with the 
feedback given to the decomposition and design. In this figure n,,,, represents the 
number of levels in the hierarchy, n the current level, ni the current module under 
analysis and E the effect for which the tree is built. 
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Figure 4-21: Feedback to decomposition and design 
Trees for effects are constructed by parsing the hierarchy of tables. These trees link in a 
consistent manner results from the functional level analysis to low level FMEAs. The 
process of fault tree synthesis is mechanical. It is a simple parsing of tables, from the 
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current level down to the bottom. Figure 4-22 shows the tree drawn from the top event 
NoYloiv. Module that is obtained by parsing tables for Module, Al, B1 and Controller. 
This tree can also be obtained linking trees represented in Figure 4-15, Figure 4-17, 
Figure 4-20. Intermediate events No. Signal A2. Ctr, No. Signal B2. Ctr, NoYlolvA2 and 
NoYloiv. B2 are not developed. Dashed branches represent incoming events of the 
Module. Table 4-13 is the FLASH table for the Modide as it should be after the 
verification (i. e. the FMEA results column is completed). 
NoTlý. module 
----------------- I-- ------------ - 
------- -------- ------- -------- ------ 
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..... ------- 
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Figure 4-22: Tree for the top event No. FlowModule 
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Table 4-13: Complete FLASH table for Module 
4.4 Tool support 
The FLASH method presented so far appears to be quite complex. However, it can be 
supported by a software tool that automates the most tedious and errors prone 
procedures. A software tool may help to navigate through the hierarchy of tables, 
generate trees, to calculate the likelihood of events propagated and to make consistency 
checks on the whole hierarchy. The navigation through tables is useful to trace the 
propagation and transformation of events from high level functional failures to low level 
component failure modes. The automatic fault trees generation and evaluation, allows 
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drawing trees for hazardous events and updating them any time the design is modified. 
Consistency checks are related to the FLASH hierarchy. Hierarchies, like the one 
produced by FLASH need to be consistent to be useful. It may happen that while writing 
tables for FLASH modules or modifying them, that consistency among tables in the 
hierarchy is lost. Hence consistency has to be checked following changes. 
During our research, an existing software tool, the Safety Argument Manage 
(SAM), developed at the University of York [McDermid, 1994], has been adapted to 
support some phases of the FLASH method. At present, a new SAM module supports 
writing and updating of FLASH tables. In addition, it has been shown how generation of 
fault trees from FLASH tables is possible. Until now the automatic tree generation has 
not been implemented in the FLASH module of the SAM software. Here are two 
reasons: 1) lack of time; 2) it is believed to be possible to reuse part of existing code for 
the automatic fault tree generation already developed in [Papadopoulos and McDermid, 
1999a] within the HiP-HOPS module of SAM. 
FLASH tables are written using an editor very similar to widely used commercial 
table editors. When the table hierarchy is completed, the editor makes possible 
navigating from any table to lower or higher level tables by selecting an event and 
choosing to Explore causes or Navigate back. Causes of any event in the hierarchy can 
be traced to component failure modes. Events are chosen from the Causes column of a 
table. The tag of the event identifies the table that contains causes of this event. Events 
are sought in the Effects column of the table propagating them. Causes are in the 
corresponding box of the Causes column. Figure 4-23 displays the Outgoing area of the 
table for the top level of a fuel system. This table propagates three effects No-. Fllelft, 
More_. Fitelft and Less-. Fuelft. Causes of the event No-Yttelft are: 
0-. FiteLbva AND 0-. FiteLbvb OR No-. PowerSupply. PS 
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Figure 4-23: outgoing area of the table for the top level 
If the analyst requires to search for causes of the event 0-. Fuel. bva, the software takes 
the bva table and seeks that event in output columns of this table (i. e. Output events to 
the "Same" or "Enclosing" level). As the Figure 4-24 shows causes of this event are the 
following: 
Fail_to_open. bva OR O-. BVAi. ec OR Pluggedbva 
> 
jI PU Tj, A, 
ýtojl*j 
NCLO 34, U-1-l' 
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LID J 
ýLnýj 
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Figure 4-24: Causes of the effect 0-. Fuel. bva 
Once analysts have found causes of the event 0-. Fuel. bva they may want to seek more 
details or the causes of the causes. For instance, they may want to investigate the event 
Fai1_to_open. bva, that is one of the causes of the event 0-. Fuel. bva. This event has the 
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tag bva therefore it has to be sought in the same table. In fact it is a basic event for the 
component bva. Reliability information for this basic event is shown in Figure 4-25. 
The function Navigate back that is highlighted at the right of the SAM window for the 
component bva leads back to the previous table i. e. Figure 4-24. This makes it possible 
to select another event and investigate its causes or find out its reliability information. 
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Figure 4-25: Basic events table for component bva 
The FLASH module of SAM also supports the writing of expressions in the Causes 
column of the FLASH table by providing the analyst with the set of events and gates to 
form the expression in the Causes column. Once the analyst has chosen the function 
"write causes" and points on the Causes column, a menu appears. This menu shows the 
only set of incoming and generated events, AND and OR gates, and parentheses that can 
be used to build expressions in that table. Any expression is built only by selecting 
entries from that "pop-up" menu. 
For the reasons already mentioned, we did not develop the software for automatic 
fault tree construction. That prevented us from running complex case studies. It has 
been discovered that manual construction of fault trees from the FLASH table is quite 
tedious, and prone to mistakes. This is particularly evident when designs are reviewed 
during an advanced stage of the lifecycle, i. e. in the integration and verification stage, 
and many trees are to be modified and re-evaluated. In those cases the automatic fault 
tree generation would be very helpful. Once an effect is selected in a FLASH table, the 
function Fault Tree should draw a tree with that event at the top. When sufficient 
reliability data are available also the top event likelihood should be given. Figure 4-26 
displays the tree for the top event No_. Fuel. fc presented in previous tables as it should 
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appears for the event in our example. Additionally the automatic fault tree generation 
can potentially be used to check the consistency of the whole hierarchy. Building all the 
possible fault trees in the hierarchy would not be possible if there are inconsistencies in 
tables. 
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Figure 4-26: Fault tree for the top event No Fuel. fc 
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4.5 Discussion 
This chapter presented the FLASH method, which aims to support the decomposition and 
design of a system and the integration and verification process. FLASH is performed in 
parallel to the design in a hierarchical fashion. It uses a common syntax that formalises 
the causal relationship that underlies traditional safety analysis techniques like FHA, 
HAZOP and FMEA information. Within the FLASH framework, causes in the (n-1) 
level tables become effects in the (n) level tables. Fault trees are built from FLASH 
tables by parsing the relations between causes and effects. In the integration and 
verification, tables produced during the decomposition and design are reviewed and 
checked to see whether specifications and derived safety requirements are met. FTA is 
used to estimate the likelihood of each hazard. The aim is to calcula te the probability for 
all the critical functional failure modes. 
FLASH can generate results that traditionally have been generated by FHA, HAZOP 
and FMEA, link these results and relate them back to the functional hazard assessment. 
This makes possible the feedback from the integration and verification phase to the 
decomposition and design phase in the lifecycle. FLASH also enables automated 
consistency checks on the results from the analysis and the mechanical generation of 
fault trees. 
The major benefits expected from the application of the method are to improve 
industrial practice concerning the safety analysis of safety critical systems. Whilst we 
have not shown that FLASH does work effectively in industries, there is evidence that it 
will be useful. In particular we have found that FLASH can be a way to comply with 
guidelines that are going to be released for the certification of PLCs for safety critical 
applicatiops by the Italian Institute for Safety and Health at the Work, [ISPESL/CEI, 
2000; Picciolo, 2000, Minichino et al. 2000]. PLCs are now taking the place of relay 
logic in safety critical applications and certification bodies require that PLCs meet at 
least the standard that was guaranteed by the relay logic that is Safety Integrity Level 2. 
In this context, ISPESL (Instituto Superiore per la Prevenzione E la Sicurezza sul 
Lavoro) which is responsible for the implementation of European directives, is issuing 
guidelines for the assessment of Safety Critical PI-Cs on behalf of the European Agency 
for Health and Safety and the Italian Ministry of Heath. These guidelines will be a 
national standard and will recommend a hierarchical decomposition and study of systems 
according to the SADT notation [Ross, 1985] that was considered by us prior developing 
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our method and is very similar to the FLASH hierarchical decomposition. In this context 
the FLASH method can potentially be seen as a way to meet those guidelines. 
FLASH has been successfully applied to the analysis of small high integrity 
systems, among them a PLC and a computerised braking system, but it is a complex 
technique that can be heavy to apply without the assistance of suitable software to take 
charge of repetitive and error prone tasks. It is unclear that it will be applicable to 
support the design and verification of a very large system such as an aircraft, a 
helicopter, a chemical or nuclear installation. The design of those systems, though they 
appear to be hierarchically decomposable, is not usually approached hierarchically. Each 
subsystem is designed separately from given specifications and then they are assembled. 
Frequently it happens that significant changes have to be made later to put all the 
subsystems together. A real hierarchical top down design like the one proposed by 
FLASH is actually not done because it would take too much time, although it would save 
expensive modifications when the artefact is already in an advanced stage of 
construction. In this context FLASH could still be used to develop each sub-system. 
However we believe that if a FLASH analysis is available for each sub-systems then it 
may be possible to link all these FLASH analyses to produce the FLASH model for the 
full system. This might be possible if the technique were sufficiently highly automated. 
The next chapter extends the FLASH formalism to Common Cause Failure analysis. 
The information about modules' lifecycle recorded into FLASH tables during the 
developing phases is used for a qualitative and a quantitative evaluation of common 
cause and the others dependent failures. 
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Chapter Five 
Common Cause Failure 
This chapter extends the FLASH formalism presented in chapter four to treat common 
cause failures. Here we show how the hierarchy of FLASH tables can be used to identify 
those minimal cut sets that need to be analysed for common cause failures. Additionally, 
we provide a novel method for quantitative estimation of the likelihood of minimal cut 
sets with coupled events that uses lifecycle information recorded in FLASH tables. 
5.1 Overview 
Common cause failures were extensively introduced in the second chapter. They are a 
particular kind of failure that occur within redundant devices and endanger fault tolerant 
systems by causing their redundant channels to fail at the same time or in a short time 
interval. They act like a single point of failure for these systems. If it were possible to 
have fault tolerant systems with uncoupled channels, there would be no need to 
investigate common cause failures in these systems since no single cause could give rise 
to system failure. However it is practically impossible to construct, maintain and operate 
completely independent redundant systems so there is always the need for common cause 
failure analysis in fault tolerant systems. 
The easiest way to consider common cause failures is to study minimal cut sets of 
fault trees drawn for critical events of the fault tolerant system. Minimal cut sets 
exhaustively represent all the combinations of failures that, when occurring 
simultaneously, cause the system failure. In the case of common cause failures, it 
happens that the root cause 17 through the coupling factor causes all the events in the 
minimal cut set to occur within a very short time span. Consequently the fault tolerant 
system fails as if all the events in the minimal cut set had arisen randomly. 
Typically, the likelihood of a minimal cut set occurring because of common cause 
failures is extremely small, at least one or two orders smaller than the smallest likelihood 
of events in the minimal cut set. However, it is always greater than the likelihood of the 
17 See chapter 2 
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whole minimal cut set if the events occur randomly, consequently it is the most important 
contribution to the total likelihood of the minimal cut set. Hence analysts have to 
consider common cause failures any time they want to use redundancies to pursue failure 
rates smaller than those of any component employed in the redundant configuration. 
One purpose of common cause failure analysis is to evaluate the actual likelihood of 
minimal cut sets with coupled events. Without considering common cause failures, fault 
trees for fault tolerant systems underestimate, often by many orders, the likelihood of the 
top event. 
FLASH supports the studies of common cause failures after fault trees have been 
drawn for critical failures and minimal cut sets obtained 18. The process consists, first, in 
the identification of minimal cut sets that have to be analysed for common cause failures 
(i. e. with coupled events), then in the estimation of the likelihood of these minimal cut 
sets. 
5.2 Identification of MCS with coupled events 
The identification of minimal cut sets with coupled events is the first step for considering 
common cause failures in the FLASH method. In the second chapter we saw that 
common cause failures arise when there are couplings among redundant components. 
These couplings may be generated anywhere in the lifecycle of components making up 
redundant channels. Coupling may be the same person producing the design, the way 
components are manufactured, installed, tested, maintained etc. To formalise the 
identification of couplings, many checklists have been proposed, two of these are in 
[Mosleh et al., 1993] and [SAE-ARP 4754,1996]. However, these are very general so we 
have developed a new checklist (reported in Table 5-1) to address software components. 
These checklists aim to be a reference for designers who try to construct fault tolerant 
systems with coupling-free redundant channels, but also to help safety analysts to unveil 
hidden couplings overseen by designers. 
In addition to these two uses, we believe, checklists can be employed for an 
additional purpose, which is to collect information about potential couplings that may 
occur during the lifetime of components. The idea is that, in correspondence with each 
heading of a checklist, we can record information specific to each component, e. g. a code 
that identifies potential couplings. For example, in correspondence with the entry 
'8 It is not intended in this chapter to show how minimal cut set can be obtained by 
reducing a Fault Tree. That can be found in [Vesely, 1981]. 
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component manufacturer, the code may identify the company producing the component; 
in correspondence with the entry component procedure, it may identify the procedure 
adopted for manufacturing; and so on, for all the entries in the list. In this way we have 
unequivocally identified all19 the potential couplings in which a component may be 
affected. 
Development (Process) Requirements 
Requirements team 
Specifications 
Specifications team 
Implementation strategy 
Implementation team 
Design strategy 
Design team 
Test (Process) Criteria 
Objectives 
Requirement test specification 
Integration test specification 
Unit test specification 
Test team 
Tools (for Development Compiler 
and Test) Link/Loaders 
Code Generator 
Design & Requirements Tools 
Operating System 
Test Stubs and Drivers 
Test Monitoring 
Test Management 
Installation Procedure Production of PROMS 
Loading a FLASH memory 
Operating Environment Operating System 
Device Drivers 
Table 5-1: Checklist of potential couplings in Generic Software Modules 
The list2o of potential couplings is, then, inherited by basic events originating within the 
component. This makes it feasible to compare basic events on the same ground. For 
example, if two apparently different valves, a stop and a control valve, produced by two 
'9 We aim to identify all the couplings of the component by using a list of attributes that 
spans the whole lifecycle and that is as exhaustive as practical. 
20 The list of potential couplings is what, in chapter 4, was called lifecycle information, 
or lists of lifecycle categories. 
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different manufacturers, are maintained by the same person 21 , basic eventS22 for both 
valves will record the name of that person in their corresponding lifecycle category. That 
person makes them coupled, so a minimal cut set in which there are basic events 
generated in those valves (e. g. fail io control for the control valve and fail stuck for the 
stop valve) is vulnerable to common cause failures, hence the analysts have to undertake 
common cause failure analysis. 
To show a practical example of how the FLASH method works, we will analyse the 
minimal cut set in Figure 5-1. This figure provides a graphical representation of 
couplings that may exist in a minimal cut set of the third order. It shows that events A, B, 
and C share a number of couplings. First we see that all of the three events share code 
I1F1 which represents the fact that the same people have installed components in which 
these events may arise. Then we see that events A and B are coupled by coupling codes 
i. e. DCA1, DTM1, DS1, OSI, OP1, MS1, and MP1 which are the potential couplings 
generated during the Concept and Design, the Operation and the Maintenance stages. 
Additionally we see that events B and C share coupling codes MM2, MDP2, and MPP2, 
which are the couplings generated during manufacturing. Therefore this minimal cut set 
has to undergo common cause failure analysis. 
When a minimal cut set like this is found there are actually three possibilities. The 
first and most obvious, is to try to remove couplings. For instance, if only we eliminate 
the couplings HF1 (i. e. Installation - Fitter) we prevent a potential root cause which 
could affect all the events in the minimal cut set. This can be done employing different 
staff23 to fit components where A, B and C arise. 
The second possibility is to assume that no root causes will spread through those 
couplings, then evidence has to be given. For instance it can be said that experience 
from similar systems has shown it to be extremely unlikely that conceivable root cause's 
will spread through such coupling. Additionally, we can say that the remaining 
couplings (i. e. those coupled events AB and BC) do not endanger the system since they 
21 It can be also the same team or the subcontractor. 
22 In FLASH terminology: all their generated events. 
23A practical example is an accident that happened to a British Aerospace aircraft (BAE 
146) with four engines which had a four-engine failitre due to common maintenance 
errors. Now they have changed the procedure: rules say that two teams have to be 
appointed for the maintenance of the four engines (i. e. they have reduced the coupling). 
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only reduce the degree of fault tolerance from three to two failures, and they alone 
cannot cause the minimal cut set. 
The third option is to quantify the likelihood of the coupled minimal cut set with the 
method that we propose in the next section. 
Concept and Design 
Design Architecture 
Technological Materials Equipment Type 
Specifications 
Manufacturer 
Manufacturing Procedures 
Process 
Fitter 
Installation/ Integration Procedures 
0 
And Test Location 
Im 
. 2! 
Routing 
Operation Staff 
Procedures 
Maintenance Staff 
Procedures 
Test Staff 
Procedures 
Calibration Staff 
Procedures 
Mechanical and Thermal 
Environmental Electrical and Corrosion 
Chemical and miscellaneous 
Figure 5-1: Couplings in minimal cut set ABC 
5.3 Likelihood of MCS with coupled events 
The likelihood of a minimal cut set with coupled events is always evaluated by using 
parametric methods. These methods adopt parameters to represent conditional 
probabilities of an event arising in some circumstances. As was said in the second 
chapter, all parametric methods developed, so far, assume the symmetry hypothesis 
[Mosleh et al., 19881, which is based on the common practice in safety and reliability 
analysis to use the same likelihood for events involving similar types of components. 
Experience has actually shown that this is appropriate for systems where common cause 
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failures have been studied in the last thirty years (i. e. nuclear power and chemical 
plants). What happens is that failure rates for similar types of valves, pumps, diesel 
engines etc. (i. e. same size, activation etc. ) operating in comparable environmental 
conditions are very similar, regardless of the manufacturer and the designer [T-Book, 
1992; OREDA, 1984]. 
However we are addressing a different area. Fault tolerant computer based systems 
are usually not constructed using similar hardware components, but by using a mixture of 
different hardware, software, information and time redundancies. Consequently events 
representing misbehaviours of their redundant channels are always bound to have very 
different probabilities. Therefore the symmetry hypothesis cannot be accepted when 
evaluating the likelihood of coupled minimal cut set for these systems. 
Hence in this section we propose a novel method for the quantitative estimation of 
probabilities of minimal cut set with coupled events that does not assume the symmetry 
hypothesis. First, we present a new perspective to look at the likelihood of a generic 
event. Then we show bow to calculate the probability of a minimal cut set with coupled 
events considering only actual couplings. 
5.3.1 Likelihood of a generic event 
The likelihood of an event is the probability that it occurs within certain conditions that 
are described by some parameters. Among these parameters there are the failure 
probability on demand, and the frequency that the event occurs, which are functions of 
other parameters describing, for instance, environmental conditions in which the 
component originating the event is operating (e. g. environmental dependencies, etc. ), 
maintenance, testing, etc. For our studies we assume that the probability of each event is 
already known. That is equivalent to say that contributions previously mentioned are 
already considered in the total likelihood of the event. 
What we aim to do is partitioning the total likelihood of the event and associate each 
share to a lifecycle category. This is like assuming that basic events in components arise 
because of something that was not properly considered or that could have been done 
better in the lifecycle of the component, i. e. an error or a defect. The portion of the 
likelihood of each event that is associated with each lifecYcle category is "the 
Percentage 17b, " that was introduced in chapter four. 
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In mathematical terms, the total likelihood of an event X can be written as P(X). If 
event X is made up of n independent events Xi 9 we can write 
P(X) as in the following 
expression: 
11 
Pw Yxi i=l 
) 
This is a very complex expression to expand 24 . For example, for n=3 (Nvhich is 
equivalent to a minimal cut set of the third order) it can be written as: 
3 
P(x) =px 
= P(2ý1 + X2 + XJ 
= P60 + P(2ý2 + 
-X3) 
- 
P(ll (LC2 + 
-X3)) 
= P60 + P(12) + P(2ý3) - 
P(2ý2: 2ý3) - 
P(&:? ý2 + 
-Xl: 
ý3) 
However, since in our study we are considering probabilities extremely small (i. e. almost 
always smaller that 10-3, terms of the second (or greater) order, i. e. 
P(-X2:! J P(X-1: 12 + &: 13), are extremely small if compared with term of the first order, 
i. e. P(&)Aýý2)AX-3), Therefore they can be neglected and we can write the 
likelihood P(A), for n=3, as: 
3 
P(X)=P YX 
P(ll + X2 + X3) 
P(20 + P(2ý2) + P(2ý3) 
24 Except in the case events Xj are mutually exclusive, in which P(X) can be written as 
P(X) = Y'-"P(2ýi) 
i=1 
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P(X) can be generalized for n generic causes as in equation 5.. 1 that represents P(X) as 
the arithmetical sum of A terms, each of them representing the likelihood P(j, ) of the 
cause xi occurring and giving rise to event 
P(X) = vLxi) 
(5.1) 
When event X is part of a minimal cut set, the cause XI. can be a potential coupling, 
consequently P(? ý, ) will be the likelihood that the potential coupling XI. will give rise 
to event 
is obtained by multiplying the total likelihood P(X) of the event X times 
the Percentage Vol. 
Yo, * P(X) (5.2) 
5.3.2 Likelihood of coupled events 
In this section we see how to estimate the likelihood of a minimal cut set with coupled 
events by using expression 5.1. First we consider a very simple example, a minimal cut 
set made up of two events, for which the lifecycle is decomposed into two categories 
only. Then we will examine a minimal cut set with three events, finally we will 
extrapolate an expression for a minimal cut set of order n with 1 lifecycle categories. 
We know that the likelihood of an uncoupled minimal cut set of the second order is 
the product of the likelihood of each event in the minimal cut set occurring randomly. 
That likelihood can be written for I lifecycle categories by using equation 5.1. It appears 
as in 5.3. 
P (A-1) = P(X) P(Y) PLxi)'P(Y-i) (5.3) 
It 
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However, as we said in the second chapter, when the minimal cut set is coupled this 
expression does not hold, so we have to consider the product of the likelihood of every 
single potential cause of each event with the likelihood of every single potential cause of 
all the other events. Therefore, the likelihood of a minimal cut set of the second order 
(n=2) with two lifecycle categories (1 = 2) has to be written as in 5.4. 
P (A13 =P NCI t12) b +Y-2)1 (5.4) 
= Lxiyi + x-iy-2 + 2ui + 2ýý] 
To further expand 5.4 we must know whether or not potential causes are mutually 
exclusive. Actually they are not mutually exclusive. A potential cause that gives rise to 
an event does not exclude another potential cause of that event. For example, the fact 
that an actuator fails because it was wrongly manufactured (i. e. it wears out too quickly), 
does not exclude the same actuator failing, at exactly the same time, because it was also 
wrongly tested during maintenance. However, the likelihood of both events happening 
simultaneously is quite small. Therefore, since potential causes are not mutually 
exclusive, expression 5.4 can be expanded as follows in 5.5. 
P (M =P KDtK2) (YI+Y-2)] 
P Lxiyi + x-, Y2 +, i2y, + 2ýý] 
P (DYI) +P (DY-2) +P(!! &/) +P (5.5) 
P (! IIYIY2) -P (K2YIY2) -P (LCIMI) -P QýIXM-2) 
+P (ty-IMIY-2) 
This expression appears quite complex, however we can make some considerations to 
simplify it. Since we deal with probabilities which are extremely small, terms of the 
third and fourth order (i. e. P(IYYd, NK&&d, NKMd, P(, Ilx and P(XILIYIY2)) are &d 
negligible when compared to terms of the second order O. e. NMd, Nxa-d, P(Md and 
Ni&d), therefore they can be safely ignored. Hence the probability of the same minimal 
cut set can be written as: 
P (LOY-1) -ý P (DY-2) +P (I&I) +P 0ý) (5.6) 
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or in a more compact forrn as: 
22 
P (X)ý = ZEP 
-i, 
yj) (5.7) 
i=I j=I 
Now, if we suppose that events X and Y are coupled for the first of the two lifecycle 
categories (see the Figure 5-2), we know that P(xjyj) has to be evaluated with methods 
for common cause failure analysis, whilst the remaining probabilities, i. e- P(X-IY2), P(MI) 
and P(x2b), can be simply calculated as products of independent terins. Hence, if we use 
subscript letters I and C to indicate Independent and Coupled likelihood (i. e. P, and PC) 
of a generic event we can represent the value of each of the terms in 5.6 as in equation 
5.8. 
p Qui) = Pi On) Pi (yi) + PCOýl yl) 
(DY-2): -": P (D) P (Y-2) 
P(j)=P()P(yj) 
P (M) = P(K2) P(Y-2) 
(5.8) 
x Y 
LIFECYCLE 
INFORMATION 
Category 1 
(Potential Coupling) Yf 
Category 2 
(Potential Coupling) 
Figure 5-2: Minimal cut set of the second order with two lifecycle categories 
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Therefore, estimation of the likelihood of a minimal cut set of the second order, with two 
lifecycle categories can be handled quite easily, as we have seen. However, if we 
increase the order of the minimal cut set and the number of lifecycle categories, the 
complexity scales up. Actually, the number of terms in the expression for the likelihood 
of a minimal cut set of the third order with five lifecycle categories (like the one 
represented in Figure 5-3) has 125 terms that can be compactly represented by expression 
5.9. 
555 
P(xm ý- (5.9) 
i=l j=l k=l 
Now, if we look at Figure 5-3, we see that some of the couplings related to only a sub- 
group of events in the minimal cut set. For instance, the first potential coupling concerns 
events X and Y, while the second concerns events Y and Z; the third involves events X 
and Z; and only the last one touches all the three events in the minimal cut set. Therefore 
if we highlight in bold coupled events in equation 5.9 we will have mixed likelihood 
terms like P(, Xl, X ty, etc. i, zd, P(x-2, Y-2, z0z, N. Y3, Y-3, zd, Nii, xz, zd, 
N, Y-,, z), 
Probabilities of these terms can be evaluated as products of an independent likelihood 
times a common cause failure likelihood. For example P(yj, E1, ý0 can be seen as 
product of common cause failure terrn P(, ýýI, J! d times the independent term Ngd- 
P(3: i, x zd =N : xýi,. yd * P(zd 
(5.10) 
Where: 
P(Ixiyd --": Pl(! KdPI(Y-d+ PC(DY-2) 
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LIFECYCLE 
INFORMATION 
Category 1 
Category 2 
Category 3 
Category 4 
Category 5 
XHY 
04xy 04yz 
x4 0 y4 Z4 
0 
4ýyz 
X5 YS Z5 
Figure 5-3: Minimal cut set of the third order with five lifecycle categories 
Probabilities for the other mixed terms with two coupled events i. e. P(, yj, Iz P(& xi i, d.,, 
93), 
... 'Nii, yi, -z-5); 
PO:,, Y2, Ld NK2, Y2, z0z, ..., P(ýx5, 
y2, zd and P(D, yl, D), P(D, Y2, 
P(D, y5, Z3) can be similarly evaluated. While the likelihood for the term P(14,14, 
_44) 
is calculated on the basis that X4, Y4 and Z4 are fully coupled. Therefore it will be as in 
expression 5.11. 
P(X-4Y4. Z4) ý PX-14) Pl(-V4) PX94) 
" PJCX4) PC(Y-4 D) (5.11) 
" PI(Y4) PC(14 94) 
" PLZ4) PC(X-4Y4) 
" PC(X-4. Y4 94) 
Table 5-2 reports all the terms that have to be substituted in expression 5.9 to consider 
common cause failures in the minimal cut set in our example. The right column has 
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terms that consider common cause failures which are used to replace terms in the left 
column for the calculation of the likelihood of the minimal cut set in Figure 5-3. 
Terms to be replaced Likelihood o coupled ferms 
I 
!f 
P(KIYI) PI QVI) Pi (YI) + PC (I] YI) 
P(Y2 ý0 PI (Y2) PI (-Z2) + PC (Y-2! Z0 
P(X-3 Z-3) PI (X-3) PI (93) + PC(13 
-ZA 
P(-14 Y4 94) PI (X-4) PI (Y4) PA94) + PI (14) PC(Y4 D) 
" PI (Y4) PC (D M+ PX94) PC(X-4 Y4) 
" PC (DY4 
Table 5-2: Likelihood of coupled terms 
Now we go back to expressions 5.6 and 5.9. They were written for a minimal cut set of 
the second order with two lifecycle categories, and for a minimal cut set of the third 
order with five lifecycle categories respectively. They can be extended to a generic 
minimal cut sets of order n with I lifecycle categories. The extended expression is given 
in 5.12. We can easily see that the number of terms in that expression is equivalent to 
the order n of the minimal cut set raised to the number I of lifecycle categories. 
III 
X1, X2,..., xn) =yz ... 
E Pý P(X" xi 
-j i=l j=l Z=l 
This expression may have tenns representing coupled probabilities up to order 11. We 
have already seen expressions for coupled pr obabilities of second and third order (i. e. 
P(, rjyl) and P(x4 -, y4g4) 
in 5.8 and 5.11). Similar expressions can also be written for greater 
order minimal cut sets, however it is not the aim of this thesis to show the form of these 
temis. 
Drawing some conclusions, in this section we have seen that it is theoretically 
possible to analyse common cause failures at the level of potential couplings. Hence, we 
have transferred the problem of common cause failure analysis from the minimal cut set 
level to a lower, more detailed, level. Additionally, we have proposed a systematic way 
to identify minimal cut sets with coupled events and showed bow common cause 
likelihood can be evaluated considering only contributions from real couplings and not 
with a summary analysis at minimal cut set level, as it is usually done. We have actually 
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approached the problem of common cause failure analysis the other way round. Instead 
of leaving common cause failure analysis as a final analysis we propose to start 
collecting data already at the beginning of the lifecycle then to use these data for a 
systematic identification of potential couplings hence for the evaluation of the common 
cause likelihood. 
However we have not yet seen how, practically, we can estimate Independent and 
Coupled probabilities that are in the expression of the likelihood of a coupled minimal 
cut set. 
5.3.3 Independent and coupled probabilities 
In this section we show a way to estimate the independent and coupled probabilities that 
are in the expression of the likelihood of a coupled minimal cut set. The method we 
propose is based on the 6 factor parametric model that was introduced in the second 
chapter. However, instead of applying this model at minimal cut set level, we apply it at 
the level of potential couplings. This way to proceed can be laborious since it should use 
as many 8 parameters as the number of actual couplings, however some considerations 
based on the experience gained in the past thirty years of studying common cause failures 
will help us in setting reasonable values for these parameters. 
The jO factor parametric model was introduced in the second chapter. It is the 
simplest of all the parametric methods, since it considers only the independent likelihood 
of each event in the minimal cut set and the likelihood of all the events happening 
simultaneously because of a common cause failure. For a minimal cut set of the second 
order it is equivalent to more complicated methods, like the multiple Greek letter model. 
It becomes more and more conservative with the increasing of the order of the minimal 
cut set, however it is the model used the most to consider common cause failures. 
The 8 factor parametric model is quite simple to apply. The coupled likelihood for 
a minimal cut set is obtained by multiplying the likelihood of any of the events in the 
minimal cut set (that for the symmetry hypothesis have the same likelihood) times the 
j8parameter. The 
independent likelihood is then obtained by subtracting the coupled 
likelihood from the total. '17herefore, if we could use the symmetry hypothesis we would 
need to know only two terms: the total likelihood, that is the likelihood of the event as if 
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it was a common, isolated basic event'5 , and the 6 parameter, that is related only to the 
degree of coupling existing among events in the minimal cut set. 
In case of a minimal cut set of the second order the study proceeds as follow. The 
likelihood of each event in the minimal cut set (that for the symmetry hypothesis is the 
same) is given to the term QT(total likelihood). 
P(-ýY) : "2 PM : -- QT 
(Symmetry hypothesis) 
(5.13) 
Then, the coupled likelihood is obtained multiplying QT times the parameterfl. The 
coupled likelihood of two events Pc(X, )ý is indicated by Q2. The subscript "2" 
represents the number of events that are coupled in the minimal cut set. 
PC(IM ==, #QT = Q2 (5.14) 
The independent likelihood is, then, calculated by subtracting the coupled contribution 
Q2 from the total likelihood QT. Since the independent likelihood refers to one event, it 
has subscript "I" i. e. Qj. 
PI M: "": (I-A QT: -- Ql (5.15) 
Therefore the common cause failure probability for a minimal cut set of the second order 
is written as in 5.16. 
p(X )ý =pI (x) pI (i) +p C(xl) = QJ2+ Q2 
Or as function of 6 and Qf. 
p(X y) = Qj 2+ Q2 = [(I-AQT] 2+ XT (5.17) 
The likelihood obtained from the manufacturer data sheets adapted to the condition 
where the component operates. 
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This expression shows also that for fl -, % 0 the likelihood of the minimal cut set tends to 
the likelihood of the two events happening independently. That is an important property, 
that we have to maintain in the expression of the likelihood of a coupled minimal cut set 
that we are going to propose. 
Lim f( I _, 8)QT] 2+)6QT 
QT 
'6 -> 0 
Lim P(X 10 = P(X) PO) 
'6 -> 0 
(5.18) 
The proper way to proceed is to write the coupled likelihood of two events as in 5.19, 
which says that the Pc for a minimal cut set XY can be thought as the fraction 8, y of the 
total likelihood of event X, or as a fractionfly, of the total likelihood of event Y- 
PC(X 1) = fil-Y P(X) ý 16Y. PM 
In this way, we would write independent probabilities PXX) and PXT) as follow: 
PXX) = IPM - Ay P(X)l = P(X) (I-fil9) 
= IPO) - A. PMI = PM (I 
pl (Y) = [PM - ßx., PMI = P(I) (1-ßl. ) 
= [P(X) - ße P(X)] = P(X) (1-AY) 
(5.19) 
and we would obtain the likelihood for a coupled MCS of the second order as in 5.20: 
P (Xl')ý [P(X)(]-, #"Y)l +, 6ýy Pw (5.20) 
However, this expression is quite complex and, additionally, we would have to estimate a 
lot of 6 parameters. In case of a minimal cut set of greater order this expression would 
become even more complex. For a third order minimal cut set it involves the estimation 
of twelve betas i. e. 8,,,, P,, pj,,, j6j,, 8,, 
flu-, 8, j, 6ý,, z, 6zy,. That is not 
practical, therefore we propose another way to proceed. We still believe that using 
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expressions like 5.14 to calculate the likelihood of a group of coupled events is a good 
choice, therefore in following sections we will propose to put all our 8 parameters equal 
to a very conservative value (i. e. 6=1). Additionally we propose to assign to the tenn 
QT, the smallest of the probabilities of events in the minimal cut set, as explained in the 
next section. 
Thefl parameter 
In the j6 factor parametric method the 
P parameter represents the conditional probability 
that the cause of a component failure will be shared by one or more additional 
components, given that a component has already failed. As j6 is a probability, it may 
range between 0 and 1, though, practically, it usually ranges between 1 0-4 and WO-1, 
where the first value is for extremely weakly coupled systems and the second one is for 
highly coupled ones. Additionally, 8 can also be seen as the strength of the coupling 
among events, the greater the j6 factor, the greater is the coupling. 
In our approach, the strength of the coupling among events is represented by the 
existence or not of shared coupling codes in corresponding (peer) lifecycle categories 
weighted with their Percentage VoI. The greater the number of shared coupling codes and 
the higher the Percentage Yo, associated with each lifecycle category, the greater is the 
coupling among events. Basically, what in the, 8 factor parametric method is considered 
in the 6 parameter is, in our approach, considered in the combination of the Percentage 
Vol and the existence of shared coupling codes for corresponding lifecycle categories. 
This is actually what we wanted to achieve since we have introduced lifecycle categories, 
coupling codes and the Percentage Vol to model explicitly the strength of couplings (i. e. 
the 6 parameter in the 8 factor parametric method) among events. Therefore the j8 that 
appears in our method, does not represent the same conditional probability as it does in 
the j8 factor parametric method. In our method we expect j8 to 
be very near to one. To 
be conservative, we propose to put 8= 1 for the analysis of any unknown or new 
systems. However, if there are sufficient data, 8 should be statistically estimated with 
methods similar to those proposed in [Mosleh, et al., 1988], but we won't discuss this 
argument any further. Examples that follow in this and the next chapter will show that 
the failure probability for the same coupled minimal cut set evaluated with the j8 factor 
parametric method and the approach proposed in this thesis (with 6=1) are very similar 
(at least within the same order). 
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Valuefor the total likelihood QT 
As far as QT is concerned, since we cannot assume the symmetry hypothesis (equation 
5.13) and we wish to use expression 5.14 to calculate Pc, we have to find another way to 
assign a value to Qr. We have at least three alternatives. We could either put QT equal to 
the average, the smallest or the biggest value among probabilities of events in the 
minimal cut set. However, since probabilities involved span various orders of 
magnitude, the average value will coincide with the likelihood of the most likely event. 
Additionally, if QT is equal to the most likely event, we may come to the absurd 
conclusion that the coupled likelihood is bigger than the most unlikely event in the 
minimal cut set, which is absolutely unrealistic. Let us see an example. We have two 
events X and Y, the likelihood of X is p(x)=10-3, the likelihood of Y is P(I)= 10-5. Ifthey 
were independent the likelihood of them occurring simultaneously would be their 
product i. e. 10-8. Since they are coupled, the likelihood that they occur simultaneously 
should be bigger than the likelihood of the theoretically uncoupled minimal cut set (i. e. 
10-8). but smaller than the likelihood of the most unlikely single event (i. e. P(Y)=10-5). If 
we have 8=. 1 and we put QT equal to the average likelihood among the two events in our 
minimal cut set, we would have the value Qjt210-32 which practically coincides with the 
likelihood of the most likely event (i. e. X). After applying 5.14, we would have that 
PX 1) 10-4, C( , which is absurd, since this figure is bigger than the upper bound of the 
likelihood that can realistically be associated with the coupled minimal cut set that we 
said is P(Y)=10-". Hence, if we cannot use the average or the biggest value among 
probabilities of events in the minimal cut set, we are left with the smallest one. Coming 
back to our example. If we put Q7. equal to the smallest likelihood (i. e. 10-5) we would 
p, =10-6, have that C(A I) that is inside the boundary we were expecting. Hence we propose 
to put the coupled probability for a minimal cut set of the second order equal to the 
smallest among the probabilities of events in the minimal cut set. For a second order 
minimal cut set we indicate that as in the following 5.21. 
PC(X Y) =, g min [P(X); P(T)] 
Consequently, independent probabilities are written as in 5.22: 
PAX) = P(X) -, 6 min [P(X); P(l)] 
PA 1) = P(l) -, 8 min [P(Y); P(l)] 
(5.21) 
(5.22) 
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The complete formula for the likelihood of the coupled minimal cut set of the second 
order obtained under these conditions, is stated in 5.23. This expression satisfies limit 
5.18 that says that, for 6 --> 0, the likelihood of the minimal cut set tends to the 
likelihood of the two events to occur independently, as shown by the 5.24. 
P(X Y) = PAX) PA I) + PC(X 1) = 
= {P(X)-fl min[P(X); P(iý]} {P(l)-, g min[P(X); P(l)] I 
+, 6 min[P(X); P(l)] (5.23) 
Lim (P(X)-, 8 min[P(X); P(l)] I {P(l)-, 6 min[P(X); P(Y)] 
'8 -> 0 
+, #min[P(X); P(T)] = P(X)P(l) (5.24) 
It can be demonstrated that the expression for the likelihood of a coupled minimal cut set 
of the third order is represented by the following expression: 
P(XI YIZ) ý PI(X)PI(Y)PI(Z)+Pi(X)[Pý, (Y. ' Z)-PI(x; Y, Z)1+Plýlý[PI(XI Z) 
-päx; Y; Z)1+PI(Z)IPý(x; 1)-PI(x; Y; Z)1+PI(X., Y, Z) 
and, within our hypotheses aboutB and QT, it can be reduced to the following: 
P(X, Y, Z) = {P(X)-ß min[P(X); P(l); P(Z)]) (P(Y)-ß min [P(X); P(Y); P(Z)]) (P(Z)- 
, 
8min[P(X); P(l); P(Z)]) +, 8Min[P(X); P(l); P(Z)] 
Expressions for greater order minimal cut sets can also be written, but it is not intended 
in this thesis to investigate all the statistics related to this matter. 
Final considerations 
Using expressions for the likelihood of coupled events obtained in previous sections at 
the level of lifecycle categories, produces better, more realistic results than applying 
them at minimal cut set level. At the level of lifecycle categories, we individually 
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consider each cause of coupling. Then, we perform the analysis only on the causes that 
are shared among events in the minimal cut set by applying proposed fon-nula for 
estimating the coupled likelihood. Since each cause is responsible for only a fraction of 
the total likelihood of each event (i. e. the Percentage 0161 which refers to the 
corresponding lifecycle category), the use of a conservative value for, 8 does not produce 
too conservative a figure for the likelihood of the minimal cut set as a whole. Let us see 
an example. 
If we take the minimal cut set in Figure 5-2 and we suppose that: 
" The first lifecycle category is responsible for a5 percent share of the total 
likelihood of each event (i. e. pereentage ? 161=5); 
" The second lifecycle category is responsible for the remaining 95 percent (i. e. 
percentage Y62=95); 
" The total likelihood of eventXis p(Ag=10-3; 
" The total likelihood of event Y is P(Y) =1 0--. 
After applying 5.2 and 5.23 to equation 5.8, we obtain probabilities in expression 5.6. 
These are the passages: 
P(? ý, ) = %I *P(X) =. 5 * 104 
P(X-2) = %2*P(X) =. 95 * 10-3 
P(yj) = %I *P(Y) = .5* 
10-6 
P(Y2) = %2*P(N) = . 
95 * 10-5 
p=I 
P(2jjyj) =(P(? ýl)-j6min[P(? ý1); P(yi)]){P(2ýl)-, 6min[P(? il); P-r(yi)])+, 8min[P(2i, ); P(yi)] 
=. 25*10-9+. 5* 1()-6 = .51 
()-6 
P(AX1Y2) ý P(AXI) P(Y2) =. 25 10-9 
P(-X2Y1) = P(jX! I-2) P(Y1) =. 475 * 10-8 
P(: 'ý, 2Y2) = P(AX2) P(Y2) = . 
9025 * 10'7 
P(Xy) =- P(X-IYI) + P(ÄIY2) + P(AX2Y1) + P(X2Y2) =- -5 
* 10-6 (5.25) 
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If we wanted to obtain the same value for that likelihood by applying the same study at 
minimal cut set level, we would have had to put, 6 =. 5*10-1 as shown in the 5.26. Being 
that a low value for fl, we would have to introduce arguments to justify it. That would 
have required using expert judgement. 
P(X, Y) = PI(X) PI(y) + PC(X, Y) =- 
5- 10-6 10-8 +. 5*10-1 * 10- =. 5 * (5.26) 
What we have actually done is to screen individual causes that may give rise to events 
and be responsible for couplings in a minimal cut set. This has been done on the basis of 
a checklist that spans the whole lifecycle of each component in the system. 'Mis assumes 
that lifecycle information was collected during the decomposition and design stages, 
when this procedure is more economic and practical. In addition to the screening of 
couplings, we have assigned a share of the likelihood of each event to causes of events. 
Then we have provided mathematical support for evaluating the likelihood of coupled 
minimal cut sets that considers individually the contribution of each single cause of each 
event. As the weight of each cause we took the share of the total likelihood of each event 
that is associated to the correspondent lifecycle category. 
5.4 Discussion 
In this chapter we have extended the FLASH formalism to consider common cause 
failures. We have used some of the information stored into FLASH tables for two 
purposes: investigation of minimal cut sets to find ones with coupled events and 
estimation of their likelihood. 
The identification of minimal cut sets with coupled events was achieved by 
analysing all minimal cut sets responsible for critical failures in the system under 
investigation. Events in each minimal cut set were scanned to see whether they were 
sharing one or more causes of coupling (i. e. coupling codes defined in Chapter four). If 
any sharing was found, the minimal cut set was considered coupled. Since the method 
identifies exactly those categories of the lifecycle responsible for actual couplings, it 
makes it easy to investigate feasible remedies for those couplings. The analysts can then 
give evidence why those couplings cannot give rise to common cause failures or, in the 
last resort, calculate the likelihood of minimal cut sets considering only contributions 
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from those couplings that were identified. The innovative contribution of the method lies 
in the systematic identification of the actual couplings. They come out of a mechanical 
process that is the comparison of lifecycle information of events in the minimal cut set. 
This process can also be easily automated. Therefore the liability for the identification 
of couplings is transferred from expert judgement summarily estimating the likelihood at 
minimal cut set level, to choosing the most convenient lists to use as base for the 
identification of couplings among events. 
The estimation of the likelihood of minimal cut sets with coupled events, is the 
natural step forward, after the identification of actual couplings. We provided a 
mathematical framework to calculating the likelihood of minimal cut sets considering the 
contribution of each actual coupling. Since the expression for that likelihood was quite 
complex we made some approximations by eliminating terms which influence was 
negligible for the final results. 
Drawing some conclusion, we have shown that common cause likelihood can be 
evaluated considering only contributions from real couplings and not with a summary 
analysis at minimal cut set level, as is usually done. We have transferred the problem of 
common cause failure analysis from the minimal cut set level to a lower (more detailed) 
level, systernatised the identification of couplings, and obtained more realistic results. 
The next chapter presents two case studies to illustrate the overall FLASH process 
as described in this and the previous chapter. The first case study is a Fuel System 
adapted from [Vesely, 1981], the second case study is a computerised braking system. 
145 
Chapter Six 
Case studies 
This Chapter presents two case studies illustrating the FLASH process during the 
decomposition and design, and during the integration and verification stages of the 
lifecycle. The first case study is based on a Fuel System adapted from an example in the 
fault tree handbook [Vesely, 1981], the second case study is based on a computerised 
braking system developed at the University of York, but based on realistic industrial 
data. 
6.1 The Fuel System 
The system that we examine in this section is a (hypothetical) fuel system (FS) whose 
task is to provide emergency supply of fuel to an engine (a generator of electrical power, 
for example) when the main supply to that engine is out of order. The system is 
automatically activated when the primary supply fails, however, it can also be manually 
activated and interrupted. As Figure 6-1 shows, the fuel system draws fuel resources 
from a tank and provides fuel supplies to the engine. 
Figure 6-1: The Fuel System 
Safety specifications for the fuel system require single point failures, which can give rise 
to hazards, to be avoided. Real-time specifications require that the engine speed Q be 
limited at Q=QO=constant. Moreover, the engine speed cannot deviate from the nominal 
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value S20 for more than 5 seconds. Only a failure may cause such a deviation for a longer 
period. Figure 6-2 illustrates the hierarchical decomposition of the Fuel System. At the 
first level of the decomposition (functional), we can see the whole equipment 
encapsulated in a box that receives fuel from the tank, electrical power, start/stop 
command signals and delivers the fuel to the engine. At the second level, we can see the 
architecture of the system, in other words basic components and their connections. The 
diagram shows three block valves (BVA, BVB and BVX), two control valves (CVA and 
CVB) and an Electronic Controller (PLC) which sets the position of those valves to 
regulate the path and rate of flow between the tank and the engine. Finally at the lowest 
level of the decomposition, we see a high level representation (GRAFCE7) of the control 
sequence executed by the controller. 
The control sequence shows that, in normal conditions of operation, the controller 
sets valve BVX to the closed position and lets the fuel flow through the path that connects 
valves BVA and CVA. While the system is in this state (Pathl), the controller manages 
the position of valve CVA and ensures that the flow of fuel through the valve always 
equals the current demand by the engine. When the controller detects a disturbance of 
that flow (caused, for example, by a failure or blockage of a valve) it activates a new path 
in the system to restore the flow of fuel at the output. The new path (PatI12) is the one 
connecting valves BVB and CVB. Finally, the control sequence shows that a failure (or 
blockage) of valve BVB while the system is in that state will trigger further action by the 
controller, namely the activation of a third path (PatlO) in the system, that between 
valves BVA and CVB 26 . 
However, there are two cases in which PatO is not available. The first case is when 
CVA fails open (i. e. Stuck Open or Significant Internal Leakage), BVA closes and the 
flow goes through Path2 (i. e. Path3 is not available since BVA has to stay closed to avoid 
the fuel going through CVA that is failed open). The second case arises when BVA fails 
open (i. e. Fail to close or Significant Internal Leakage), CVA reduces the flow to a 
minimum, but the supply is not completely shut off. Both of them are critical incidents 
and the likelihood has to be less than 10'3 during the mission. To activate the remaining 
possible path (i. e. Path4, through valve BVB, BVX and CVA), CVB must be plugged and 
BVB, BVX and CVA must be still operating. This is an extremely unlikely circumstance 
therefore PatIz4 was not implemented. 
26 There is actually a fourth possible path, that connecting valves BVB and CVA, which 
for simplicity we do not consider in this discussion. 
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Figure 6-2 : Hierarchical Decomposition of the Fuel System 
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6.1.1 Analysis in the Decomposition and Design Stage 
The analysis of the Fuel System (FS) starts at functional level. The fuel system is 
studied as a function that has to provide fuel to the engine when it is required. As such 
the system has three failure modes: a) fitel is required, but not provided, b) filel is not 
required, but provided and c) fitel is provided when required, but the system is not fidly 
fitnctionalU (i. e. a recovery action took place to by-pass a faulty component). Hence the 
FLASH table for the fuel system at functional level propagates three effects as 
represented in Table 6-1. These effects have different criticality levels that are indicated 
in the Criticality column (i. e. Catastrophic, Critical and Negligible). The 5'h column 
reports recommendations that have to be considered by designers for the development of 
the fuel system internal architecture. For example, recommendations for the first effect 
states that the system should be fault tolerant for single failures in mechanically activated 
components, additionally they require that the likelihood of this effect be smaller than 10- 
6 during the mission time. For the second and third effect requirements are less 
demanding, being events not as critical as the first. However their likelihood is requested 
to be smaller than 10-3 during the mission. 
After the functional hazard analysis is completed, the FLASH method requests the 
architecture achieving the function to be proposed. The architecture has to take into 
account specifications, recommendations and derived safety requirements into the 5'h 
column. Such architecture is shown in Figure 6-3. It requires the failure of at least two 
valves to cause the failure of the system. Figure 6-4 represents the correspondent failure 
model of the fuel system drawn according to the FLASH notation. Names are given to 
flows delivered by components according to the syntax defined in Chapter 4. 
27 In this case a fault occurred. The system is still working properly, however any 
additional fault may cause a system failure i. e. failure modes a) or b). 
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Table 6-1: HASH table for the FS function, before the architecture is drawn 
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Figure 6-3: Architecture for the fuel system 
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Figure 6-4: Details for the fuel system 
Table 6-2 illustrates a fragment of the high-level FLASH analysis for the fuel system 
after the causes column has been completed. The table records one (and perha ps the most 
critical) of the functional failure modes of the system, the absence of flow in the line that 
feeds the engine (No Flow -fitel to the engine). According to the analysis, this event can 
be caused by an omission of the start signal (which causes a failure to start the system), a 
commission of the stop signal (which causes inadvertent shut-down of the system), or a 
combination of component failures that block all the available paths in the system (No 
Floiv-Pathl, No Floiv-PatlO, No Floiv-PatO). For simplicity and economy of space, the 
table that we present here determines only the causes of failure in the third path (No 
Flo)v - PatlO). The analysis shows that the flow in this path is disrupted either by 
internal failures of valves BVA, BVX, CVB or omissions of the signals that are 
continuously sent by the electronic controller to maintain block valves BVA and BVX 
open (Oinission - DPBvA , Omission - DPBvx). The root causes of those events are 
further explored in the FLASH tables for the corresponding components (i. e. the valves 
and electronic controller). 
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FUELSYSTEM 
Failure event Causes Descflption 
Omission - Start OR 
No Flow of fuel on the line 
Commission - Sto OR P 
that feeds the engine. The 
engine cannot start. No 
(No flow - Pathl AND 
electric power is provided. * 
No flow - Path2 AND It can be caused by an 
No Flow -fitelfrom the 
No flow - Path3) omission of the start signal, a 
FS to the engine Where: commission of 
the stop signal 
No flow - Path3 
or because there is no flow in 
BVA failed closed OR 
the three possible paths that 
BVX failed closed OR can 
be activated by the PLC. 
CVB failed closed OR 
For simplicity, the causes of 
Omission - DPBvA OR 
failure in one path only 
Omission - DPBvx 
(Path3) are further explored 
only 
Table 6-2: Fragment of the high-level FLASH analysis 
Table 6-3 presents a fragment of the analysis for valve BVA. Here we can see that the 
condition BVA failed closed can be caused either by an electromechanical failure of the 
valve (BVA failed to open) or because the aperture of the valve is blocked (BVA 
Phigged). 
Block Valve A 
Failure Event Description Causes 
Valve BVA is inadvertently closed due 
to an internal hardware failure which B VA failed to open OR B VA BVA failed closed causes it to fail to open or because it is plugged 
plugged. I I 
Table 6-3: Fragment of the FILASH table for BVA failed closed 
Table 6-4, on the other band, contains fragments of the analysis for the electronic 
controller (PLC). There we can see that the failure of the electronic controller to deliver 
the valve open signal to BVA (Oinission -DPBvA) can arise from different root failures in 
the two states of the system that the valve is active (i. e. in states: Pathl and Pat113). In 
both states, the event is caused by a number of low level internal hardware failures of the 
controller (electronic controller output circitit stuck at zero; electronic controller 
register BVA_CVA stuck at zero; electronic controller register BVA stuck at zero; 
electronic controller logical operation negated). However, in the first state and while 
the system delivers fuel through the initial path, the analysis shows that the event can 
also be caused by a failure of the sensor that monitors the position of valve BVA. Indeed, 
if the output of that sensor is stuck at zero (Omission -PBvA), the controller will wrongly 
perceive this as an indication that BVA is closed. This in turn will trigger a inadvertent 
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transition of the control sequence to the second state (PatIZ2), the deactivation of the 
initial path (including BVA) and the activation of the second path in the system. 
On the other hand, if the system is in a transition towards the third state (for 
example because valve BVB has failed closed) the electronic controller may fail to open 
valve BVA simply because sensor PBvB has failed to detect that BVB is failed closed 
(Conintission - PBvB). Here, we can observe that the analysis provides some useful 
pointers to particular subtle failures that may confuse the controller, corrupt the control 
sequence and eventually compromise the failure detection and recovery mechanisms of 
the system. 
Elewftnic Controller (PLC) 
Failure event Description Causes 
Contributing 
Factor 
The PLC fails to deliver the valve open PLC output circuit stuck at signal to valve BVA, while the system is zero OR in state Pathl (in other words while it PLC register BVA CVA stuck delivers fuel through valves BVA and at zero OR - 
Omission - 
CVA. PLC register BVA stuck at zero Pathl DPBVA 
It can be caused by a number of low level 
OR 
PLC logical operation negated PLC hardware failures, or because there is OR 
a commission of the PBvA (sensor) signal 
which causes an inadvertent exit from the Omission - PBvA Path] state. 
The PLC fails to deliver the valve open PLC output circuit stuck at 
signal to valve BVA, while the system is 
zero OR in state Path3 (in other words while it PLC register BVA CVB stuck delivers fuel through valves BVA, BVX _ 
at zero OR 
Omission - 
and CVB. PLC register BVA stuck at zero Transition from 
DPBVA 
It can be caused by a number of low level 
OR Path2 to Path3 
PLC hardware failures, or because there is 
PLC logical operation negated 
a commission of the PBvB (sensor) signal 
R 
which prevents the system of entering the Commission - PBvB PatU state. 
Table 6-4: Fragment of the FILASH table for the PLC 
After writing causes for events propagated, it is possible to finish off the 5'h column by 
considering the possibility to detect, recover from, or mitigate the effect of the event 
propagated, and eventually to issue recommendations for further developing lower level 
components and the Maximum accepted likelihood for critical causes. Table 6-5 
represents a fragment of the FLASH table for the electronic controller after the 
completion of the 5 Ih column. 
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Electronic Contro ller (PLC) 
Failure Contribu- 51h Column: Justification, Design 
event 
Description Causes ting Recommendations, Derived Safety 
Factor Requirements 
Before design 
Recommendations 
Ile failure cannot be handled. It has to be 
Ile PLC fails to deliver extremely unlikely 
the valve open signal to Effect max accepted likelihood 
valve BVA, while the 10-5 on demand 
system is in state Pathl PLC output circuit After design 
(in other words while it stuck at zero OR This failure cannot be recovered. delivers fuel through PLC register Detection 
valves BVA and CVA. BVA 
- 
CVA stuck at Sensor off valve BVA 
Omission - 
zero OR Recovery 
DPBVA It can be caused by a PLC register BVA Path I Unlikely 
number of low level stuck at zero OR Recommendation 
PLC hardware failures, PLC logical operation Software must be developed to comply with 
or because there is a negated OR safety integrity level four 
commission of the PBvA Max accepted likelihood for critical (sensor) signal which Omission-PBvA events in the Causes column. 
causes an inadvertent P(PLC output circuit stuck at zero t) < 10-6h-1 
exit from the Path] P(PLC register BVA_CVA stuck at 
state. zero) < 10-6h" 
P(PLC register BVA stuck at zero) <10-6h" 
P(PLC logical operation negated) <10-6h-I 
P(Omission - P13VA) < 10"50 
Before design 
Recommendations 
The failure cannot be handled. It has to be 
The PLC fails to deliver extremely unlikely 
the valve open signal to Effect max accepted likelihood 
valve BVA, while the 10-5 on demand 
system is in state Path3 PLC output circuit After design 
(in other words while it stuck at zero OR This failure cannon be recovered. 
delivers fuel through PLC register Detection 
valves BVA, BVX and BVA CV13 stuck at Transi- Sensor off valve BVA 
Omission - 
CVB. zero 511 tion from Recovery 
DPi3vA PLC register BVA Path2 to Unlikely It can be caused by a stuck at zero OR Path3 Recommendation 
number of low level PLC logical operation Software must be developed to comply with 
PLC hardware failures, negated OR safety integrity level four 
or because there is a Max accepted likelihood for critical 
commission of the PBvB Commission - PBvB events in the Causes column. 
(sensor) signal which P(PLC output circuit stuck at zero t) < 10-60 
prevents the system of P(PLC register BVA_CVB stuck at 
entering the Path3 state. zero) < 10-6 h" 
P(PLC register BVA stuck at zero) < 10-60 
P(PLC logical operation negated) <10-60 
P(COMMiSSiOn - PBVA) < 10-6h" I 
Table 6-5: Fragment of the FIASH table after completion of the 5 "' column 
Figure 6-5 shows a fragment of the fault tree that is mechanically generated from the 
hierarchy of FLASH tables for the fuel system. It can be seen how the interruption of 
flow in the line that feeds the engine (No Flow - fitel to the engine) can be caused by a 
combination of lower level malfunctions and basic component failure modes. 
Additionally, since the tree is constructed by parsing the hierarchy of FLASH tables, its 
construction validates whether the hierarchy is consistent and the required information is 
in the hierarchy of tables. 
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The following section presents the FLASH analysis of the fuel system in the 
integration and verification phase of the lifecycle. 
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Figure 6-5: The fault tree for the failure event "No Flow -fuel to the engine" 
6.1.2 Analysis in the Integration and Verification 
The aim of the FLASH analysis in the integration and verification is to confirm that each 
module and component of the hierarchy meets the requirements, specifications and 
recommendations entered into the FLASH tables (i. e. the 5 Ih column). The process of 
verification starts from modules at the lowest hierarchical level and proceeds towards the 
top functional level. Fault trees are built for each effect and evaluated using fault tree 
analysis. The structure of each tree is taken from the Causes column and by parsing 
tables of included modules. The likelihood of the top event is recorded in the "FMEA 
results" column as "Likelihood of the effect". 
Among modules here considered, block valve A (BVA) and Electronic Controller 
(EQ are basic components. Hence they are analysed first. The likelihood of each event 
propagated by BVA can be calculated from information into Table 6-6. For example, 
O-Sitel. bva, which tree is shown in Figure 6-6, is caused by two basic events (i. e. 
Failjoý_open. bva and Phigged. bva) and one incoming event (i. e. 0-. BVAi. Ec). The 
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likelihood28 of each basic event is calculated considering the mission time, the failure 
probability on demand and the failure rate as reported in Table 6-6. The likelihood of 
incoming event 0-. BVAi. Ec, is obtained either, developing and evaluating the fault tree 
with that top event (i. e. represented in Figure 6-7) or, taken from the Summary FMEA 
result column in the table for the Electronic controller (i. e. Table 6-7). Hence, from 
Table 6-6 and Table 6-7 we determine that, in the transition between PatI12 and PaII13, 
P(Phtgged. bva)=5*104, P(Faiý_tq_open. bva)=4.13 *10-4 and P(Q_. BVAi. Ec)= 7* 1U5. 
Consequently, the likelihood of event 0-. FiteLBVA (when the system is in transition 
between PatO and Path3) is P(O_. FiteLbva)ý 9.8*104. 
(BVA failed Closed) 
0-. Fuel. bva 
Ornission-DP BVA Plugged. bva Fail-to open. (0- bva 
Figure 6-6: Tree for the event omission Fuel from BVA 
This likelihood is recorded in the FMEA result column for the event along with 
information demonstrating that recommendations and constraints in the 5, h column are 
met. We can see that in Table 6-7, the FMEA results column reports that the detection 
for the event 0-. FiteLBVA is possible from a speed sensor on the engine and from a flow 
sensor on the flow to the engine. Additionally, it says that the likelihood of this event is 
9.8*104 in both states in which it may a rise. Since recommendations and constraints are 
actually met and the likelihood for the event Q_. fiteLbva is less then the acceptable value 
into the 5 th column the analysis moves further, another event in the same table is 
28 The likelihood that the event "E" happens during the mission time "At" is equal to the 
sum of the likelihood the event happens on demand "q,, " plus the likelihood the event 
happens during the mission time. If it is assumed an exponential distribution with 
constant rate "AE" for the event to happen, the equation for likelihood of the event 
becomes P(E, At, qo + 1_ 
AE I 
At 
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analysed. When all the events in that table have been considered, the analysis moves to 
another table at the same or higher hierarchical level. If all of the recommendations and 
constraints are met the analysis will eventually reach the highest functional level and 
validate the overall design. In any other case some modifications in the design will be 
necessary. 
Same level Causes Effects & Consequences Critica- P Column 
Summary 
FMEA lity Justification, Design Recommendations, Derived Safety Requirements 
results 
Before design 
Recommendations 
iWect 
max accepted likelihood 
Ilic likelihood must be less than 10' during the mission time (100 hours) 
FaiLto-open. 
bva OR Ile fuel goes throu,, h the Detection: should be possible. Le. from a speed sensor on the cn&e and O-. FucLbva 0 BVALec 
vah-evilicnitshoul5ricit 
NA from a flow sensor on the flow to the engine. OR. Recoýerv: must be possible for single failure. Plugged. bva Recommendations: Detection algorithm should know the status ofthe 
s), stcm and find suitable way to detect failures and recover them. 
Accewed Likelihood: 
A (Fag_to_ol>cn. bva) < 10-' It" 
. BVALec) < 104 h" 
A(Q 
_ A (Plugs! cd. bva) < 10-' h-' 
Before design 
Recommendations 
Fail to close. 
iWect 
max accepted likelihood 
bva OR 
'ne fuel doescri't go 
10-4 during the mission 
CýJucl-bva Sevcrc_jnt - 
Le 
through the valve when it NA Detection should be possible. Lt. from a speed sensor on the engine and ackagc. bva should from a flow sens, ur on the flow to the engine. OR Recover-y: must be possible for single failure. C-BVAi. cc Recommendations: Detection algorithm should know the status ofthe 
systern, and find suitable way to detect failures and recover them. 
Accepted Ukeli : 
The Ukelihood must be <3.10 ' during the mission 
Before design 
Recommendations 
iWect 
max accepted likelihood 
'ne Sensor fails givin 
10-4 during the mission 
* BVAo. bva 
- 
0 BVAo. bva g 
output bit 0 
NA Detection: not possible 
Recovery: must be possible for single Wure. 
Recommendations: Detection algorithm should know the status of the 
s)ýstcm and find suitable way to detect failures and recover them. 
Accepted Likelihoo : 
I I'he likelihood must be < 3* 10 ' during the mission 
Before design 
Recornry"dations 
iiect 
max accepted likelihood 
Ile sensor fags giving 
10 4 during the mission 
* BVAo. bva C BVAo. bva 
output bit I 
NA Detection: not possible 
Recovery must be possible for single failure. 
Recommendations Detection algorithm should know the status ofthc 
systcm and find suitable way to detect failures and recover thcrn. 
Acevqqed Likelihood: 
'nc likcMood must be < 3*10-5 during the rnission 
Basic Events 
Reliability data FaiI_to_open. bva SeverejnLlearkage. b FaLioslose. bva Plugged. bva C-. BVAo. bva 0-. BVAo. bva 
va 
I I I I 
Description Fail to open There is a major The valve flils to The valve is The scas r The se sor 
when required leakage inside the close Plugged fails giving fiUs giving 
valve output bit I output bit 0 
Failure Rate ý. [Ilhl 3e-006 3e-006 Me-OG6 5e-W5 2e-007 2e-007 
Repair Rate ttillhl 
Failure Probability on 4. le"4 Me-004 
d -L - Mean Time to Failure F r l -- 
h f InT F hi 
"ission tinx [h] 100 100 100 150 100 
Table 6-6: Table for the block valve BVA 
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mission-ul' BVA 
(Q_. BVAj. Ec) 
LC u PLC register PLC register PLC logical ssion - 
P0 ut Orni 
circuit sftk at BVA stuck at BVA_CVA operaton P BVA zero zero stuck at zero negated 
mission-uv i3vA 
(Q_. BVALEc) 
PLC output PLC register PLC register PLC logical Commission 
Circuit stuck at BVA stuck at BVkCVB operation 
zero zero stuck at zero negated 
-0- UUU 
Figure 6-7: Trees for the event omission DP- BVA 
Block Valve A 
Failure Causes Description Justification, Design Recommendation & Actions Summary FMEA Results Event Required 
Before design 
Recommendations 
Effect max accepted likelihood The detection is possible 
Valve BVA is The likelihood must be less than la3 during the from a speed sensor on the 
inadvertently mission time (100 hours) engine and from a flow 
BVA failed 
BVA failed to closed due to an Detection: should be possible. i. e. from a speed 
sensor on the flow to the 
en ine 
closed 
openORBVA internal sensor on the engine and from a flow sensor on the 
g . The average likelihood that 
(0 Fuel plugged hardware failure flow to the engine. the event 0 . Fuel. bva has to 
. bva) 
OR which causes it Recoverv: must be possible for single failure. - be generated by internal BVAi. ec to fail to open Recommendations: Detection algorithm should events is 9.8*104 or because it is know the status of the system and find suitable way Ukelihood is very near the 
plugged. to detect failures and recover them. upper bound for the Accented Failure Rate: 
acceptability. X (Fail 
- 
to 
- 
oPen. bva) < 10 h 
. 
l3VAi. cc) < 104 h A(Q 
_ A(Plugged. bva) < 10'3hl 
Electrwk Controller (PLC) 
Contributing P Column: Justification, Design 
Failure event Causes Description Factor Recommendations, Derived 
Safety Summary FMEA Results 
Requirements 
Before design 
'ne PLC fails to Recommendations 
deliver the valve 'nc failure cannot be handled. It has to be 
open signal to extremely unlikely 
valve BVA, while Effect max accepted likelihood 
PLC out ut circuit 
the system is in 
state Path 3 (in 
104 during the mission time 
p 
stuck at zero OR 
. 
other words u hile After design 
PLC register it dca-ers fuel This failure cannon be recovered. 
BVA 
- 
CVB stuck through vah-cs Detection 
Sensor off valve BVA The actual likelihood is 7* 10 
On ussion - 
at zero OR RVA, BVX and Transition Recovery during the mission. TI)e failure 
Dpbvý 
PLC rc&tcr BVA CVB. from UnUely cannot be handled, hoý ever it is 
(0 BVAi stuck at zero 
OR 
PLC logical It can be caused by 
Path2 to Recommendation extremely tinlikely. The software 
. ej) operation negated a number of low 
Paih3 Softwarc must be developed to comply with is developed to comply with 
OR level PLC safety integrity kvcl four safety 
integrity level four. 
hardware failurcs, Max accepted Failure Rate for critical 
Conunission - or became there is events 
in the Causes column. 
Pou, a commission of )ýPLC output circuit stuck at zero t)< 104 If' 
the Pios (sensor) A (PLC register BVA_CVB stuck at 
signal which zero) <10'h' 
prevents the A (PLC register BVA stuck at zero) < 104 h' 
system ofcnicring 
eration ne ated) <104h' A (PLC lo ical o the Pazh3 state. g g p 
A (Commission - P,,, ) <104h-' 
Table 6-7: BVA and Ec tables after the Integration and Verification 
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6.1.3 Common Cause Failures 
Common cause failures are the subset of dependent failures that cannot be treated 
explicitly in the analysis. They arise when two or more events in a minimal cut set are 
coupled. FLASH addresses the study of common cause failures when there is all the 
information required for constructing fault trees and minimal cut sets for each tree can be 
obtained. Minimal cut sets susceptible to common cause failure are subsequently 
identified by comparing lifecycle information among their events. When events sharing 
the same coupling code in a peer lifecycle category are found, these events are 
considered coupled; hence that minimal cut set has to be considered for common cause 
failure analysis. 
Table 6-8 reports the list of all the minimal cut sets of the fuel system responsible 
for the functional failure mode "Fuel is required, but not provided fs". It can be seen 
that there are 96 minimal cut sets of the second order and 188 minimal cut sets of the 
third order. The FLASH method requires all these minimal cut sets to be analysed to 
find couplings. For example the first minimal cut sets represent the simultaneous failure 
of the first timer register (i. e. TI) and block valve A (i. e. FTO-BVA = Fail to Open). An 
accurate examination of Table 6-9 representing its couplings, reveals that these events 
are actually uncoupled hence the likelihood of this MCS is the simple product of the 
likelihood of each of its constituent events (i. e. P(FTO-BVA) * P(FTQ BVA)= 1*10,8 ). 
On the other band, Table 6-10 for minimal cut set 81 (i. e. C BVAO BVA; 
FTO-BVA) clearly shows several couplings. This minimal cut set represents the 
simultaneous arising of two failure events inside the block valve BVA: a) the fail to open 
of the valve and the failure of the sensor monitoring the flow through the valve. These 
events are coupled since they share coupling codes in several lifecycle categories. For 
instance they have the same concept and design i. e. Design architectitre=DCA1, 
technological material equipment type=DTM1, and Speciflcatioll=DSI, additionally, 
they share the same installation fitter (i. e. IIFI), finally they the have same staff and 
procedures for operation (i. e. OSI and OPI) and maintenance (i. e. MS1 and MPI). 
Hence, the likelihood for this minimal cut set has to be estimated using methods for 
common cause failure analysis. 
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LIST OF MININIAL CUTSETS SORTED VS. ORDER 
Minimal Cut Sein # minirtul Cut se', # Nfi. i-1 C. 1 sýU 9 Nfinünal Cut Seu 
1 Fro EVATI 
- 
72 0-0-C- 0200 T2 - L43 C 1005 0 10 10 0 R403 214 ý, 100 1C1C 1005 0 1010 
2 FrO 13VA 0 1005 73 FrO EVA 43 R405 _ 144 _ C1C 1005 0 10 10 0 R403 215 ý7 1C 1001 C1C 1005 0 1010 
3 FTO 13VA 01C 1005 74 0 R4O5PLG EVA 145 C ESSBI EN 0 1010 0 R403 216 -' BVBO BVBC 1C 10050 1010 
4 FTO 13VAO ESSRI EN 75 0 0200 0 R405 146 0 1005 0 1010 0 R403 217 C ESSBI EN 0 101073 
5 Fro EVA 76 00C 03M 0 R405 147 0 1010 01C 1005 0 R403 219 0 R4O6C ESSEI ENO 1010 
6 C-F. SSB2-E»4Frü EVA 77 FrO EVA 0 R402 148 0 ESSBI EN 0 10100 R403 219 C ESSBI EN C 10010 1010 
7 Fro-BVA 01M6 78 0 R402 PLG EVA 149 C 10060 10100 R403 220 Z ESSBI EN C1C 10910 loio 
8 FFO EVA 01C 1006 79 0 03M 0 R402 150 C1C 1006 0 1010 0 R403 221 7 BVBO BVB C ESSE] EN 0 1010 
9 FrO EVA 0 ESSB2 EN 80 00C 0200 0 R402 151 C_ESSB2 EN 0 10100 R403 222 j 1005 0 101013 
10 l' ) PLG RVATI 81 C EVAO EVA FrO EVA 152 0 10060 10100 R403 223 ) R406 0 1005 0 1010 
11 ý 0 R404 PIr. EVA 82 C EVAO EVA PLG EVA 153 0 1010 01C 1006 0 R403 224 :7 10010 1005 0 1010 
12 2 C 10n5 PlIr. EVA 83 C RVAO EVA 0 0200 154 0 ESSB2 EN 0 1010 0 R403 225 :71C 10010 1005 0 1010 
[ 
3 C1C 1005 FLG EVA 94 C HVA0 EVA 00C 02m 155 0 R401 0 R403 TI 226 :7 BVBO BVB 0 1005 0 1010 
,1 4 C ESSBI EN Pl G EVA 85 C l(M Fro EVA 156 0 R401 0 R403 0 R404 227 1010 01C 1005 T3 
.5 0 1005 Pl G EVA 86 C UM Pl r, EVA 157 C 1005 0 R401 0 R403 228 R406 0 1010 01C 1005 
. tý C 1006 FTO EVA 87 C IIM 0 02m 158 C1C 1005 0 R401 0 R403 2-19 10010 1010 01C 1005 
17 01C 1005 PIIG EVA 88 C IOWO 0C 0200 159 C ESSBI EN 0 R401 0 R403 2-30 21C 10010 10100 1C 1005 
18 1 0 ESSE 1 EN FLG EVA 89 1 C1C UM FrO EVA 160 1 0 1005 0 R401 0 R403 231 , BVEO BVBO 10100 1C 1005 
19 
_C 
1006 PLG EVA 90 C1C 1000 PLG EVA hl 01C IM5 0 R401 0 ß403 2.32 ESSRI EIN 0 1010 T3 
29 C1C 1006 FLG EVA 91 cic KMO 02m 162 0 FSSRI EN 0 RýII 0 R403 2.13 R4060 FMBI WO 1010 
21 C ESSB2 EN PLG EVA 92 C1C IMOO 0C 02m 163 C 1(X)6 0 R401 0 R403 214 Mül 0 F-IISBI EN 0 Mit) ýý 
22 0 10D6 PLG EVA 93 FrO EVA 0 R4G4 164 C1C l" 0 R401 0 R403 2,15 -1c 1001 () r-ýýSBI EN () 1010 
23 01C 1006 PLG EVA 94 C 1005 FrO EVA 165 C ESSB2 EN 0 R401 0 R403 7-36 7 lIVIIO BVB 0 ESSE 1 EIN 0 1010 
24 0 FSSR2 EN PLG EVA 95 C1C 1005 FrO EVA 166 0 1(X)60 R401 0 R403 237 c UM 0 1010 11 
25 0 0200 TI 96 C ESSBI EN EVA 167 01C 1006 0 R401 0 R403 2-38 0 R406 C 1006 0 1015 
26 0 0200 0 R404 97 C1C 1001 C1C 1005 0 R401 168 0 ESSB2 EN 0 R401 0 R401 2-19 CI()()ICIO0601010 
27 C 1005 0 02m 98 C BVBO BVB C1C 1005 0 R401 169 FrO HVB 0 10100 R403 240 C 1006 C1C Iml 0 1010 
29 1 C1C 10ü5 0 0200 99 1 C ESSBI EN 0 R401 T3 170 1 FFO Bl, B 0 R401 0 R403 241 C BVB0 BNI3C f"0 1010 
29 C FMBI EN 0 0-20 100 0 R406 C ESSBI EN 0 R401 171 0 10100 R403FLG B, B 242 C9C l(MO 101013 
30 1005 0 0200 101 C ESSBI EN C 10010 R401 172 0 R4010 R4G3PLG BVB 243 0 R4O6C 1C l(MO Mit) 
31 01C 1005 0 0200 102 C FSSBI EN C1C 10010 R401 173 0 1010 0 02010 R403 244 C 1001 C1c 1- 01010 
32 0 EssIll EN 0 020a IM C Evilo BVB C FSSBI F-N 0 R401 174 0 02010 R401 0 R403 245 C1C 1001 C1C 1006 0 1010 
33 c 10060 02()() 104 0 1005 0 R401 T3 175 0 1010 00C 02010 R403 246 C-BVBO-BVB c1c 1006 0 1010 
34 C1C 1006 0 0200 105 C BVBO BVB 01C 1005 0 R401 176 00C 02010 R401 0 R403 247 C ESSB2 EN 0 1010 l3 
35 C ESSB2 FN 0 03M 106 0 ESSBI EN 0 R401 11 177 0 1010 0 R403 T2 248 1 0 R4O6C ESSB2 EN 0 1010 
36 0 1006 0 0200 107 0 R4060 ESSBI EN0 R401 178 0 R401 0 R403 T2 249 C ESSB2 EN C 10010 1010 
37 01C10t)600200 108 C1001 0 ESSBI EN 0 R401 179 0 1010 0 R403 0 R405 250 C FSSB2 EN C1C 10010 1010 
_ _ 38 1 0 ESSB2 EN 0 0200 101) 1 - C1C 1001 0 FMBI EN0 R401 180 1 0 R401 0 R403 0 R405 251 l' BVB0 BVBC ESSB2 ENO 1010 
39 00C 02WTI 110 C BVBO BVB 0 ESSE] EN 0 R401 191 0 10100 R4020 R403 252 0 1006 0 1010 T3 
40 00C 0200 0 R4G4 111 C 1006 0 R401 73 182 0 R401 0 R402 0 R403 253 0 R4060 10060 1010 
41 C 1005 00C 0200 112 0 R406 C 1006 0 R401 183 C BVAO EVA 0 10100 R403 254 C 10010 1006 0 1010 
42 c1C 10050 0C 0200 113 C 1001 C 10060 R401 194 C BVAO EVA 0 R401 0 R403 ý ýs C1C 10010 10060 1010 
43 C ESSBI EN 00C 0200 114 C 1006 CAC IMI 0 R401 185 C 10000 10100 R403 256 C BV130 13VB 0 1006 0 1010 
44 0 Imso 0c 0200 115 C BVBO BVB C 10n6 0 R401 196 C 10000 R401 0 R403 257 0 10100 1C IM6T3 
45 01C Ion-so 0C 0200 116 C1C 1006 0 R401 T3 187 C1C 10000 10100 R403 258 8 0 R406 0 1010 01C 1006 
46 0 ESSE 1 EN 00C 0200 117 _ 0 R406 C1C 1006 0 R401 188 C1C 1000 0 R401 0 R403 259 9 C 10010 1010 01C 1(X)6 
47 1 C 1006 00C 02[X) 118 1 C 1001 C1C 1006 0 R401 189 1 C 10010 1010 TI 2ffl C1C 10010 10100 1C IXA 
48 c1c kmo 0c 0200 119 CICIOOICICIO060R401 1 0 R406 0 1005 0 R401 
2N 
261 261 C BVEO EVE 0 101()() 1c 1cm 
49 CESSB2-EN0 0C 0200 120 C BVB0 BVB C1C l(W, 0 R401 191 91 
9 
C 10010 1005 0 R401 2 262 0 ESSB2 EN 0 1010 T3 
so 0 1006 00c 0-100 121 C 1-SSB2 EN 0 R401 T3 192 92 2 C1C 10010 1005 0 R401 263 O-R4060-ESSB2-EN 0 1010 
51 01C 10060 0C 0200 122 0 R4O6C ESSB2 EN0 R401 193 3 !9 3 C EVEO BVB 0 1005 0 R401 C 10010 ESSB2 EN 0 1010 
52 0 ESSB2 EN 00C 0200 123 C UMB2 EN C 10010 R401 - 194 94 ! 01 C10050R4O1T3 265 C1C 10010 ESSB2 EN 0 1010 
53 FTO EVA FrO BVB 124 C ESSB2 EN C1C 1001 f) R401 95 - 195 ! 
19 
0 R406 01C 1005 0 R401 6 266 C BVBO BIA3 0 ESSB2 EN 0 101t) 
54 FTO BVB PLG EVA 125 c BVBO BVB C FMB2 EN 0 R401 - 1 216 6 C 10010 1C 1005 0 R401 267 0 R401 TI 11 
55 FTO-BVB 00200 126 0 1006 0 R401 73 197 7 C1C 10010 1C 1005 0 R401 268 0 R406 0 R401 TI 
56 FTO BVB 00C 0200 127 0 R406 0 1006 0 R401 198 C BVBO EVI3 0 1010 Tl_ 269 C 10010 R401 TI 
57 FrO EVA PLG BVB 128 C 10010 1006 0 R401 199 
198 
[ 
10 1010 TI T3 270 C1C 10010 R401 TI 
58 PLG BVAPLG BVB 129 C1C 10010 1006 0 R401 00 200 0 R4060 1010T1 271 C BVB0 BVB 0 R401 TI 
59 0 0-2f)OPLG BVB 130 C BNI30 BVB 0 1006 0 R401 201 201 C1C 10010 1010T1 272 0 R401 0 R4134 11 
6() 00C 02WPLG EVB 131 01C 1006 0 R401 13 202 202 0 1010 0 R404 T3 273 0 R406 0 R401 0 R4G1 
61 FT0-13VA 0 0201 132 0 R4()6 01C 1006 0 R401 203 203 O-R406 0 1010 0 R404 274 C 10010 R401 0 R4C4 
62 0 0201 Plß EVA 133 C 10010 1C 1006 0 R401 204 204 C 10010 1010 0 R404 275 ic 1C 10010 R401 0 R4a4 
63 0 0-'W 0 020 1 
-- 
134 C1C Mi 01C 1006 0 RJOI 5 2m C1C MIO 10100 R404 276 _ 1C B1V130 13V0 0 R401 0 RJIM 
64 0 02010 0C 0200 135 C EVB0 BVB 01C 1006 0 R401 
ý 
2nm C BVBO BVBO 10100 RiM 277 C 1005 0 R401 T3 
65 Fro EVA 00C 0201 136 0 ESSB2 EN 0 R40173 207 207 C 10n50 1010T3 278 0 R406 C 1005 0 R401 
66 100C 0201 Fiß EVA 1 137 10 R406 0 ESSR2 EN 0 R401 208 0 R406 C 1005 0 lolt) 279 C 1001 C 1005 0 R401 
67 0 02wo 0C 0201 138 c 10 FMB2 EN 0 R401 1 3)9 1C 1001 C l(h15 0 1010 280 C 1005 C1C 10010 R401 
68 00c 02wo 0 z70201 139 C1C 10010 ESSB2 EN 0 R401 210 C 1005 ý1C 10010 10 10 281 C BVBO BVB C 1005 0 R401 
69 FTO BVAT2 140 C EVRO BVB 0 FSSB2 EN 0 R401 2ýI i£ FlýLI20 BBC 01010 ýLB in r 282 C1C 1005 0 R401 73 
70 PLG BVAn ! 41 10 10100 R403TI 2 c 7c 0 )l in 51 TI 283 0 R406 C1C 1005 0 R401 
71 0 0200 T2 142 10 10100 R4030 R4014 213 10 R406 C1 C1005 0 10 10 284 C UM C1C IM5 0F 401 
Table 6-8: List of the minimal cut sets generating the top event 
For common cause failure analysis we will use the method proposed in chapter 5 as an 
extension of the FLASH method. First of all we calculate the total likelihood of each 
event during the mission, i. e. P(FTQ BVA)=I. Oe-3 and P(Cý BVAO-BVA)=1.0e-5. 
Then, we calculate the likelihood of each lifecycle category to cause the event by 
applying expression 5-2 (the whole list of probabilities is reported in Table 6-11). For 
example, the likelihood of event FTO BVA to be caused by an error in the lifecycle 
category Manufacturer (i. e. MMI) of valve BVA is: 
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P(FrO_BVA,,,,,,, ) = P(FrO-BVA)* 3/100 = 3*e-5 
Then, we calculate the likelihood of each coupling cause by applying expression 5.23 to 
obtain the list of coupled probabilities shown in Table 6-12 (estimated by using P= 1). 
I Basic Events I 
Failure Rate ), [I/hl 
Repair Rate [tfl/hl 
cl Mean Time to Failure MTTF [h] 
Failure Probability on demand 
Mission time [h] 
Design 
Architecture 
Concept and 
Design 
Technological 
Materials 
Equipment Type 
Specifications 
Manufacturer 
Manufacturing Procedures 
Process 
Installation/ Fitter 
Integration Procedures 
0 And Test Location 
Routing 
Operation Staff 
2 
0 Procedures >. Maintenance Staff 
Procedures 
Test Staff 
Procedures 
Calibration Staff 
Procedures 
Mechanical and 
Thermal 
Environmental Electrical and 
Corrosion 
Chemical and 
miscellaneous 
FTO BVA Ti 
le-6 le-7 
le-3 
loo loo 
Table 6-9: Coupling table for MCS 1 (FTO BVA; TI) 
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I Basic Evýý 
Failure Rate ). [11h] 
Repair Rate p[1/hj 
Mean Time to Failure MTTF [h) 
Failure Probability on demand 
Mission time [h] 
FTO-B VA 
_le-6 
le-3 
loo 
C-B VA O-B 
VA 
1 e-7 
Design Architecture 
Concept and 
Design 
Technological Materials 
Equipment Type 
Specifications 
Manufacturer 
Manufacturing Procedures 
Process 
Installation/ Fater 
Integration Procedures 
0 Im 
And Test Location 
0 Routing 
Operation Staff 
Procedures 
2 Maintenance Staff 
Procedures 
Test Staff 
Procedures 
Calibration staff 
Procedures 
Mechanical and Thermal 
Environmental Electrical and Corrosion 
Chemical and miscellaneous 
Table 6-10: Coupling table for MCS 81 (C BVAO BVA FTO BVA) 
Basic Events 
FTO BVA IIC BVAO BVA 
Coupling 
Code 
Ukelihood that the 
Lifecycle category 
causes the basic 
event 
Coupling 
Code 
Likelihood that the 
Lifecycle category 
causes the basic 
event 
Design Architecture DCA1 2e-5 DCA1 8e-7 
Conceptand 
Design 
Technological Materials 
Equipment Type 
DTM1 3e-5 DTMI 7e-7 
Specifications DS1 I e-5 DS1 6e-7 
Manu MIMI 3e-5 MM2 5e-7 
Manufacturing Procedures MPD 1 5; '-5 MPD 2 4e-7 
Process MPP 1 1 e-5 IVIPP 2 8e-7 
Installation/ Fitter 1IF1 3e-5 IIF1 5e-7 
Integration Procedures UPI 6e-5 IIP2 4e-7 
0 And Test Location 111-1 2e-5 HL2 6e-7 Im 
-S Routing 
1IR1 5e-5 IIR2 7e-7 
C. ) Operation Staff osi 4e-5 osi 8e-7 
S! Procedures ON 6e-5 ON 6'-7 
Maintenance Staff MS1 7e-5 MS1 2e-7 
Procedures MPI 8e-5 MPI 3e-7 
Test Staff TS1 6e-5 TS2 1 e-7 
Procedures TP1 8e-5 TP2 3e-7 
Calibration Staff CS1 7e-5 CS2 5e-7 
Procedures CP1 6e-5 CP2 I e-7 
Mechanical and Thermal EMT1 5e-5 EMT2 3e-7 
Environmental Electrical and Corrosion EEC1 4e-5 EEC2 6e-7 
Chemical and 
miscellaneous 
ECM1 8e-5 ECM2 7tj 2e-7 
Table 6-11: Probabilities that a coupling cause will iise an event in MUS 251 
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Terms that have to be substituted Dependent likelihood expression 
Ilkeli- 
hood 
fP(FrQ_BVADCAI) 
-Min[(P(FFOý_BVADCAI); P(Cý_BVAO_BVADCAI)II P(FTOý_BVADcAi)P(Cý_BVAO-BVADCAI) *(P(q_BVAO BVADCAI) 
' m2e-7 BVADCAI); P(Cý_BVAO_BVADcA, )]I -Min[(P(FTO 
+ Minf(P(FT, 5 BVADCAj); P(C BVAO BVADCAI)l 
(P(FFO_BVADT,,,, ) 
-MinjP(FrQ_BVADT'lJj); P(Cý BVAO BVAD-n 
P(FTOý-BV&Tý\11)P(Cý-BVAO-BVADT\11) *(P(Cý_BVAO BVAt)T\il) 
' w3e-7 
-Min[(P(FTO 
ýVADT!, 
ii); P(Cý_BVAO BVAI)Tktl)]) - +Minf(P(FF6 BVADTxfl); P(C BVA15 BVAQTMI)l 
fP(FrQ_BVADsj) 
-Min[P(FFOý-13VADSi); P(Cý_BVAO_BVAI)sl)]I 
P(FrQ_BVADsl)P(Cý_BVAO-BVADSI) *f P(Cý_BVAO 
- 
BVADsi) -le-7 
-Min[(P(FrOý_BVADsi); P(Cý_BVAO-BVADsi)]} 
+Minr(P(ITP BVADSI); P(C_BVAO BVADSI)l 
{P(FTO-BVA41FI) 
-Min[P(FIFOý_BVAjIFI); P(Cý_BVAO_BVAIFI)I) 
P(FrOý_BVA41FI)P(C_BVAO_BVAIIFI) *fP((ý_BVAO-BVAjIFI) z3e-7 
-Min[(P(FrQ-BVAnFi); P(Cý-BVAQ BVAiIFI)I) 
+MinRP(FFO BVAilfi); P(C BVACBVA41FI)j 
f P(FFO_BVAosi) 
-Min[P(FTOý_BVAosi); P(Cý_BVAO-BVAosi)]I 
P(FTQ_BVAosj)P(Cý_BVAO-BVAoSj) *(P(Cý_BVAO-BVAosj) ý4c-7 
-Min[(P(FFQ_BVAosi); P(CýBVAQ BVAosl)]) 
+Minf(P(FrO BVAOSI); P(C BVA15_BVAosl)l 
{P(FrQ_BVAopl) 
-Min[P(FTOý_BVAopl); P((ý_BVAO_BVAopl)lI 
P(FrQ_BVAoPi)P(Cý_BVAO-BVAopj) *(P(Cý_BVAO-BVAopj) e6e-7 
-Min[(P(FTQ_BVAopj); P(Cý_BVAO BVAcpj)jj 
- 
+Min[(P(FFO BVAopi); P(C BVA6 BVAopl)l 
fP(FrQ_BVA%, sj) 
-1ýlin[P(FrOý_BVA. ý. isi); P(Cý-BVAO_BVA,, tsl)]I 
P(FrOý_BVA%Isl)P(Cý_BVAO-BVA. \isi) * (P(CýBVAO-BVA%js 1) -7e-7 
-Minf(P(FTCý_BVA. \tsi); P((: ý_BVAO BVA\Isl)]) 
- +Minf(P(FFO BVAmsi); P(C BVA6 BVAxjs I)l 
fP(FTO 
- 
BVA\ipj) 
-Min[P(FrO-BVA, \tpi); P(Cý_BVAO_BVA,, ipi)]I 
P(FrOý_BVA, \ipi)P(Cý_BVAO-BVA\,,, ) *{P(CýBVAO-BVA, \jpj) -8e-7 
-Min[P(FFP BVA\ -. 
jpj); P((ý_BVAO_BVA\jpj)]} 
+Minf(P(FTO BVA. \Ipl); P(C BVAO BVA. \Ipl)l 
Sum ofall dze depcndent probabilitics ---4e-6- 
Table 6-12: Products that have to be substituted in equation 5-1 
Substituting these values into expression 5-7, we obtain the likelihood of the minimal cut 
set, which is 4e-6 during the mission time. This value is almost two orders bigger than 
the likelihood calculated without considering couplings, that is I. e-8. 
Under same conditions, if we had applied the Beta factor parametric method to MCS 
81 we would have obtained a likelihood of the same order (only four time bigger than it 
was obtained with the FLASH method). This can be seen from the following expression. 
P(FTO-BVA)*P(Cý_BVAO_BVA)+Beta*Min[P(FrO_BVA); P(C_BVAO-BVA)]= 
Em 1.0e-3 * 1.0e-5 + 0.1 * Minll. Oe-3,1.0e-5] 
rE 1.0e-6 
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Hence, the FLASH method contributes studying and evaluating inter-component 
dependencies since: 
1) Only real couplings among events in a MCS are considered. 
2) Quantitative estimation of the likelihood of MCS with coupled events is based only 
on real couplings hence the figure for the likelihood of MCS is more accurate and 
realistic. 
3) For a given MCS and under same conditions, the FLASH method obtains a similar 
value for the likelihood of the MCS as the P factor parametric model. 
6.2 Computer-Assisted Braking system 
6.2.1 Description 
The Computer-Assisted Braking (CAB) system that we address in this section is a model 
of a concept being considered for employment in modern cars to enhance braking 
performance and vehicle safety. It is meant to provide three functions in addition to 
traditional brakes. The Anti-lock braking, widely known as ABS, that detects the onset 
of wheel lock up (which would result in skidding) and momentarily release the brakes to 
allow the wheel to turn and regain grip. The Entergency stop detection and enhancement 
that detects the rapid pedal movement associated with an emergency stop, and 
automatically maximises the braking used. The Load-compensated braking that 
measures the weight on the vehicle's suspension to ensure that a given pressure on the 
brake pedal provides the same degree of braking, regardless of how heavily the vehicle is 
loaded, or how the load is distributed. 
The braking system has to meet legal requirements therefore it must retain a direct 
hydraulic link from the brake pedal to the brakes so that, in the event of complete failure 
of the computerised parts of the system, the driver will still have minimal braking 
functionality. Additionally, to allow the system to control braking individually to each 
wheel, there must be four separate hydraulic lines, the pressure in each of which can be 
altered (reduced as well as increased) by computer controlled actuators. This means that, 
if the system fails, the actuators must be guaranteed to return to a "neutral" position, 
where they are neither increasing nor decreasing the driver's braking effort. Therefore, it 
was decided to fit each hydraulic line to each wheel with a feedback pressure sensor to 
allow closed-loop control. The brake pedal is to be fitted with two sensors, each 
returning a value indicating how bard the pedal has been pressed. Axles of the vehicle 
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are to be fitted with two pressure transducers to measure the load on the vehicle. Finally, 
each wheel is to be fitted with a rotation sensor to be used for lock-up detection for anti- 
lock braking functions. The braking system context diagram is shown in Figure 6-8. 
Wheel rotatfion Brake discs 
sensor 
H draulic lines 
Me load I 
sensors, ý Actuators and 
f, feedback sensors 
I/ Control lines 
CAB 
Brake pedal and 
duplicated sensors 
Figure 6-8: CAB system context diagram 
Since the braking system has to be implemented in a vehicle it has to meet some basic 
performance requirements that are derived from the vehicle dynamics. It has to achieve 
the maximum available braking pressure in less than 400 nis, additionally, it has to 
decrease the pressure delivered such that brakes are fully released from maximum 
pressure in less than 200 nis. Finally, the maximum permissible latency from pedal 
movement to brake effect is 20 nis. 
Hence, it was decided to fit two output controllers to drive the hydraulic actuators, 
each controlling the actuators for a diagonal pair of wheels. These controllers are 
already designed (commercial of the shelf). Each takes required output commands over a 
duplicated Controller Area Network (CAN) bUS29 link, and converts these to the required 
29 Controller Area Network (CAN) is a high-speed local area network protocol designed to have predictable 
properties, and to be suitable for control applications. In CAN, data is transmitted as a message consisting 
of between 1 and 8 bytes. Messages are sent via stations, which police access to the bus. Typically, each 
station can buffer a maximum of 14 incoming or outgoing messages. Each message source is assigned a 
unique identifier, represented as an 11-bit number. This identifier is used to filter messages and assign 
priorities to the messages. Messages have a period, or minimum inter-arrival time, which they inherit from 
the sending task. If either the sender or receiver of a message detects an error, the sender station is signaled 
and re-transmits the message. 
See ISO Draft International Standard Road Vehicles - Interchange of Digital Information - Controller 
AreaNetivork (CAN)forHigh Speed Communication, ISO DIS 11898,1992 
or K. Tindell, A. Burns and A. Wellings "Calculating Controller Area Network (CAN) Message 
Response Times" in Proceedings of fhe 1994 IFAC Workshop on Distributed Computer ControL 
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electrical output to the actuators. Each controller works on a cyclic basis, and will only 
alter its outputs once per period of the cycle. If more than one output command message 
were received in a period, only the first will be used; subsequent messages will be 
ignored. If no command message is received during any period, outputs will be "frozen" 
at the last value received until a new command is received. 
Because of the highly critical nature of the application, the manufacturer has 
imposed further design constraints. The computer hardivare implementing the design 
must have redundancy. Additionally, the system must exhibit gracefill degradation in 
case of failures. In particular, there must be a "fallback" algorithm which is capable of 
running independently on any of the redundant hardware units, and which is capable of 
providing minimum braking functionality (i. e. pressure simply proportional to pedal 
travel) on its own. Finally there must be redundancy in any communication system used 
between the hardware units. 
6.2.2 Analysis in the Decomposition and Design 
The safety analysis of the CAB started carrying out a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) 
on the computerised braking system. The analysis concluded that any deviation from the 
specified behaviour is potentially hazardous. Seven specific failure modes were 
identified, and assigned criticalities as surnmarised in Table 6-13. Most of these failure 
modes are already present in a hydraulic braking system. They are caused by loss of 
hydraulic fluid or ingress of air, water or other contaminants into brake lines. Failure 
modes that the PHA identified as unique to a computer -assisted system are the 
unexpected application of brake (c) and uneven braking (f). 
ID Effect description Risk class 
A Complete lack of braking Catastrophic 
B Lock up (1-4 wheels, 1-2 axles) Catastrophic 
C Unexpected application / release of brakes Catastropbic 
D Braking response not proportional to demand Major 
E Tardy response 
(time from demand to brake effect, slow rate 
of change in response to demand) 
Major 
F Uneven 
braking (pressures vary "wildly" in response to 
constant demand) 
Major 
G Unequa braking (1-3 wheels brake less or more than required) Major 
Table 6-13: CAB failure modes identified by PHA 
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Table 6-14 represents the FLASH table that corresponds to the same analysis level as the 
PHA. For economy of space we have put the complete table, as it looks after the 
completion of the FLASH analysis. However during the PHA only the first, third and 
fourth columns are completed. It can be noticed that these columns contain the same 
information as Table 6-13. 
Instance = Brakes ComponentType Brakes Periodicity - Sporadic Tag = Brakes 
56 Cofumn: Justification, Design Comments Eventpropagated Causes Description Criticality Recommendations, 
(FMEA) Derived Safety Requirements 
V-Sens-in. Sens Before design 
a-. Braking-func OR (V-FN-RO. cab Complete lack of Catastrophic Recommendations 
. brakes AND braking Sensors should be fail-safe and without V-. FQ-R. N. cab) SPF. 
V_Sensjn. Sens OR Hardware redundancies must be impkmerucd. According to the 
bi_. Brakingjunc (V-FN-RO. cab ock-up (14 wheels, Catastrophic 
Effect max accepted likelihood 
'7 
implementation and 
. brakes AND 1-2 axles) 
10 during the mission time integration 
V-. FO-F, NI. cab) Afterdesign proposed/ hypothesise 
Detection d, there are no SPI's 
Not possible and the expected rate 
Recovery for the event is 0.6E-7 
The driver will try to correct w ith the stecring [1/111 
wheel Vý. Sensjn. Sens rate is 
%ý_. Sensjn. Sens OR Unexpected Recommendation < 0AE-7 
[1/hI 
c_. Braking-func (V-FN-RO. cab 
pplication/release Catastrophic 
Software must be developed to comply with V__FN_RO. cab rate is < 
. brakes A ND f brakes salcty integrity kvcl four O. lE-3 
11/hI 
V_170ý_RN. cab) Max accepted likelihood for critical events Vý_. FOLRN. cab rate is < 
in the Causes column. 0.11E-3 11/hI 
The rate of%ý_. Sensjn_5cns must be< 
. 
5E-7 [1/hI, each Ný_. FNý_RO. cab and 
V_. FCLRN. cab rate must be <0.4E-3 
DAL 
d Braking ý_func 
Vý_. Sensjn. Sens OR 3raking response no 
Sensors are fail-safe 
and without SPF 
. brakes 
(V_FNý_RO. cab OR iroportional to Major 
ý 
. 
. 
Braking func. brake d KJOLRN. cab) lemand Before design - - s rate is < 0.3E-3 11/hI 
rardy response (timc Reco mendations 
eý . Bzakingjunc 
V-Sens. in-Sens OR 'rorn demand to Sensors should be fail-safe and without 
Sensors are fail-safe 
and without SPF _ 
. brakes 
F. ILRO. cab OR 
V_. F0LRNT. cab 
)rake effect slow 
ateofchangein 
Major SIT. 
Effect max accepted rate 
. 
eý_. Brakingjunc. brakes 
-esponse to demand) <0AE-3 11/hl rate 
is < 0.3E-3 [1/hI 
V 
. 
Sens in. Sens OR 
Jneven braking Afterdesign Sensors are fail-safe 
C. BrakingJanc _ _ FIN=-RO. cab OR pressures vary " Major 
Detection and without SPF. 
. brakes K . FQ RN. cab 
wildly in response Possible L. Braking-func. brakes 
_ _ o constant demand) Recovery rateis< 3E-3(1/hl 
The driver will try to correct with the steering Sensors are fail-safe 
A heel and without SPF. 
Recommendation g-. Braking-func. brake 
%ý_Sensjrt. Sens OR Software must be dcvclopcd to comply with s rate is <0.6*la4 11/hI 
K_. FN_RO. cab OR Unequal braking. (1- safety 
integrity kvcl four Eý_. F?, IRO. cab 
g Braking func 
Ný_FCLRN. cabOR 3 wheels brake less 
Max accepted failure rate for critical rate<0.7*104 [11h] 
-- 
. brakes 
E_. FN_RO. cab OR 
E_FO RN. cabOR or more 
than 
Major events in the Causes column. 
Each rate of.. E_. FN_RO. cab, 
E-. FCLKN. cab 
_ I.. F, N RO. cab OR required) E_F0_RN. cab, L.. FN_RO. cab, and rate<0.7*10-4 
[1/hI 
_ 1_. FCk_P-N. cab I_. FCLR, 14. cab must be < 0.1*10,1 [1/hI. 
l_. FN_RO. cab 
rate<0.9*10-4 [1/h] 
l_. FCLRN. cab 
I rate<0.9*10-1 [I/hl 
Table 6-14: Top level FLASH table 
After the preliminary hazard analysis a system design is proposed. It consists of three 
independent hardware "channels". Each comprises a processor, with necessary memory, 
hardware timer and counter registers for scheduling and accurate interval timing of 
sensor input, signal processing electronics to handle the inputs from the sensors and dual 
CAN bus stations. Sensor inputs are duplicated, and hard-wired to each board. The three 
boards communicate only via the duplicated CAN buses, which are also used to send 
output to the output controllers. Figure 6-9 shows the high level structure of the 
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proposed braking system hardware and flows delivered by some modules. With this 
information it is possible to complete the 2 nd and 5 th columns in Table 6-14 and begin 
development and analysis of lower levels components. Table 6-15 is a fragment of the 
FLASH table for the CAB device. It represents rows regarding the delivery of 
commands to brakes actuators of the front near side and rear offiside wheels (FAý RO). 
The table shows how Omission (0), Commission (C), Early (E), Late (L) and Value (V) 
failures in the output module (Output. Modl) directly result in similar failures to be 
propagated by the CAB. Whilst, value failure propagated form the CAB to the front near 
side and rear offside wheels of the car (i. e. V YN RO. CAB) can be caused by a fault in 
both busses (V Busses. 2B) or in the three processors (V Pair_13P). More specifically, 
the failure logic underneath propagation of V Busses. 2B and V Pair_1.3P is further 
considered in Table 6-16 representing the so called group of events (4.2.3). 
----- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- To front 
Duplicated nearside and 
From CAN rear offside 
sensors 
/n 
Sens in. Sens 
actuators buses output Oup Processor 
le, , 
FDLRO. cab "4RaiýF-1-MI module Mod 12 
1 
Processor 2 rPaIr 1. Chý 
FQ RN. cab I + Output /2 
module To front 
-1-F 
Processor 3 ý' Pair 1 Ch5 2 . offside and 
rear nearside B lB 2 us us actuators 
Figure 6-9: Structure of the proposed braking system hardware 
The development of sub-modules proceeds. The control system of the CAB is developed 
to be cyclic, with some processes running at regular intervals to provide the necessary 
response characteristics. The scheduling of processes is periodic for processes that run 
at regular intervals (offsets is used to control the order and time interval between process 
running at the same periodic rate), while it is sporadic for tasks that run in response to 
some events e. g. the arrival of a signal from another process. 
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Instance 
CAB Component Type = CAB Periodicity = Perodic Tag = CAB 
Event 5th Column: Justification, Comments 
propagated 
Causes Description Design Recommendations, 
(FMEA) Derived Safety Requirements 
According to the implementation 
Q- CL. Output. Nlodl 
Omission 
braking for This event is stopped by the 
and integration 
proposed/hypothesised the FNý_110. cab 2/4 wheels output module expected rate for the event is 
0.3*104 [1/hl 
C Q_Output. Modl 
Comn-dssion 
braking for This event is stopped by the The expected rate for the events is FN_RO. cab 2/4 wheels 
output module 0.3*104[1/hl 
The event must exhibit a 
E_ E Output. h1odl Early braking rate < 0.3*1&3[1/hl. The The expected rate for the events is FN_RO. cab for 2/4 wheels 1ý-. Output. Nlodl rate must 0.9*104[1/hj 
be<0.1-10,3[1/hl 
The event must exhibit a 
I-. L Output. Modl Late 
braking rate < 0.3*10.3[1/h]. The The expected rate for the events is 
FNý_110. cab for 2/4 wheels L.. Output. Modl rate must 0.9*10411/hl 
be<0. j*la3[I/hj. 
The event must exhibit a 
rate < 0.4*la3[1/hj. The expected rate for the event is 
V Vý_. Output. Nlodl Wrong K-Dutput. Modl and <0.1*10,3[1/hI. K-Output. 
FN RO. cab 
OR V Tair 1.3P braking value V Pair UP must Modl and V. Pair UP rate is 
_ OR K_. Busses. 2B for 2/4 wheels be<0.2*1&3[1/h]; <0.5*104[1/h]; 
K-. Busses. 2B must be V-. Busses. 2B is <0.9*10-8[1/hI. 
<o. l-l(y7 11/h] I I 
Table 6-15: Flash table for the CAB system 
GROUPS OF EVENTS 
justification, Design 
GOE Causes DescriplLon Recommendations, Action Comments (FMEA) 
requftred 
Wrong pressure value 
The expected 
Vý_. Pair_l. chl delivered to brakes 
The event must exhibit a rate for the 
AND (All three channels rate<0.5*104 
[1/h] events 
Vý. Pair 
- 
UP V_. Pair 
- 
1. ch2 fail giving the same 
V-. Pair-l. chl, V-Pairý-Lcb. 2 (considering 
AND 
value to the output and 
V-. Pair-l. ch3 rate must 
* 
Common cause 
K-Pair-1.63 
module) 
104 [1/h] be<0.1 failures) is 
0.3*10-7[1/hl 
(Fail-silent. Bu 
s. Busl AND 
V-. Bus. Bus2) The expected 
OR rate for the 
(V-. Bus. Busi All data exchange are The event must exhibit a rate < events V-. Busses. 2B AND 
messed up 0.1*10-7 
(considering 
Fail-silent. Bus common cause 
. Bus2) OR failures) is (V-. Bus. Busi 0.9*10-8[1/h] 
AND 
K-Bus. Bus2) 
Table 6-16: Group of even table for FILASH Table 6-15 
To meet requirement for a maximum 20 nis latency from pedal movement to brake effect, 
a 10 nis period has been selected for the main periodic tasks. This ensures that a 
complete iteration of the main control loop will always complete within the time limit. 
The proposed top-level functional decomposition of the CAB system is shown in Figure 
6-10. The notation used to show the inter-process communications is based on DORIS / 
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DWO, a development of MASCOT. The communications protocols used are summarised 
in Table 6-17. 
Sensorjeedback 
From 
Modifierývalues 
sensors: 
Se Sjn' 
AJI sens; AJI votes 
F Pair I 
Modifier In Bus Modifier 
- > 
ij Selection VOTES Watcher Addition 
out Pair 
s (AN signal 
Periodic Sporadic Sporadic Periodic Periodic To output 
Basic modules Pedal val Basic Tess -P 
Sporadic 
PROCESSOR1 
Modifier-yalues 
All sons All votes Pair I 
In Modifier Bus -> 
Selection Watcher 
out 
r- Pair 2 
Periodic Sporadic Sporadic Final 
_press 
Periodic 
j 
To output 
Basic modules Pedal-val Basic_press 
----------------- 
Sporadic 
----------- ----------------------- -- -- ---------------------------------- 
PROCESSOR 2 
------------------------- 
----------------- ----------- ----------------------- --- 
Sensor feedback 
--- ----------- --------------------- ------------------------- 
Modifier values 
AA se s AJI-vot Pair I 
In 
Modifier Bus Modifier i jI 
Selection Watcher Addition 
-I- 
Out 
i 
Pair 2 j4 
Periodic Sporadic Sporadic Periodic Rnal_p. s. Periodic To output 
modules 
Pedal-val Basicjxess 
PROCESSOR 3 
Figure 6-10: Functional block diagram of the CAB system 
Interaction Symbol Inputs Outputs Writer can be Reader can be 
Name held up held up 
Signal L> One One N Y 
P l oo > One One or more N N 
Multicast 
Signal Ej - 
One Many, distributed N Y 
- 
'fable 6-17: Communications protocols 
30 H. Simpson Methodological and Notational Conventions in DORIS Real Tillie 
Networks British Aerospace Dynamics Division, 1994 
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In each period of the cycle, each channel (processor) calculates a basic braking value 
from the pedal sensor value. The values of all the other sensors are then used to 
determine whether the three modifiers (i. e. Anti-lock, Emergency stop enhancement and 
Load compensation) are required in the current cycle, and calculate the necessary 
changes in braking for each wheel to implement these modifiers. The three channels 
then vote on which modifiers to add. For a modifier to be added, at least two of the 
channels must have determined that it is required. The actual amount by which braking at 
each wheel is to be increased or decreased to implement the modifiers is not 
communicated, as it is so dependent on the precise value of the sensors read by each 
channel. This means that, if one channel has not calculated a value for a modifier that 
has been voted necessary (i. e. the other two channels require it), then this channel must 
revert to the basic value initially calculated. 
The system is scheduled so that the OUT processes on the three processors should 
always complete in the order Processor I- Processor 2- Processor 3. In the case where 
a channel has had to revert to a basic value, this will be output later than the normal 
completion time of all three OUT processes, to ensure that the basic value is not used if 
an enhanced value is available from another channel. This ensures that Processor I 
normally controls the braking, avoiding the possible fluctuations caused by switching 
between channels, as would be the case if output order were not pre-determined. Data 
types of all the flows in the design shown in Figure 6-10 are shown in Table 6-17. The 
functionality of each process is reported in Table 6-19. 
The use of a pre-emptive, priority-based scheduler is proposed for the system. This 
means that, if a low-priority process is executing, and a higher priority task becomes 
runable, the low-priority task will be suspended until the high priority task has 
completed. Figure 6-11 shows roughly what the timing of processes in one cycle of the 
CAB system is expected to be. 
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Flow name Source Destination Protocol Data Type 
14 Individual sensor values: 
2 pedal 
Sens-in Sensors IN Pool 4 wheel rotation 
4 axle load 
pressure feedback 
Sensor 
- IN OUT Pool 
Record containing 
Feedback 4 nressure feedback values 
Record containing 
All sens IN 
MODIFIER_ Pool pedal value 
SELECTION 4 wheel rotation sensor values 
4 axle load values 
Pedal val IN BASIC Signal Pedal value 
Basic. ý press BASIC 
MODIFIER_ Signal Record containing 
. SELECTION 4 basic braking values (I per wheel) 
Record containing 
Modifier MODIFIER MODIFIER 4 basic braking values (I per wheel) 
Values SELECTIOR ADDITIONý 
Pool 4 ABS modifier (1 per wheel) 
4 Load compensation modifiers (1 per wheel) 
4 Emergency stop modifiers (1 per wheel) 
BUS 
Votes MODIFIER_ %VAfCHER Signal Record containing 3 flags, indicating whether SELEC71ON (On all 3 each of the 3 modifiers is required 
processors) 
All votes 
BUS_ MODIFIER 
- Pool 
Record containing 3 sets of 3 votes (i. e. one from 
WATCHER ADDITION each processor) 
Record containing 
FinalL pre-ss 
MODIFIER 
- OUT Pool 
4 Braking values (1 per wheel) 
. ADDITION Fla. g indicating whether modifiers have been 
added successfully 
Pair 1 OUT Hardware Signal Braking actuator drive values for front nearside 
and rear offside wheels 
Pair 2 OUT Hardware Signal Braking actuator drive values for front offside 
_ I I and rear nearside wheels 
Table 6-18: Data types of all flows 
IN (Periodic process run at the start of each cycle) 
Read all sensors 
Use data from both pedal sensors to form single pedal value 
Output pedal value to BASIC 
Output pedal, wheel revolution and load values to pool for use by MODIFIER SELECTION 
Output actuator feedback to pool for use by OUT 
BASIC (Sporadic process triggered by arrival of pedal sensor data) 
Calculate a basic braking pressure for each wheel based on the pedal sensor only 
MODIFIER SELECTION (Sporadic process triggered by arrival of basic) 
Use all sensor information to determine which modifiers are required in this cycle 
Calculate modifier values and place record containing basic and modifier values in pool for use by MODIFIER 
ADDITION 
Broadcast votes to all BUS WATCHER processes to identify which modifiers are required 
BUS WATCHER (Sporadic process triggered by arrival of votes) 
Build up record of votes (i. e. which processors have determined a need for each of the modifiers) 
MODIFIER ADDITION (Periodic process, with offset from start of cycle) 
From record of all votes assembled by BUS WATCHER, determine which modifier(s) to add to the basic braking value 
If no value is available for a required modifier, revert to basic 
OUT (Periodic process, with offset from start of cycle) 
If modifiers successfully added output calculated pressure immediately (adjusted according to sensor Feedback) 
otherwise wait until end of period, and output basic value (adjusted according to sensor feedback) 
Table 6-19: The functionality of each process 
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1 OUT 
2 MODIFIER ADDITION 
31N 
4 BUS WATCHER 
5 BASIC 
6 MODIFIER SELECTION 
Table 6-20: Order of priority tasks (I is high) 
Duration of one cvcle 
0 UT offset from start of cvcle 
MODIFIER ADDITION offset 
IA 
PI IN I BASIC[ j"E-Lýýj-16'NVJM Iý, 'I", " DD T0 
tfItt 
ABC0EFG 
Figure 6-11: Timing of 1 cycle of the CAIB system on processor 
Table 6-21 represents the fragment of the FLASH analysis that regards the propagation 
of Pair_1 from Channel-1. We can see that some failure events (i. e. 0, C, E) are 
stopped by the output module, while value failure (i. e. V .) is propagated to brake shoes. 
A value failure of Pair_1 out of Channe1_1 can be due to a single failure that arise inside 
Channel-1, (i. e. V Pair-I. Outl, V Sensorjeedback. Inl, V. Modifie'ý-vahles. MSI, 
V Final_pressMA1, V All-votes. BIVI or V Processor. Pl), a failure of both busses 
(i. e. V Busses. 2B) or some internal failure of Channel-1 (i. e. Y-. Pedal-VaUn, 
V Basic-Press. BSI, Y-. A11_sens. In, V-Yotes. MS1) combined to a failure in an output 
of another channel (i. e. V. Votes. Ch2 or V Votes. C13). 
The study of the CAB has continued further. However we are not reporting 
tables that have been made for all the other modules in Figure 6-10 since we believe we 
already have illustrated enough the FLASH process in practice. 
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Instance = 
Channel-1 Component Type = Channel Periodicity = Signal Tag = Chl 
Event 511, Column: Justification, 
propagated 
Causes Description Design Recommendations, 
Derived Safety Requirements 
This event is not 
propagated. In case of 
0- 0-Pair-LOutl AND O-Busses. 2B OR Ornission for value on-dssion the output 
Pair-l. chl 0-. Processor. Pl to output mod 1 module will use the 
previous value 
delivered by the system. 
This event is not 
Cornmission for propagated. In case of C CL. Pairý-1. Outl OR C Busses. 2B OR 
value to output conunission 
the output 
Pairý_Lchl C Processor. Pl 
mod 1 modulewill use 
the 
previous value 
delivered by the system. 
This event is not 
propagated. In case of 
E- 1ý-. Pairý-`I. Outl OR E-Busses. 213 OR Early for value to omission the output 
Pair-l. chl Eý_. Processor. Pl output mod 1 module will use the 
previous value 
delivered by the system. 
This event is not 
propagated. In case of 
I.. Pair-LOutl OR L.. Busses. 213 OR Late for value to ornission the output 
Pairý_1. chl L-. Processor. Pl output mod 1 module Nvill use the 
previous value 
delivered by the system. 
K_. Pair_l. Outl OR 
Vý. Sensorjeedback. lnl OR 
Vý. Modifier_values. MS1 OR 
V- (Vý. Pedal-Val. ln OR %ý-. Basicý__Press. BS1 Wrong value to The event must exhibit a 
Pair-l. chl 
OR V-. AlLsens. In OR V-. Votes. MS1) 
output mod 1 rate < 0.4*10-3 h-1 AND (V-Votes. Ch2 OR VL. Votes. Ch3) 
OR V-. Final_press. MAl OR 
VL. AlLvotes. BW1 OR V-Busses. 213 OR 
K-Processor. P1 
Table 6-21: FLASH table for Channel I 
6.2.3 Integration, verification and Common Cause Failures analysis 
FLASH analysis in the integration and verification stage confirmed that the design meets 
specifications, recommendations and derived safety requirements issued during the 
decomposition and design. FLASH tables presented in the previous section (i. e. Table 
6-14, Table 6-15 and Table 6-16) already showed the column Stininiary FME4 results 
with results from the verification stage. Common cause failure analysis has not been 
performed on the CAB system. It would have followed the same path as the analysis of 
the Fuel System. Once minimal cut sets for critical failure modes are obtained, they are 
searched for couplings. If couplings are not found, their likelihood is calculated as 
product of likelihood of each event in the minimal cut set; if couplings are found, the 
extension of the FLASH method presented in chapter 5 has to be applied as we did in the 
first case study presented in this chapter. 
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6.3 Discussion 
The overview of these case studies has highlighted bow the FLASH analysis can be 
integrated with the decomposition and design, and the integration and verification, stages 
of the lifecycle. The FLASH process was able to provide the results expected from FHA, 
HAZOP, FMEA, and FTA. Chapter 2 discussed the main problems arising in the 
assessment of complex systems, when classical safety analysis techniques are applied. 
These are the inconsistencies between the various analyses and the difficulty in linking 
the results back to the functional hazard assessment. It is believed that FLASH has 
overcome these issues. Additionally, the way FLASH decomposes a system and collects 
information about events is a valuable help for considering common cause failures. It 
has been shown how data gathered into FLASH tables during the lifecycle can be u sed to 
identify minimal cut sets vulnerable to common cause failures. Coupled events and 
coupled components are identified and when reliability data are known, quantitative 
figures can also be derived. Hence, on the basis of the FLASH analysis, analysts and 
designers can decide whether to accept a proposed system design or ask for 
improvements. 
FLASH can be compared with classical analysis methods on the basis of the support 
it gives to development, formality, speed of analysis, keeping the analysis updated with 
design and providing immediate feedback. In addition, the traceability of functional 
failures to basic events becomes useful when it has to be shown that the system meets 
specifications and safety requirements. 
The FLASH approach is quite formal and it becomes heavier as the complexity of 
the system increases. It becomes laborious and tedious when tables are compiled by 
hand. However a software tool can speed up the FLASH process and make it a 
competitor (we at least hope) of classical methods in terms of results obtained and 
overall economy of the safety analysis. A suitable software tool will reduce to instants 
the most tedious phases of the FLASH process that is consistency checking of tables and 
IT construction and evaluation. We have experienced that the "FLASH schenia" we 
implemented into the SAM platform [McDermid, 1994], extensively helps in navigating 
the FLASH hierarchy by following links among tables. This tool bad belped 
considerably in the writing and updating of tables for our case studies. 
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Though FLASH is based on classical, widely diffused safety analysis techniques it 
is a completely new approach and its results and benefits have to be compared with ones 
achieved with the best industrial practice. The application of FLASH to a variety of 
industrial cases will prove the practicability of this technique in an industrial 
environment. It is believed that some changes might have to be made to the FLASH 
approach to adapt this technique to some complex systems (e. g. adding new columns to 
accommodate additional information). However, it is also believed that the basic 
FLASH process will not need to change significantly. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions 
This thesis has made a step towards integration of safety analysis techniques ordinarily 
performed in sequence during the lifecycle of computer based safety critical systems. 
Integration was made possible by the identification of several links amongst such 
analysis techniques. We exploited those links to provide a unifying analysis technique, 
supporting common cause failure assessment and continuous feedback to designers so 
that we can substantiate also what is often called "design for safety". The result is to 
improve the quality of the safety analysis of moderately complex computer based safety 
critical systems. 
7.1 Review of Research Objectives 
The research addressed some limitations and shortcomings of classical safety analysis 
techniques that were pointed out in Chapter 2. These were presented in terms of the 
following questions: 
a) Is it possible to develop a technique that encompasses the different safety analyses 
typically performed across the lifecycle? 
b) Can the application of this technique result in a meaningful and easy way to perform 
a collection of safety analyses which can assist the design of the system? 
C) Can we ensure the consistency of the results within the assessment? 
d) Can those results be represented both graphically and in tables, so that we can 
combine the benefits of both representations? 
e) Finally, is it possible to use this technique to systematise the identification of 
common cause failures? 
To answer these questions we investigated different approaches, which resulted in a 
method called FLASH. This was described in Chapter 4 and was extended to enable 
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common cause failure analysis in Chapter 5. The method was applied in two case studies 
presented in Chapter 6. 
7.2 Contribution of the thesis 
We believe that the material presented in this thesis substantiates to a large extent the 
central proposition that was expressed in Cbapter 1: 
"It is possible to produce an integrated safety analysis framework 
which can be used to produce a complete and consistent safety 
analysis, including treatment of common cause failure and which call 
be used to drive "a design -for-safety " process. " 
The proposed safety analysis framework is founded on current industrial practice for 
safety analysis and on our understanding of the similarities shared among analysis 
techniques. The framework supports common cause failure analysis by providing an in- 
depth and detailed screening of the real couplings amongst components and quantitative 
estimation of the common cause failure contribution. Finally, design for safety is 
achieved by the continuous feedback between designers and analysts that is furthered by 
the proposed analysis process. 
7.2.1 Theoretical Contribution 
Need for Formality and Traceability throughout the design process 
We started our research studying current industrial practice and saw that a number of 
different techniques are used for safety analysis as the design evolves. However these 
techniques are not formally linked to each other and, as a consequence, the consistency 
of the analysis cannot be assured throughout the design and development process (2.2). 
In a complex design it is, therefore, often difficult to trace (using the results of the safety 
assessment) causes of critical malfunctions of the system in the hierarchy of subsystems 
and components which comprises the design (2.4). 
Need for Careful Screening of Couplings among events in minimal cut sets 
We showed that there are two possible ways to prevent common cause failures, either by 
eliminating (effects of) root causes or by removing coupling factors. In the first case 
178 
defences against potential root causes are considered and put in place (2.3.4). In the 
second case, a high degree of diversity among components is required (2.3.5). However, 
whilst there are methods that assess defences against the causes of common cause 
failures (e. g. the cause defence matrix in 2.3.8), there are no methods that provide a 
careful screening of couplings among events in the same minimal cut set. 
Need for Quantification of the Common Cause Failures Likelihood 
We saw that, whilst there are a number of methods for making a quantitative evaluation 
of common cause failures in pure hardware systems, these methods cannot be used for 
evaluating the likelihood of common cause failures in computer based safety critical 
systems. The reason is that all of these methods are based on the Symmetry hypothesis 
which, unfortunately, cannot be accepted for minimal cut sets in computer based safety 
critical systems, since probabilities of events in the same minimal cut set may span 
various orders (2.3.9). 
Extending Recently Proposed Techniques 
To address the limitations and shortcomings that were pointed out, we investigated 
various approaches. First we tried to extend software fault tree notation [Leveson, 1983] 
(3.1). We merged this technique with the Cause Consequence Analysis notation 
formulating what we called "Event Tree Output notation" (3.2). Then, we attempted to 
extend the Master Plant Logic Diagram [Modarres, 1992] producing the MPLD* 
notation (3.3). Finally, at the last stage of our early work, we introduced two other 
notations: a graphical one to represent the mapping of software to hardware and a table 
based one to store the detailed information that was not practical to store in the MPLD*. 
However, we were not yet able to achieve the targets that we bad set out for our thesis. 
None of the above notations was integrated with classical techniques (i. e. FHA, HAZOP, 
FMEA and FTA) nor could they be used to link those techniques (3.4). 
Links amongst Classical Safety Analysis Techniques 
The identification of links amongst classical safety analysis techniques and the decision 
to develop an approach which encourages the top-down study of computer based safety 
critical systems were the major turning points that led to the proposed method. Firstly, 
we realised that the causes of failure events considered at a certain level of the analysis 
can become the failure events considered in subsequent levels (4.1). Secondly, a 
common syntax that formalised such causal relationships was introduced (4.2.3) and a 
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table suitable for supporting FHA, HAZOP, FMEA and containing information to 
construct fault trees was outlined (4.2.6). Finally, the process of the FLASH analysis 
was established both as it should be approached in the decomposition and design (4.3.1) 
and in the integration and verification (4.3.2) stages of the lifecycle. 
Systematic Screening of Couplings 
The FLASH framework is also designed to enable the identification of couplings among 
components, and to support common cause failure analysis, i. e. by means of screening of 
minimal cut sets to find ones with coupled events and by quantitative evaluation of such 
cut sets. In this process, events in each minimal cut set are scanned to see whether or not 
they share one or more potential couplings (5.2). If any sharing is found, minimal cut 
sets are considered coupled, and they are designated to undertake common cause failure 
analysis. By exactly identifying actual couplings, FLASH makes it easy to propose 
effective remedies. 
Likelihood of Minimal Cut Sets with Coupled Events 
We also provided a mathematical approach for calculating the likelihood of minimal cut 
sets that considers the contribution of each actual coupling cause (5.3) as identified by 
the FLASH method. We have transferred the problem of common cause failure analysis 
from the minimal cut set level to a lower, more detailed, level systernatising the 
identification of couplings and obtaining more realistic figures. As a consequence, the 
basis for the identification of couplings is transferred from "expert's judgement" to the 
list of lifecycle categories used for identifying couplings among events and its weighting 
factors. 
7.2.2 Practical Contribution 
Integration of Safety Analyses Techniques 
As we discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the integration of safety analysis techniques 
performed throughout the lifecycIe offers possibilities for checking the consistency of 
results of safety analysis, guaranteeing continuous feedback to designers, providing a 
compact and accessible format to present safety analysis results (e. g. to certification 
authorities), and finally the advantage of applying one technique instead of several. The 
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greater cost due to the utilisation of a more complex and articulated technique 31, Should 
be paid back by the fact that less techniques have to be taught to the personnel and that 
the results from one level analysis are immediately available to start the following level 
of analysis. Additionally, all safety analyses are immediately accessible to anyone with 
the knowledge of that single technique without any conversion cost. Furthermore, costs 
for the infrastructure (e. g. software packages) necessary to support the overall safety 
analysis process may also be reduced, although there are issues of developing tool 
support (see below). 
Results both Graphical and Tabular 
The provision of safety analysis results, both in tabular and graphical format, combines 
the advantages of the ability to provide detailed tabular information that is easy to 
access 32 and an intuitive 33 graphical representation. In FLASH the graphical 
representation of results is taken from the tabular one. Fault trees can actually be built 
starting from tables at any level of the hierarchy by parsing relationships between causes 
and effects. 
Industrial Practice 
It is expected that FLASH will improve the industrial practice of safety analysis of 
computer based safety critical systems (at least of moderate complexity 34). Whilst we 
have not shown that FLASH does work effectively in industry, there is evidence that it 
will be useful. In particular we have found that FLASH may offer a way to comply with 
guidelines that are to be released for the certification of Programmable Logic Controller 
(PLC) for safety critical applications by the Italian regulatory authorities (4.5). 
Automation 
FLASH can be supported by a software tool that eases repetitive and error prone tasks, 
helps to navigate through the hierarchy of tables, generate trees, calculate the likelihood 
31 FLASH is more complex than any single technique it intends to replace. 
32Though tabular representation is perhaps little intuitive and difficult to understand at a 
glance, it can be detailed down to any granularity. 
33 Graphical representation can be intuitive and easy to understand at a glance, however 
when graphs extend to multiple pages, they are no longer intuitive. 
34 At present, FLASH is quite complex to apply, hence expensive. Therefore we reckon it 
is justifiable at least for highly critical systems. 
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of events propagated and make consistency chkks on the whole hierarchy. Suitable 
software may automate also the scanning of minimal cut sets to find those sharing one or 
more causes of coupling (5.2). We believe also that the quantitative evaluation of the 
total failure probability for each coupled minimal cut set can be automated to a certain 
extent. A preliminary software prototype with basic features has been developed and 
presented in (4.4). 
Providing Support to Design for Safety 
The case studies discussed in the sixth chapter showed how FLASH analysis is 
integrated with the decomposition and design, and the integration and verification stages 
of the lifecycle. The application of this technique was able to provide the results that we 
would expect from FHA, HAZOP, FMEA, and FTA. Additionally, we have shown how 
the data gathered into the FLASH tables during the lifecycle can be used to identify 
minimal cut sets that are vulnerable to common cause failures and to estimate the 
likelihood of those cut sets. Hence, on the basis of the FLASH analysis, analysts and 
designers are provided with a comprehensive and detailed view on system safety 
implementation, hence they may use this information to decide whether to accept a 
proposed system design or ask for improvements. 
7.3 Suggestions for Further Work 
We believe that this thesis is only a starting point towards integration of safety analysis 
techniques. As such we can see several areas in which further work can be done. At 
present there are some limitations that we believe are easy to remove, and some others 
that probably require more thought. Further work on this method can be divided into two 
main domains: the consolidation of the present technique and a theoretical extension. 
7.3.1 Consolidation of the Technique 
This work has to be done to have the technique accepted and employed as best practice 
by the industry. 
Automation 
Often in this thesis we have stressed the problem of automation. Though FLASH can be 
performed by hand, the process becomes heavier for the analyst as the complexity of the 
system increases. The analyst is actually asked to perform a lot of repetitive and error 
prone tasks. Our software prototype has considerably helped us to run our case studies, 
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but its limited potential has prevented us considering big industrial applications. 
Therefore, there is the need of a more powerful tool, which automates the process 
further. 
Industrial Case Studies 
Once a suitable software tool is available, it will be possible to run industrial case 
studies. These should demonstrate whether or not a FLASH approach is feasible in 
complex systems. At present, there is no conclusive evidence that the method supports 
the design and verification of a very large system such as an aircraft, a helicopter, a 
chemical or nuclear installation. The design of those systems (though they appear to be 
hierarchically decomposable) is not usually approached hierarchically. As it was p ointed 
out in Chapter 4, FLASH could still support the development at sub-system level. 
However, it still remains to be demonstrated that if a FLASH analysis is available for 
each sub-system then it may be possible to link all these FLASH analyses to each other 
in order to produce a FLASH model for the full system. 
Validation 
Though FLASH is based on classical, widely diffused, safety analysis techniques it is a 
completely new approach and its results and benefits have to be compared with those 
achieved with the best industrial practice. Availability of industrial case studies 
performed using FLASH will allow benchmarking the method against current safety 
analysis techniques, and enable to access the extent of its limitations and benefits. 
FLASH can be compared with classical analysis methods on the basis of the support 
it gives to development, formality, speed of analysis, keeping the analysis updated with 
design and providing immediate feedback. The traceability of functional failures to basic 
events, which FLASH provides, becomes useful when evidence is required that the 
system meets specifications and safety requirements. It is believed that, to adapt the 
technique to some complex systems, some changes might have to be made (e. g. adding 
new columns to accommodate additional information). However, it is also believed that 
the basic FLASH process will not change significantly. 
Certification 
Provided that the proposed framework will "survive" the test on industrial case studies, it 
might also be certified by regulatory authorities as a standard practice to conduct and 
present safety analyses. Hence industries may be asked to present safety analyses in a 
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"FLASH format". At present, we believe FLASH has a good chance to reach this point, 
since it can trace any event to its causes and it seems it fits the forthcoming Italian 
guidelines on PLCs for safety critical applications. Additionally FLASH tables have the 
potential to accommodate features that may be requested by certification authorities. For 
instance, FLASH tables may be modified to record motivations for any decision 
concerning safety made during the design. Names of people responsible for such 
decisions could also be recorded, hence, eventually, it could be possible to trace whoever 
is liable for any (good or wrong) design decision. 
7.3.2 Theoretical Extension 
This is the work that can be done to extend or improve the technique itselL 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Another extension of FLASH could be in improving the technique itself. For example, 
during the verification stage, a sensitivity analysis made on fault trees [Homma and 
Saltelli, 1996] drawn for critical events could show the impact of potential improvements 
even before proposing modifications to the design [Contini et al., 1999b] and performing 
again the FLASH analysis. This will indeed speed up the overall analysis process. 
Merging with other Approaches and Techniques 
The FLASH method can potentially be usefully extended to formalise the writing and 
updating of causes-effect relationships into FLASH tables. For instance it could be 
evaluated whether it is feasible to include a formal algorithm, which automates the 
writing of those relationships. Example of suitable algorithms are proposed in 
[Papadopoulos and McDermid, 1999a-b], in [Atkinson & Carpignano, 1996] and in 
[Sardella, 1995]. These enhancements may boost additional automation and formality. 
7.4 Final Remarks 
Closing the thesis we wish to say that our approach is a contribution towards improving 
consistency, completeness and correctness in safety analysis. We have focused our 
efforts towards the integration of well -established safety analysis techniques and found 
an interesting way to link several safety analysis techniques 35 ordinarily performed in 
35AIthough integration of classical techniques is the route we selected, we are aware that 
perhaps other routes could be taken to achieve our goals. 
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series during the lifecycle. We were also able to consider common cause failures both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. The proposed method incorporates a number of 
principles that, in theory, could enable their application in a complex system. The two 
case studies we ran demonstrated the validity of the approach when applied to 
moderately complex systems. However a conclusive evaluation of the real value and 
scalability of this approach could only be achieved in a much wider and realistic context 
of application. 
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